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Abstract 
This thesis has two primary aims. The first is to more fully understand 
the power that the Treasury and New Zealand Business Roundtable 
(NZBRT) had in the formation of the privatisation programme. The 
second aim is to test the bureaucratic, rational-actor and economic elite 
models to see how effectively each can identify and explain the nature and 
degree of power that these groups possessed. To do this, the bureaucratic 
and bounded rationality models are first applied to the Treasury's 
relationship with the Minister of Finance. The economic elite model is 
then applied to the NZBRT's relationship with the Minister. 
This thesis concludes with four significant findings. First, in light of the 
evidence presented, the power that the Treasury and NZBRT had in the 
formation of the privatisation programme is argued to have been less 
dominant than conventional wisdom has suggested. Second, the models 
are only of limited use in analysing the power held by both organisations. 
Third, significant analytical difficulties exist when attempting to view the 
concept of power in non-conflicting situations. Finally, power is found to 
be both an elusive and multi-dimensional concept; it can operate in a non-
conflictual, covert and impersonal context. The political resources used by 
groups can be used not only to dominate and control, but also to facilitate 
and reinforce the status quo. 
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Introduction 
,.- \ 
1 The Purpose of This Study 
(The f~t1r1th Labour Government, during the six years in office, is argued to 
have adopted a distinctly "elitist" style in the process of political decision-
making. Rather than allowing a high degree of popular participation and 
corporatist consultation with interest groups, it was supposedly influenced 
by a small group of public policy advisers and businesspeople) These 
individuals are identified as belonging primarily to two organisations -the 
Treasury and the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT). Thus, both 
these organisations are argued to have possessed a significant degree of 
political power in the formation of public policy, dictating both the direction 
and pace of change in the New Zealand economy. The result of this, so the 
argument goes, is that the values of the few have been systematically 
\ ' '• :· I ',· ' I) imposed on the many. ! ---.__ (ij. 1 . , , , , 
With this in mind, and under the umbrella of this elitist assumption, the 
nature of this enquiry is twofold.~irst, it seeks to more fully understand 
the power that the Treasury and NZBRT had in the formation of public 
policy.Jhe central questions to answer here are: were these groups as 
"powerful" as some political commentators have implied? In what ways 
can this power be systematically observed and analysed? In the process of 
answering these questions, this enquiry also seeks to "test" a number of 
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theoretical frameworks. In doing so, the aim here is to see how effectively 
each model can identify and explain the nature and degree of power that 
these groups possessed. 
To facilitate both these aims, the privatisation programme is used as a case 
study. More specifically, this thesis looks at t~e Treasury and NZBRT's 
impact on the programme's decision-making proces~ prior to 17 December 
1987 - the day the Government announced that it would implement the 
programme as an "on-going" policy initiative. In other words, this study 
seeks to understand ~he power that these two organisations had in the 
formation of the privatisation programm9 For the purposes of this enquiry, 
the choice of case study is both stimulating and appropriate~ecause the 
privatisation programme is considered to be one of the Government's 
most significant - and controversial - policy initiatives. Moreover, it is a 
policy in which, on one hand, a large number of individuals and groups 
are argued to have been excluded from the decision-making process, while 
on the other, the Treasury and NZBRT are purported to have been 
"profoundly influential." 2 J 
Summary of Chapters 
This thesis is conducted in five chapters. Chapter one theoretically 
examines the distribution of power among groups in society. It starts by 
briefly examining the concept of power, turning then to consider the 
pluralist and elitist models; two divergently opposed theories explaining 
how power is distributed among groups in society. Finally, the three 
theoretical frameworks that will be tested with reference to the Treasury 
and NZBRT are discussed; namely, the bureaucratic, bounded rationality 
and economic elite models. 
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The purpose of chapter two is to "set the scene" prior to the 
operationalisation of these models. First, it describes the privatisation 
programme's background, explaining the events leading up to, and the 
rationale behind th~(Government's decision to privatise th~: State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs).Jsecond, and by way of three observations, the 
/ 
discussion examines the elitist assumption upon which this study is based. 
In doing so, it shows how the masses were totally excluded from the 
decision-making process{With the elitist assumption established, the 
study then proceeds to focus on the few groups that are argued to have 
been involved- the Treasury and NZBRT.) 
Chapter three attempts to analyse the ~ower that the Treasury had in the 
formation of the privatisation programme.JTo do this, the bureaucratic 
and bounded rationality models are operationalised with a focus on the 
Treasury's relationship with the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. The 
criteria contained in both models is found to be highly applicable in this 
study, providing an outcome suggesting that the Treasury had "captured" 
Douglas's thinking. However, this conclusion is argued to overstate the 
power that the Department actually had. Accordingly, a number of other 
factors are briefly considered in order to present a more "balanced" 
analysis. In the light of these additional findings, the chapter concludes by 
suggesting that it was the Minister and not the Treasury who was in 
control of the decision-making process. 
Chapter four operationalises the economic elite model in the attempt to 
analyse the nature and degree of the NZBRT's power. However, due to the 
lack of observable contact between the NZBRT and Douglas, it is difficult 
to effectively apply the model's criteria as it views only direct, overt 
influence. It is therefore argued to provide a largely inconclusive outcome; 
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while the NZBRT may have significantly influenced Douglas's thinking, 
the exact means and extent to which this was done can only be speculated 
upon. To provide more of an insight to a seemingly distant and 
impersonal relationship, the views of Charles Lindblom are briefly 
applied. In doing so, the discussion identifies a number of ways in which 
the NZBRT could have influenced Douglas's thinking without directly 
impacting upon the decision-making process. 
Chapter five examines this study's findings and makes a number of 
concluding remarks. First, it discusses the elitist assumption underpinning 
this study. The utility of the bureaucratic, bounded rationality and 
economic elite models is then considered. Each is argued to have been 
largely ineffective in fulfilling their primary aim. The discussion then 
turns to the difficulties involved in systematically analysing the concept of 
political power - particularly in situations where there is little observable 
conflict. It also suggests that power is multi-dimensional in nature. 
Accordingly, it should not then be viewed merely in a conflictual, overt 
and interpersonal context. As this study reveals, an actor's political 
resources can not only be used to dominate and control the decision-
making process, but also to facilitate and reinforce the status quo. 
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Endnotes: 
1 A large number of books and articles have been published discussing the influence of 
the Treasury and business community. For a good general discussion of their influence, 
see, in particular, Jonathan Boston., "The Treasury and the Organisation of Economic 
Advice: Some International Comparisons", in Brian Easton., (Ed.) The Making of 
Rogernomics, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989). Also, Brian S. Roper., 
"Limits to the State: Economic Crisis, the Politics of Business and Supply-side 
Economic Policy in New Zealand", Paper delivered at the APSA Annual Conference, 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, September 1989. See also, Bruce Jesson., 
Behind the Mirror Glass: The Growth of Wealth and Power in New Zealand in the 
1980s, (Auckland: Penguin, 1987), especially, pp. 7-12, 121-134, 154-171. 
2 Colin Clark, Wellington, 23 August, 1990. 
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Chapter One 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power: 
A Theoretical Approach 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conceptual themes that 
underpin this study. To do this, the discussion falls into three parts. The 
first will briefly examine the concept of power, identifying a variety of 
definitions that have been created in an attempt to more fully understand 
how it operates in the political system. Part two will consider the 
distribution of power among groups in society. In doing so, the discussion 
examines the pluralist and elitist models, two diverging interpretations 
explaining how power is distributed among these groups. As this study 
adopts the elitist perspective for its own analysis, part three outlines the 
l economic elite, bureaucratic and bounded rationality models;) three 
theoretical frameworks which highlight the power used by a select few 
groups in the decision-making process. ) 
The Elusive and Multi-Dimensional Nature of Power 
In beginning any theoretical discussion on group interaction in the 
political process, the concept of power must- albeit briefly- be considered. It 
is not the intention here to enter into a full discussion on what power is; 
such a pursuit would entail a herculean effort and is thus clearly beyond 
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the intended scope of this study. Rather, the purpose is merely to identify a 
number of different conceptions of power that have been created in the 
attempt to more fully understand its nature. 
What exactly is power? Such a question is not easily answered. Indeed, this 
is reflected in the fact that considerable debate has raged among social 
scientists about how the concept should be defined and what the most 
appropriate methods for the study of it are. A succinct discussion of this 
debate is found in a study entitled Power: A Radical View by Stephen Lukes. 
In it, he suggests that power may be best understood as having three 
dimensions. Each will be briefly outlined here. 
(rhe one- dimensional view of power is essentially based upon the traditional 
pluralistic approach, developed most particularly by Robert Dahl and 
Nelson Polsby.l(In an influential definition, Dahl states that "A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do."2 The key to operationalising this definition, argue the 
pluralists, lies in focusing on the observable behaviour of groups actively 
participating in the decision-making process. Thus, Dahl states that power 
can only be analysed "after careful examination of...concrete decisions."3 
The one - dimensional view also asserts that there must be observable 
~onflict between two actors before a power relationship can be analysed. If 
there. is no conflict between. gr~ups, so the argument}go~~( ~·~~J\,/fe_ 
expenmental test of power attnbutlons cannot take place.4, · ·' · \) 
The two_- dimensional view of power, most recently articulated by Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, posits that the power of an actor largely 
depends on his or her ability to - consciously or unconsciously - create or 
reinforce barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts.s\Therefore, power 
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. 1-' 
is exercised over not only participants within the decision-making process 
but also towards the exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether. 
Political organisations are therefore assumed to develop a "mobilisation of 
bias", favouring the exploitation of certain kinds of conflict whilst 
suppressing others.6 f-ccordingly, a satisfactory analysis of two-
dimensional power involves the examination of both decision and non-
decision making. As Michael Parenti observes: "One of the most 
important aspects of power ... [is] not to prevail in a struggle but to pre-
determine the agenda of struggle - to determine whether certain questions 
ever reach the competition stage."7 
Bachrach and Baratz's analysis has one significant feature in common 
with the pluralists: namely, the stress on observable conflict. Just as the 
(!1uralists maintain that power in decision-making only shows up where 
there is conflict] Bachrach and Baratz assume the same to be true in cases 
of non decision-making; if there is no conflict, it can only be presumed 
that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values - in which 
case non-decision making is impossible.B Moreover, they argue that if 
universal acquiescence appears to exist in the status quo, then it is 
impossible to empirically determine whether the consensus is genuine or 
instead enforced through non-decision making.9 
The three - dimensional view of power is considered to be the most radical of 
the three approaches. Here, Lukes states that "A [exercises] power over B by 
getting [B] to do what [B] does not want to do, but [A] also exercises power over 
[B] by influencing, shaping or determining [B 's] very wants.''lD Thus the bias of 
the system can be mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways that are 
neither consciously chosen nor which are the intended result of particular 
individuals' choices. Such a view is developed by Parenti who argues that 
Page 3 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
power can be seen as a systemic force surrounding- if not permeating- any 
specific pursuit of goals. Decisions, he states, "take place in a social and 
systemic context that prefigures what will and will not be considered a 
policy choice."ll In other words, the social system's structures, 
institutions, long standing beliefs and the imperatives of the economy all 
can help to shape policy outcomes in ways that are not,easily understood 
even by many decision-makers.12 
The three - dimensional view also argues that power may operate in the 
absence of observable conflict. Lukes provides two reasons explaining why 
conflict is not a necessary precondition. First, two types of power, 
manipulation and authority, may not necessarily involve conflict, because, 
as even Bachrach and Baratz acknowledge, both these power types can be 
conceived of as "agreement based upon reason."13 Second, if an actor has 
the ability to shape and influence another's wants, then it follows that 
conflict can be prevented from arising in the first place. As Lukes 
concludes: 
[It is the most] supreme and ... insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things ... To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine 
consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus 
by definitional fiat.14 
In summary, a number of comments can be drawn together from these 
three views of power. First, and as the above discussion suggests, while 
power can be seen in every human and social relationship, it is 
nevertheless, an amorphic and elusive concept . Accordingly, the systematic 
study of power can be a frustrating task. As Kaufman and Jones observed: 
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There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost ghostly 
quality ... We "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying 
to define it .. .It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad.15 
Second, power can be seen to involve a relationship between an actor (such 
as a person, group or collective) and the environment. Third, being 
"powerful" refers to the ability of these actors to achieve their goals . In other 
words, and as Parenti states, it "is the ability to get what one wants."16 
Finally, and as the discussion here has alluded, the concept of power is 
multi-dimensional. In accordance with whichever perspective is adopted, 
power can be seen to operate in a variety of different relationships -
ranging from those that are overtly conflictual to ones in which no 
apparent conflict can be observed. This study seeks to more fully 
understand- with reference to the privatisation programme- where power 
is concentrated in society and how it is exercised by those who possess it; in 
other words, which individuals and/ or groups hold it, and by doing so, 
have the ability to influence the formation of public policy. 
Democratic Theory and the Distribution of Power 
Ideally, the notion of democracy implies that individuals are able to 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives.17 From this one could 
propose that democracy refers to mass participation in the allocations of 
values in a society. The underlying value of democracy stated by scholars 
such as Dewey and Mill is individual dignity.18 Human beings, by virtue of 
their existence are, democratic theorists assert, entitled to life, liberty and 
property. John Locke, for example, argued that the very purpose of 
government was to protect individual liberty. Individuals form a "social 
contract" with each other, establishing a government that would protect 
their inalienable rights; they tacitly agree to accept governmental activity in 
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order to better protect life, liberty and property.19 Central as well to classical 
democratic theory is the belief in the equality of all people. With time, the 
extension to this ideal was a notion of equality that included equality of 
opportunity in all aspects of life.20 
Traditional democratic theory provokes some interesting questions for 
contemporary social science scholars. Are the masses permanently barred 
from exercising power when power is concentrated in the hands of the 
few? Or is there a diffusion of power with many elite groups exercising it? 
Can individuals move freely from being one of the masses to one of the 
decision-makers, or is this access closed to all but a select few? In 
attempting to explain the nature of power and its concentration within any 
given community, social scientists have created two divergent and 
opposing theoretical explanations: pluralism and elitism. 
It must be clarified from the onset that central to both the pluralist and 
elitist models is the assumption that groups - known in this study as 
"elites"- represent differing interests in society. Each model recognises that 
mass individual participation in decision-making is not possible in a 
complex, urban, industrial society. Decision-making must therefore be 
effected through the interaction of elites, rather than mass individual 
participation. However, while sharing this base assumption, each model 
differs dramatically in its perception as to the amount of power that is 
concentrated within each elite group and the meaningful participation that 
the masses h<ive with these groups. 
" ', .. ;, I 
nf; r·~ !'; I~JI, ('it. ~. !,j ,. \j \ 
The Pluralist Model 
\Pluralism states that power is widely distributed throughout society. No 
one group is dominant over the other)nstead, what occurs in the political 
I 
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system is an intricate balance of power amongst overlapping economic, 
professional, religious, ethnic and other such groups. Each group is said to 
exercise a certain influence over the decision-making process, but none is 
seen as possessing a monopoly or decisive share of power, since the 
different groups all check and counter-balance each other. Thus, no distinct 
power elite is discernible - no one is independent from the other.21 
Moreover, key political decisions are argued to be made openly in 
government institutions by duly elected officials. These officials represent, 
and are accountable to, the general public.22 
The model identifies a number of reasons for the close relationship 
between elected officials and the masses. For instance, it states that within 
each political community there are a multitude of publicly elected officials. 
Numerous leadership groups are therefore present with each specialising 
in a particular policy area. Accordingly, the pluralists maintain that the 
public is not without government institutions to hear complaints and 
redress grievances. Moreover, there is elite diversity. No one race, creed, 
sex or economic class is argued to dominate all leadership posts. Finally, 
political leaders firmly believe in political values. A common commitment 
to procedure and the respect for individual rights and liberties is shared by 
the leadership. Thus, the theory asserts, any conflict is dealt with in an 
open and democratic way.23 
The model also asserts that the masses play a crucial role in the decision-
making process. It is, for instance, not difficult for the average person to 
join the decision-maker's ranks. If one wishes to seek office, then -
according to the pluralists - a wide variety of opportunities are available. 
Moreover, citizens can affect the political process through membership in 
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interest groups. Through the active participation of these groups in the 
political process, members are able to have their viewpoints presented.24 
As a consequence of this close interaction between leaders and followers, 
the leaders are argued to make decisions based upon the input from 
various groups and individuals.25 Furthermore, these decisions will reflect 
a diverse and large range of interests that exist within the community. 
Finally, a two way relationship exists between the leaders and followers 
with regard to policy formation. A change in policy is often initiated by the 
masses or conversely, in anticipation of demands from the masses.26 
Two pluralist scholars help illustrate the above assumptions. Dahl offers a 
good illustration of pluralist theory in his significant and widely acclaimed 
analysis of political decision-making in New Haven, Connecticut. In it, 
Dahl focused on those actors who were potentially influential in deciding 
the outcome of New Raven's political decisions; two hundred and thirty 
eight of the city's most prosperous citizens, known alternatively as the 
"economic notables", came under particular scrutiny. Based on his findings 
in New Haven, Dahl concluded that the role played by this group in 
making key decisions was not overtly impressive in any of the key issue 
areas. Thus: 
[There leaves] little room for doubt that the Economic Notables, far from being 
a ruling group, are simply one of many groups out of which individuals 
sporadically emerge to influence the policies an acts of city officials. Almost 
anything one might say about the influence of Economic Notables could be said 
with equal justice about half a dozen other groups in the New Haven 
community.27 
Dahl's study of New Haven also highlights the pluralist assumption that 
the key political decisions are made predominantly by elected officials. Only 
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the Mayor was argued to be in a position to exercise significant direct 
influence on more than a few areas of public policy. Moreover, direct 
influence was specialised; a leader in one issue area was not likely to be 
influential in another. If he was, surmises Dahl, he would probably be an 
elected public official.28 
David Reisman offers a second perspective as to why groups in society tend 
to be in equilibrium - in the sense that none continually dominates 
governmental decision-making. His explanation for this centres on the 
observation that all groups are subject to veto by other groups: 
[There has been a change] in which a single hierarchy with a ruling class ... has 
been replaced by a number of "veto groups" among which power is dispersed .. .ln 
the amorphous power structures created by veto groups it is hard to distinguish 
rulers from the ruled.29 
The sovereignty of one group can therefore not exist as others will have 
the veto power to stop things inimical to their perceived interests. 
flPluralism then is the belief that democratic values can be preserved in a 
system of multiple, competing elites. No one group achieves ascendancy 
over the others because of the competition that exists between elite groups. 
Moreover, the masses have an influence in the decisions that the elites 
make, be it directly through interest group representation or indirectly 
through the electoral process.·~ 
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The Elitist Model 
The central proposition put forward by the elitists is that all societies are 
divided into two classes - the few who govern and the many who are 
governed. This fundamental concept is succinctly expressed by Mosca: 
In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class 
that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all the 
political functions, monopolises power, and enjoys the advantages that power 
brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled 
by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legat..30 
As already identified, the pluralists would not fundamentally disagree 
with this elitist view. As a leading pluralist scholar, Dahl states that the 
"key political, economic, and social decisions ... are made by tiny 
minorities .. .It is difficult- nay impossible- to see how it could be otherwise 
in large political systems."31 The elitist perspective, however, is the 
antithesis to the pluralists' assertion that elites act in concert and on behalf 
of the masses. 
First, elite theory asserts that the few-who govern are not typical of those 
they govern over. This is because elites control societies' resources such 
wealth, education, status, skill and so forth. Moreover, the members of the 
ruling elite are said to be drawn disproportionately from the the wealthy, 
educated, white and socially prominent groups in society. In short, they are 
drawn from society's "upper class", who control a disproportionate share 
of societal institutions.32 
Second, elites are said to share a consensus about fundamental norms 
underlying the social system. The model asserts that the elites agree on the 
basic "rules of the game" as well as the continuation of the social system 
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itself. This consensus allows a continuation to the stability of society. 
According to David Truman: 
Being more influential, they [the elites] are privileged; and being more 
privileged, they have, with few exceptions, a special stake in the continuation 
of the system in which their privileges rest.33 
Third, elitism implies that public policy does not reflect the demands of the 
masses. Rather, policy outcomes reflect the interests and values of the 
ruling elite. Any policy changes that occur in a society, the model argues, 
will simply be a redefinition by elites of their own values. Not all the elites 
motives are self serving; the values of elites may be very "public regarding" 
and the welfare of the masses may be an important element in the 
decision-making process. However, elite theory does state that the 
responsibility for the mass welfare rests upon the shoulders of elites, and 
not upon the masses.34 
Finally, elitism assumes that the masses are, to a very large extent, passive, 
apathetic and ill-informed. Moreover, the masses have at best, only an 
indirect influence over the decision-making behaviour of elites. Mass 
sentiments are argued to be manipulated by elites far more regularly than 
elite values are influenced by the sentiments of the masses. 
Communication between the two groups is said to flow downwards. Policy 
questions are seldom decided by the masses through elections or through 
the presentations of policy alternatives by political parties. For the most 
part, these "democratic" institutions - elections and parties - are only 
important for their symbolic value. Such institutions help bind the masses 
to the political system by giving them a role to play on election day and a 
party with which to identify themselves.35 
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Two elitist perspectives are briefly outlined here to illustrate the model's 
fundamental assumptions. First, the aristocratic thesis posits that a large 
number of individuals are simply unqualified to make the decisions 
required for all society. Thus Lippmann has written that where a 
Government is dominated by mass opinion, "there is a morbid 
derangement of the true functions of power. The derangement brings 
about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern. "36 
(C. Wright Mills offers a different perspective, stating that power is not held 
by any individual per se, but rather in the position they hold within the 
institution he or she belongs to. Thus, people of crucial influence. can, 
according to Mills, be identified by a simple standard: the controlling 
position they acquire and retain in the heirarchies of society's great 
! 
: institutions.37 Such an approach has been labelled the positional method for 
studying community power. Mills identifies three levels of power that 
exist in society. The top, and most important level consists of the power 
elite who are composed of "the warlords, the corporation [and] the 
political directorate."38 The second level is where policy decisions for most 
everyday affairs are in fact made. This "middle and lower level" of power 
consists of bodies such as the State Legislature and Bureaucracy, however: 
... these levels [only] provide the noisy content of most "political" news and 
-- gossip; the images of these levels are more or less in accord with the folklore of 
how democracy works ... The middle level of politics is not a forum in which 
there are debated the big decisions of national and international life.39 
The third and lowest level of power consisting of "the masses" or "the 
public." Undoubtedly, asserts Mills, this group does actively engage in a 
variety of political activities. In substance however, it contributes in little, if 
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any, meaningful way to the decision-making process. In concluding, Mills 
offers these condemning thoughts: 
1Such are the images of democracy which are still used as working justifications /~f power ... We must now recognise this description as more a fairy tale than of 
i juseful approximation. The issues that now shape man's fate are neither raised 
\~nor decided by any public at large. The idea of a society that is at bottom 
1
\ ~COmposed of publics is not a matter of fact; it is the proclamation of an ideal, 
\md as well the assertion of a legitimation masquerading as fact.40 
The elitist perspective therefore offers quite a different explanation than 
that given by the pluralists, asserting that the decision-making process is 
influenced by only a few s~l~~~. 'roups in society. 
r. .\'. ( \ . . I·,) ·, Q_\ L ' 
It can be seen from the above discussion that the distribution of power 
'~ - - -- -
among groups in society can be interpreted in two distinctly different ways. 
(fhis study adopts the_':lit~~t assumption in its analysis. It argues the Labour 
tovernment did not .s~~!< the input of a large number of groups prior to 
implementing t~~va_t_~~ort ,Programme:) The corollary of this, 
therefore, is th(~nly a few>gr~y~ ,had any input in the decision-making 
. ' ./ 
process. Accordingly;and-under the umbrella of this broad assumption, the 
analysis in this study focuses on a small number of groups with the aim of 
ascertaining how much power each had during the formation phase of the 
privatisation programm~ The rest of this chapter discusses the three 
models that will be operationalised in order to facilitate such an analysis. 
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The Economic Elite Model 
The economic elite model shares all of the fundamental assumptions held 
by the elitist model. The model, however, develops it by asserting that 
some groups are more powerful than others; specifically, political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the top economic elite . Indeed, the political 
system is argued to be run by and for the people and institutions that 
dominate the economy. Other groups and individuals are secondary in 
relation to the economic elite in affecting and benefiting from public 
policy.41 
~he model states that members of the economic elite are people who 
command the operations of the major businesses in an economy. Since 
most economies possess few very large big businesses, the economic elite 
comprises of a small minority of the society.\ By this fact alone, the 
members of this elite will be atypical of the general populatio!)!:~25econd, 
\_,/ 
members of the elite see eye to eye on pecuniary matters. There is little 
internal dissension in the economic elite as the fundamental goal of the 
economic world is to maximise profits. If conflict between members does 
arise, they will usually be conducted out of the public eye and will be of a 
short duration.43 Finanr(~he economic elite is united through a wide 
variety of bonds. ~ompanies for example are drawn together through 
interlocking directorates and shared stock ownership.~oreover, there are 
strong social ties that bind the business community.44 Y 
J 
Influence by the economic elite, the model asserts, is brought to bear on the 
Government in a number of direct ways. In the initial selection of electoral 
candidates, for instance, care is taken to select candidates who are not at 
odds with the priorities of the economic leadership. Elites also influence 
appointments to governmental posts as appointees are often members of 
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the economic elite. It follows therefore that economic leaders become 
political leaders with official positions that frequently benefit their own as 
well as their fellow members interests.45 Extensive lobbying undertaken by 
big business is said to be another channel of influence. Through a variety of 
platforms such as; the media, speeches, submissions and personal 
associations, attempts are made by the elite to influence policy outcomes 
favourable to their goals. Finally, the structure of government institutions 
benefits corporate interests\Government decision-making is primarily a 
decentralised process with the major work on policy proposals occurring in 
.specialised administrative agencies and in the committee process) 
~Consequently, the model asserts, efforts by the economic elite to influence 
the decision-making process do not require that all personnel in the 
Government be contacted.4~ 
Such a close relationship is argued by the model to yield a number of 
results. Most significantly, government decisions are said to benefit and 
further the priorities of the economic sector. Other groups in society may 
benefit, but only if their interests coincide with the goals of the economic 
elite - or if the elite have no interest in that particular policy. Moreover, 
any change in public policy must have the support of the economic elite; 
the ordinary citizen or group must convince the economic elite that it is in 
the elites interest to change the status quo. 47 
Two discussions that help to illustrate the economic elite theory are briefly 
outlined here. Both concur fundamentally with the model's assertion that 
the economic elite hold the dominant position in the political system. 
Parenti, for instance, argues that this dominance is largely due to the lack of 
accountability that corporations have with the Government: 
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For all its activities on behalf of business, government has remained 
remarkably laissez-faire when holding industry accountable for the social costs 
of its enterprises. The concept of "limited government," so often violated in the 
area of civil and personal liberties, holds firmest when applied to business.48 
(The economic elite's primacy and its relative unaccountability to 
government, Parenti argues, relates to the need to riia_inl~in~-~thy 
economy. To win the confidence of the business community, help 
eJiji>a healthy investment climate and sound economy are all goals 
that political leaders see as commensurate with the national prosperity and 
the public interest.49 
Charles Lindblom develops this point further. In any private enterprise 
~-
system, he suggests, a large category of major decisions are turned over to 
businesspeople, both small and large. Accordingly, businesspeople: 
... thus become a kind of public official and exercise what, on a broad view of 
their role, are public functions. The significant logical consequence of this for 
polyarchy is that a broad area of public decision-making is removed from 
polyarchal control.SO 
Lindblom's explanation for this "unmatched" position of power mirrors 
Parenti's. Public functions in the market system rest in the hands of 
businesspeople; it follows therefore that jobs, prices, production, growth, 
the standard of living, and security all rest in their hands. Thus, 
Government officials cannot be indifferent to business performance 
because a failure in the market system such as depression, inflation or 
other economic distress can easily bring a Government down.Sl 
Businesspeople are therefore not seen by Government officials simply as 
the representatives of a special interest. Rather, they "appear as 
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functionaries performing functions that government officials regard as 
indispensable. "52 
With the business sector having such an imperative role in the market 
economy, the Government must, notes Lindblom, induce rather than 
command. Benefits must be given to businesspeople in order to stimulate 
the required performance. This, he argues, translates to the privileged, 
indeed- primary- position of business. 53 
Perhaps, questions Lindblom, other groups enjoy a similar privilege for 
similar reasons? In short, the answer he concludes with is a resounding 
"no." Workers, for instance, are in a different position because they do not 
take the same risks as the businesspeople. Moreover, labour organisations 
(such as unions) do not hold the same power because unions cannot stop 
production on such a large scale, or for such a period of time to hold any 
real "power" over the market system and therefore, the Government.54 
~om also argues that such a close relationship cannot exist without 
business executives being admitted into circles of explicit negotiation, 
bargaining, and reciprocal persuasion, from which ordinary citizens are 
excluded.)uch arrangements are discussed in the context of the issuing of 
"actual grants of government authority to businessmen. "(sic)SS In these 
situations, asserts Lindblom, the line between janting a rule of obedience 
and yielding to the advice is often a thin one.56 
Lindblom's discussion of the economic elite, whilst concurring with much 
of the economic elite model, does however differ in one significant way. 
He argues that the economic elite does not need to exert, as the economic 
elite model asserts, direct influence on the decision-making process in 
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order for it to receive policies that are favourable to its interests. 
Government, he notes, does exercise broad authority over business 
activities. However, this authority is limited by the fear that too harsh a 
control over the business sector will have adverse effects on the economy 
and, in turn, the Government. Consequently, what exists is an extreme 
degree of "mutual adjustment" between government and business. It is 
often distant and impersonal and operates through an unspoken deference 
of administrations, courts and legislatures.57 Moreover, this also means 
that corporate interests can become an important consideration in policy-
making without any direct intervention by business; decision-makers will 
not want to implement policies that will significantly damage business 
interests, as doing so could have detrimental effects on the economy and 
therefore Government credibility. 
Lamare illustrates Lindblom's assertion well when describing the 
relationship between U.S Steel and the city of Gary, Indiana. U.S Steel was 
Gary's largest employer and taxpayer. It also was the source of the heavily 
polluted air that had, over the years, become an increasing problem for the 
city.58 However, the Government in Gary was reluctant to impose any 
emission control laws for fear of overburdening its corporate benefactor. 
As Lamare notes, "[f]or years the city failed even to consider the enactment 
of pollution legislation, even though its air became increasingly foul."59 
Eventually, it did pass some emission control laws although it made sure 
that they did not harm U.S Steel's interests. Thus, "throughout this policy 
process; the company never directly became engaged in decision-making: 
U.S Steel therefore influenced the content of the pollution ordinance 
without taking any action on it."60 
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Placing this difference aside, however, Lindblom's thesis supports the 
economic elite model, showing that the great degree of business control is 
"unmatched by similar control exercised by any other group of citizens."61 
Businesspeople do not get everything they want, he argues, but they do get 
a great deal. When they do not get enough, recession or stagnation 
ensues.62 
( The Bureaucratic Model 
The bureaucratic model can be included under the umbrella of the elitist 
model because the bureaucracy is regarded as being one of the few groups 
exerting considerable influence in the decision-making process. Central to 
the understanding of the bureaucratic model is the concept of political 
power. The argument here is that political power is continually 
concentrated in the hands of less bureaucrats. This, it is argued, results in 
the breakdown of the representational process and consequently creates 
what Etzioni-Halevy terms a "dilemma for democracy." 63 More significant 
to this study, it is argued that such power enables the bureaucracy to 
manipulate and control the decision-making process. 
What is a bureaucracy? Varying definitions have been given. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the ideas of Max Weber will be used. 64 It will 
also be noted that "bureaucracy" here refers to the public service as opposed 
to a private bureaucratic organisation. 
Authority is the first definitional concept of a bureaucracy. Authority, 
noted Weber, exists whenever obedience is based on a belief in the 
command's legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy turns power and domination into 
authority.65 Weber distinguished three types of authority. It is the third -
the legal-rational authority- that forms the basis of bureaucracy. This is so, he 
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argued, as power is legitimated "by being in accordance with formally 
correct rules and by the right of those in authority - under such rules - to 
issue commands."66 Second, and closely associated with authority, exists a 
status system. This refers to the allocation of different amounts of authority, 
rights or privileges to the various positions in the hierarchy.67Size is the 
third important definitional characteristic of a bureaucracy. It can include 
the organisation's scale of operations, volume of work, numbers of clients 
or simply the geographical scope of its activities.68 Fourth, bureaucratic 
activities are regulated by general, consistent and abstract rules. These rules 
act to describe (potentially all) the rights and duties of each officia1.69 A fifth 
characteristic is specialisation. Each office has a well defined sphere of 
competence with clearly defined duties resulting in it becoming "a world in 
itsel£."70 Sixth, a hierarchy exists within the bureaucratic structure where 
ranking positions descend from top to bottom. Hierarchy gives formal 
control to those at the top of the formal communication system. Since 
information is obviously a prerequisite for participation, this control 
enables the elite within an organisation the ability to manipulate both the 
issues and determine what kind of issues will be raised for organisational 
consideration.71 Seventh, the bureaucracy frequently has a non bureaucratic 
head who inherits, appropriates or is elected to that position.72 Officials 
employed in a bureaucracy hold office by appointment and hold a 
contractual relationship between themselves and the organisation, are set 
for a career being protected from arbitrary dismissal, and are selected on the 
basis of objective qualifications which are acquired by training, established 
by examinations, diplomas or both. The eighth and final major definitional 
characteristic of a bureaucracy is the process of co-option in which those in 
power designate their successors. Since such successors are chosen by 
existing elites, it can be assumed, Weber argues, that they will personify 
traditional values.73 
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It should be immediately noted that in reality, organisations may exhibit a 
variety of these elements to greater or lesser degrees. Such a list of elements 
is consequently referred to as an ideal type. Empirically therefore, it makes 
more sense to describe degrees of bureaucratisation rather than attempting to 
impose a black or white dichotomy.74 
In what ways can the bureaucracy be termed "elitist"? Etzioni-Halevy 
attempts to answer this through the discussion of the "democratic 
dilemma" that exists with regard to the contemporary bureaucracy; 
asserting that a paradoxical and self-contradictory connection exists 
between bureaucracy and democracy. On one hand, the growing power of 
bureaucracy does indeed pose a threat to democracy.75 For example, the 
bureaucracy has at its disposal more sophisticated information gathering 
devices and therefore can retrieve increasingly more information. 
Moreover, it is intent on guarding this information and preserving the 
utmost secrecy in its own domain. Bureaucracy also poses a threat to 
democracy as it has increasingly gained the potential to exempt itself from 
the control of elected officials and to infringe on their domain. The 
implication of this, argues Etzioni-Halevy, is that it can exempt itself from 
the democratic process itsel£.76 
On the other hand, a modern democracy cannot function without a 
relatively powerful and independent bureaucracy. For democratic 
procedures to work properly, the modern State must have an organisation 
at its disposal that will allocate the resources in a non- partisan way.77 If any 
organisation composed or controlled by elected officials and their parties 
did the same job, the allocation of resources could easily favour citizens 
closely associated to that particular party: "Thus, only a full-fledged, 
Page 21 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power: A Theoretical Approach 
politically independent bureaucracy can safeguard full-fledged democratic 
procedures. "78 
The technocratic school of thought develops Etzioni-Halevy's assertion. By 
viewing the control bureaucracy has over the "inputs" or formulation of 
public policy, it refutes the position of classical public administration 
which perceives politics as the practice of policy formation while 
administration is purely that of policy execution. According to the classical 
view, the bureaucrat is passive and does not enter the policy formation 
process. Instead, the technocrats argue that such a view is 
"normative ... extremely romantic and idealised ... the modern political 
system is essentially "bureaucratic" - characterised by "the rule of 
officials. "79 
Almond and Powell concur with this view arguing that bureaucracies have 
grown to the extent that they tend to monopolise the "outputs" of a system 
as well.BO This is because only bureaucracies enforce laws, policies or 
decisions. Moreover, the extent to which a general policy is implemented 
will usually depend on the bureaucracy's interpretation, and upon the 
spirit and effectiveness with which they enforce it. 
In what ways can bureaucratic power be used to influence the decision-
making process? For the purposes of this study, six are identified. First, the 
sheer pervasiveness of the public sector is cited as one of the main sources of 
bureaucratic power. Bureaucracies, particularly since the end of the Second 
World War, have increasingly become more prolific and have penetrated 
much wider spheres of social life. Weber offers another perspective to this 
by stating that the need for, and the growth of the bureaucracy, is a result of 
its rationality and technical superiority, thus making it the most 
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appropriate tool for dealing with the tasks and problems of complex, 
modern society.Sl 
Second, bureaucracies are staffed with officials who are experts in their field. 
Politicians, on the other hand, are usually devoid of the specialist 
knowledge required to formulate policy and can therefore become 
increasingly dependant on the experts in the bureaucracy. Consequently, 
the "trained permanent official is more likely to get his [or her] way in the 
long run than his nominal superior, the Cabinet Minister, who is not a 
specialist. "82 Such power is enhanced given that there is a regular 
turnover of the elected politician compared to the relative permanence of 
office enjoyed by the civil servant. The implication here is that politicians 
are inherently disadvantaged on both past experience and future 
perspectives. 
Third, and linked closely with expertise, is the ability of bureaucratic 
officials to control information by selective obstruction and agenda-setting. A 
wide variety of methods can be adopted by the bureaucracy to control, select 
and obstruct the information it provides to the politician. For instance, it 
can be seen in the timing of meetings. Another is seen in the power that 
inter-departmental official committees have. A good insight into the 
power held by these committees is offered by Lord Balogh who stated that: 
Most decisions of any importance involve more than one ministry. First they go 
to one inter-departmental committee at Assistant Secretary I Under Secretary 
level. Then they go to an official committee of Permanent Secretaries chaired 
by the head of the Treasury or the Cabinet Office. Usually some compromise is 
reached there before it comes to ministers. 83 
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Indeed, actual agenda-setting by the bureaucratic official has been cited as 
one of the most direct ways in which the bureaucracy controls the policy 
process. The following comment, made by Lord Armstrong, former head 
the British civil service, offers a good illustration: 
Obviously I had a great deal of influence. The biggest and most pervasive 
influence is in setting the framework within which the questions of policy are 
raised ... We set the questions which we asked ministers to decide arising out of 
[the] framework [ that the ministry believed in] and it would have been 
enormously difficult for my minister to change the framework so to that extent 
we had great power ... I think we chose the framework because we thought it 
the best one going.84 
In the light of such illustrations, it is not difficult to appreciate the 
substantial power of the bureaucracy over the Minister and therefore in the 
formation of public policy. For a politician to effectively fight such activity, 
he or she would, it is argued, require "the intellect of a Newton and the 
thrust of an Alexander the Great combined with a Napoleon." However, 
"[s]uch people are seldom met."85 
A fourth source of bureaucratic power lies in the ambiguities and 
contradictions built into its role. For instance, the bureaucracy must identify 
what the future needs are, and yet must also serve different governments 
which may have totally opposing conceptions of what such needs might be. 
Such a dilemma is recognised in the Coombs Royal Commission of 
Enquiry (1977) on the Australian Government Administration: 
The Commission observes that, for purely practical reasons, the administration 
inevitably plays a role in determining the character of the processes of 
government and that there is a lack of definition and clarity about the nature 
and extent of that role. Such lack of precision can be a significant source of 
misunderstanding and cross purposes (p.19) 
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The issue arose in the Commission's work most frequently in relation to the 
claim that officials should be "neutral" on political issues. On the one hand, 
such neutrality was seen as basic to the capacity of the administration to serve 
equally well governments of different political persuasion. On the other 
hand ... a claim to be neutral frequently was either false or reflected merely a 
singular lack of self-awareness. (p.24)86 
The ambiguity in role definition is frustrated further by the lack of political 
accountability towards the bureaucracy. Accountability, argues Jackson, is a 
relationship intended "to enhance the responsiveness of administration 
agents to those whom they are expected to serve and to provide a means by 
which complaints and grievances may be raised and redressed."87 With 
specific regard to a parliamentary system, a fundamental aspect of this 
concept is the notion of "ministerial accountability." This form of 
accountability therefore judges the performance of those in political office 
and applies sanctions where necessary, including the demand for the 
removal of a Minister from office.88 However, ministers, nor Parliament 
accept a blanket responsibility for the acts of their officials. Accordingly, the 
argument that "because somebody whom the Minister has never heard of 
has made a mistake, means that the Minister should resign, is out of date 
and rightly so." 89 
If ministers increasingly refuse to "carry the can" for what goes on in their 
department, then it is not surprising that bureaucrats "have retreated 
steadily into the mists of non-accountability."90 Jackson's analysis of 
bureaucratic accountability cites a variety of reasons as to why ministerial 
accountability is simply not possible, or at least, is made particularly 
difficult. For instance, many public sector policies and projects are spread 
over a lifetime. Different governments would therefore be involved, 
consequently making it inappropriate to hold any single Minister 
accountable and responsible for actions or policies that his or her 
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predecessors initiated. Moreover, the complexity of modern government 
also limits the notion of ministerial responsibility. As the bureaucratic 
model has illustrated, the vastness and complexity of the modern 
bureaucracy means that it would be difficult to hold an individual 
accountable for the whole. This is particularly the case when the individual 
is only a part of the whole and does not necessarily understand the whole. 
Finally, with the aformentioned fragmented and interdependent nature of 
the bureaucratic system, there is a tendency to "pass the buck" whenever. 
anything goes wrong. To locate points of control (and therefore 
responsibility) is consequently difficult.91 
A fifth reason cited for the power of the bureaucracy relates to the social 
background of bureaucratic officials. Empirical analysis has varied, however, 
a broad consensus has been established that - in the words of Krislov: 
"broad social groups have spokesmen and office holders in administrative 
as well as political positions."92 For instance, using the United Kingdom as 
a case study, Hill's analysis of the British Civil Service showed three biases 
that seemed to exist in the recruitment of administrative trainees into the 
civil service. First, a preference existed for Oxford and Cambridge graduates. 
Second, there was a preference for former pupils of fee-paying independent 
schools. The third bias saw favouring graduates from the arts and 
humanities as opposed to physical and social science applicants. No doubt 
such findings could be debated, however they illustrate the similarity of 
background of many of the recruits to the bureaucracy.93 
A second area of social conformity has been identified in relation to the 
bureaucratic official. Helco and Wildavsky identify a secondary socialisation 
process that takes place within the bureaucratic organisation. Bonds 
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(similar to kinship) exist amongst officials, despite changes in the 
membership of the group.94 
Finally, it will be recalled from the discussion relating to the pluralist 
model, that the fragmentation of bureaucracy has been cited as one of the 
reasons that a pluralistic political system can operate. However, it has been 
argued that this fragmentation can actually create bureaucratic autonomy 
and therefore bureaucratic power.95 This, notes Etzioni-Halevy, holds 
especially so when fragmentation and interest-group alliances go hand in 
hand: 
Fragmentation permits sub-system politics -a triumvite of a bureau, committee 
and interest group - in specialised areas that, in normal political times, can act 
without interference from other political actors ... Bureaucracy, therefore, has 
opportunities to exercise political power because ... government is fragmented.96 
Thus it can be seen that the bureaucracy has at its disposal a significant and 
powerful inventory with which to influence the decision-making process 
in both a direct and indirect way. Such a conclusion can be seen to parallel 
and reinforce the central elitist assumption; rather than a mass 
participation in the decision-making process of public policy, it is instead 
formed by a select few. 
The Bounded Rationality Model 
The bureaucratic model states that a source of bureaucratic power comes 
from its ability to control and manipulate the information given to the 
decision-makers in government. The bounded rationality model, while 
not implicitly elitist per se, does provide another perspective to support 
this assertion. 
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What is rationality? The classical definitions of rationality have been 
drawn from economic theory and its concept of the "rational man." In 
principle, it notes that in any situation where a decision must be made, 
there will always be a variety of choices available, each resulting in a 
different outcome. Choices reflecting the decision-makers preferences are 
therefore prioritised and will produce a recommendation that is preferred 
by the decision-maker because it will result in a desired outcome.97 The 
basic axioms of the rationality model, therefore, are that all behaviour is 
goal-directed. Furthermore, when individuals choose between a number 
of alternatives, they will chose the one that best serves their own self 
interests.98 
While models differ to some degree, all do agree that individuals 
maximise something - be it profits, budget size, economic growth, social 
prosperity and so forth. Rationality, moreover, is usually characterised by a 
patent behavioural nexus between ends and means: the aim is for the best 
decision to be made, therefore it follows that the means used will justify 
the ends.99 
Two broad forms of rationality, bounded and unbounded - each offering 
quite different approaches - can be used by an actor in the formulation of 
decisions. Unbounded rationality is based upon a number of assumptions 
around which much controversy exists. Models of unbounded rationality 
assume that decision-makers, in formulating decisions, know all their 
alternative choices and the consequences that follow from each alternative. 
Policy makers must, for instance, know all of society's value preferences 
and their relative weights, calculate the ratio of achieved societal values for 
each policy alternative and from this select the most efficient policy 
alternative. Thus, individuals are deemed to be omniscient. In models of 
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unbounded rationality there are no surprises, nor are individuals, in 
retrospect, therefore disappointed by their choices. Such a model is clearly 
unrealistic and behaviourally naive)OO 
Bounded rationality arises out of necessity because the information 
processing and computational powers of decision-makers are limited.101 
This is based firstly on the assertion that the real world is a highly complex 
and uncertain place, and secondly; that individuals are limited in their 
ability to deal with and to comprehend the ambiguities and complexities of 
their environment. As Herbert Simon observes: 
It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach any 
high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so great, 
the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that even an 
approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive.l02 
This statement recognises limits of unbounded rationality when decision-
makers seek to maximise some valued outcome. In contrast to this type of 
maximising behaviour, Simon includes as part of the bounded rationality 
model the concept of satisficing. Satisficing behaviour refers to situations 
where the decision-maker seeks a solution that is simply "good enough": 
that is, where the combination of satisfactory and suffice produce a 
"satisficing" choice. The decision-maker therefore will not have to consider 
all the alternatives or consequences in his or her decision. Rather, the 
decision-maker needs only to consider the "most evident alternatives that 
will produce a reasonable increase in benefits (ie: satisficing behaviour)."l03 
The manner in which the bureaucracy influences the politician (and 
therefore the decision-making process) can be seen to contain aspects of the 
bounded rationality model. This is because the bureaucracy can give advice 
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that does not take into consideration all viewpoints and possible 
consequences. Bounded rationality also implies that the impact of policy 
in certain sectors may be considered - however because there is a 
prioritising of variables and outcomes, adverse affects to these sectors may 
be deemed "acceptable." From this, it follows that the saticfising process in 
the bounded rationality model will allow the bureaucracy to select - and 
delete - information that does (or does not) fit its viewpoint or underlying 
motives. Such a situation, it is argued here, will directly affect the scope 
and quality of information received by the politicians from which policy 
decisions must be made, as only a partial - or "satisficed" - view of the 
problem will be presented. 
It will also be recalled that central to the bureaucratic model is the concept 
of political motivation such as self-interest and the preservation of power. 
The bounded rationality model does not encompass such "subjective" 
criteria. As already noted, the actions of particular actors are based on and 
presented in purely rational terms. Accordingly it is argued here that in 
adopting such a "rational" approach, the bureaucracy can hide any ulterior 
motives. In other words, by presenting advice structured in a "rational" 
fashion, access and therefore influence to the decision-makers is 
enhanced, furthering their own self interests. 
Conclusion 
The distribution of power amongst groups in society has been shown in 
this chapter to be viewed in two distinctly different ways. On one hand, the 
pluralists argue that a wide variety of groups are involved in the decision-
making process. On the other, the elitist school of thought posits that only 
a select few groups - an elite - have any significant influence in the 
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formation of public policy. The masses are therefore argued here to possess 
insufficient power with which to influence the decision-making process. 
This study adopts the elitist assumption in its own analysis. In doing so., 
and with the aid of the bureaucratic, bounded rationality and economic 
elite models, it will attempt to analyse the nature and degree of power that 
a select few groups had in the privatisation programme's decision-making 
process. 
Page 31 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
Endnotes: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
For a good discussion of power by these authors, see, for instance, Robert Dahl., 
"The concept of Power", in R. Bell., D. Edwards., R. Harrison Wagner., (Eds.) 
Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, (New York: Free Press, 1969). 
Also, Nelson Polsby., "The Sociology of Community Power; A Reassessment", in 
Social Forces , No. 37 (1959). 
Robert Dahl., "The Concept of Power", Behavioural Science , No.2 (1957), pp.459-
477. Quoted in Steven Lukes., Power: A Radical View, (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
pp.ll-12. 
Lukes., p.13. 
Ibid., p.14. 
Peter Bachrach., & Morton Baratz., Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice , 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.8. Cited in Lukes., p.16. 
Bachrach., & Baratz., Ibid. Quoted in John Gaventa., Power and Powerlessness: 
Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley , (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 
p.9. 
Michael Parenti., "Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom", Journal of 
Politics, No.32 (1970), pp.501-30. Quoted in Gaventa., p.10. 
Bachrach., & Baratz., p.49. Cited in Lukes., p.19. 
Ibid. 
Lukes., p.23. (emphasis added). 
Michael Parenti., Power and the Powerless, (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), p.12. 
Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
Bachrach., & Baratz., p.20. Quoted in Lukes., p.23. 
Lukes., p.24. 
Herbert Kaufman., & Victor Jones., "The Mystery of Power", Public Administration 
Review, 14 (Summer 1954), p. 205. Quoted in Thomas Dye., Who's Running America? 
The Carter Years, Second edition, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p.11. 
Parenti., 1978, p.4. 
Thomas Dye., & Harmon Zeigler., The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon 
Introduction to American Politics, Second edition, (Belmont: Duxbury, 1972), p.8. 
18 For a comprehensive discussion relating to the values of democracy see, for instance, 
John Stuart Mill., Representative Government, (New York: E.P Dutton, 1952). 
continued ... 
Page 32 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
38 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
Dye., & Zeigler., p.9. 
Ibid., p.10. For a full discussion on democratic theory, see R. Pennock., "Democracy 
and Leadership", Quoted in W. Chambers., & R. Salisbury., (Eds.) Democracy 
Today L (New York: Dodd Mead, 1962). 
James Lamare., Texas Politics: Economics, Power and Policy, First edition, (St. Paul: 
West Publishing, 1981), p. 4 . 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.S. 
Ibid., p.6. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Robert Dahl., Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p.72. 
Ibid., p.100. 
David Riesman., The Lonely Crowd , Abridged edition, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), p. 215. 
Gaetano Mosca., The Ruling Class , (New York: McGraw-Hill,1939), p.SO. Quoted in 
Dye., & Zeigler., p.S. 
Robert Dahl., "Power, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Modest Approach", Paper 
delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
p.3. Quoted in Dye., & Zeigler., Ibid. 
Dye., & Zeigler., Ibid. 
David Truman., "The American System in Crisis", in Political Science Quarterly L 
December (1959), p.489. 
Dye., & Zeigler., p.7. 
Ibid. 
Walter Lippman., The Public Philosophy L (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), p.19. 
Quoted in William Kornhauser., The Politics of Mass Society, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1960), p.27. 
David Ricci., Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Lo&ic of Political 
Analysis L (New York: Random House, 1971), p.107. 
C. Wright Mills., The Power Elite, (New York: Galaxy, 1959), p.9. 
continued ... 
Page 33 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power: A Theoretical Approach 
Louis Horowitz., (Ed.) Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright 
Mills, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.356-357. 
Ibid., p.361. 
Lamare., 1981, p.6. 
Ibid., pp.6-7. 
Ibid., p.7. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.8. 
Parenti., 1978, p. 181. 
Ibid., p.l89. 
Charles Lindblom., Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, ( 
New York: Basic Books, 1977), p.172. 
Ibid., pp.l72-173. 
Ibid., p.175. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.l76. 
Ibid., p.l85. 
Ibid., p.186. 
Ibid., p.179. 
James Lamare., What Rules America? (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1988), p.81. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Lindblom., p.l87. 
Ibid. 
Eva Etzioni-Halevy., Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma , (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 87. 
continued ... 
Page 34 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
64 For a succinct analysis of a wide range of definitional approaches to the concept of 
bureaucracy see, for instance, D. Held., & C. Pollitt., (Eds.) New Forms of Democracy 
, (Beverly Hills: Sage,l986), particularly chapter 7. 
65 Etzioni-Halevy., p.27. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Robert Presthus., The Organisational Society: An Analysis and a Theory , (New 
York: Vintage, 1962), p.36. 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Ibid., p.28. 
D. Held., & C. Pollitt., p.159. 
Presthus., p.30. 
Ibid., p.33. 
Etzioni-Halevy., p.28. 
Presthus., p.49. 
D. Held., & C. Pollitt., pp.159-160. 
Etzioni-Halevy., p.90. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.91. 
Ibid., p.92. 
Peter Jackson., The Political Economy of Bureaucracy , (Oxford: Phillip Allan, 1982), 
p. 217. 
G. Almond., & G. Powell., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach , 
(Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 153. 
Etzioni-Halevy., p.31. 
Max Weber., The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation , Trans. by A.M. 
Henderson., (New York: The Free Press,1947), p.338. Quoted in Etzioni-Halevy., p.33. 
P. Kellner., & Lord Crowther-Hunt., The Civil Servants , (London: Macdonald, 1980), 
p.226. Quoted in Etzioni-Halevy., p.150. 
continued ... 
Page 35 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
B. Sedgemore., The Secret Constitution , (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980), p.32. 
Quoted in Etzioni-Halevy., p.l51. 
P. Kellner., & Lord Crowther-Hunt., Ibid., Quoted in Etzioni-Halevy., p.150. 
H. C. Coombs., et al. (1977) Report on the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration, (Canberra: Government Printer, 1977). Quoted in Etzioni-
Halevy., p.95. 
Jackson., p.221. 
Ibid., pp.221-222. 
Sir John Hunt., Evidence presented to the Eleventh Report of the Expenditure 
Committee , (Civil Service: HC 535, [1976-1977] HMSO), para 95. Quoted in Jackson., 
p.222. 
N. Johnson., "Defining Accountability", Public Administration Bulletin L No. 17, 
December 1974. pp.3-13. Quoted in Jackson., Ibid. 
Jackson., p.223. 
S. Kirslov., Representative Bureaucracy , (London: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p.7. Quoted 
in Jackson., p.217. 
M.J. Hill., "The Exercise of Discretion in the National Assistance Board", Public 
Administration, Vol. 12, Spring (1969). Cited in Jackson., Ibid. 
H. Helco., & H. Wildavsky., The Private Government of Public Money , (London: 
Macmillan, 1974), Cited in Jackson., p.218. 
Etzioni-Halevy., p.147. 
K. Meier., Politics and Bureaucracy , (North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury, 1979), p.Sl. 
Quoted in Etzioni-Halevy., p.148. 
Jackson., p.87. 
Ibid., p.89. 
Presthus., p.52. 
100 Jackson., p.93. 
101 
102 
Ibid., p.96. 
Herbert Simon., Administrative Behaviour , Third edition, (London: The Free Press, 
1976), p.79. Emphasis added. 
continued ... 
Page 36 
Interest Groups and the Distribution of Power : A Theoretical Approach 
103 William Dunn., Public Policy Analysis , (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1981), p.230. 
Page 37 
Chapter Tw-o 
The Privatisation Programme: 
Background Events and the Establishment of 
the Elitist Assumption 
"In the Southern hemisphere the water goes round the other way as it goes out the plughole" - a 
high government official explaining a "socialist" government's "free-market" policies to a 
puzzled foreigner, 1984.1 
Introduction 
Before focusing on the power that particular interest groups may have had 
in the formation of the privatisation programme, it is necessary to discuss 
some background to the programme itself. With this in mind, this chapter 
is divided into two parts. The first briefly reviews the events leading up 
to, and the rationale behind, th(Governrnent's decision to privatise the 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) in December 1987:J In part two, the 
discussion examines, with broad reference to the elitist model, three 
observations that support the elitist assumption adopted in this study. 
From Intervention to "Moremarket"- A Brief Sketch 
Since the election of the fourth Labour Government in July 1984, New 
Zealand has undergone unprecedented economic and social change. As 
Boston and Holland correctly observe, the corning to power of the Labour 
Government marked a crucial turning-point in the content, character and 
style of post-war era politics.2 This Government not only questioned 
existing policies and attitudes, but also(irnplemented radically new 
\ 
approaches and solutions that, in turn, have affected all aspects of New 
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Zealand societY) In doing so, the aim has been to create a more open, 
competitive, market-led economy which will generate faster economic 
growth, higher employment levels and a social welfare system that is 
ultimately more secure and equitable.3 
Central to Labour's economic strategy was the fundamental questioning of 
the Government's role in the economy. Prior to 1984, the(state was 
assumed to have an active and major role to play in the country's 
economic affairs; it was responsible for correcting market failure, 
providing goods and services, regulating economic activity such as 
production and pricing, redistributing income and providing social 
welfare for the needy.~he role of the market as an allocative mechanism 
in this context therefore, was limited with the adoption instead - by both 
National and Labour - of "a highly interventionalist mode of economic 
management. "4 
Such an interventionalist approach is best illustrated during the National 
Administration, under the leadership of Sir Robert Muldoon which 
sought to manage the economy through a Keynesian frameworkS For 
example, by 1983, it had funded $6.88 billion in development projects 
(known as the "Think-Big" strategy) which aimed to stimulate economic 
growth. 6 The primary sector was also the focus of considerable 
Government intervention. For instance, in an attempt to maintain the 
standard of living in the farming sector, government assistance to pastoral 
farming totalled $4.3 billion during the period 1979 - 1983.7 By 1981, the 
consequences of such economic intervention became increasingly evident; 
New Zealand's overseas debt increased dramatically, the annual rate of 
inflation spiralled upwards and interest rates soared. To combat these 
trends, government intervention increased with the implementation of a 
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variety of comprehensive and mandatory controls on the business sector. 
This intervention culminated in July 1982 with the introduction of a 
lengthy wage and price freeze; the level of wages, prices and rent was 
suspended for twenty months resulting by December 1983 in an (artificial) 
inflation rate of 3.6 percent.8 As Boston and Holland remark, the 
cumulative effect of the National Government's interventionalist stance 
between 1975-1984 was "the growth of a pernicious form of institutional 
sclerosis, a complex web of administrative controls, a relatively low-
growth economy ... and a massive increase in the nation's foreign debt."9 
By 1984 it was clear that some significant policy changes would need to be 
implemented in order to reverse the downwardly spiralling New Zealand 
economy. As James graphically states: 
By 14 June 1984, when a snap election was called, pressure for big change in 
New Zealand was banked up. Big change was seeping through the cracks in the 
conservative Muldoonist dam. All that was needed for that seepage to turn into 
a flood was a catalyst. The election of a Labour Government...was that 
catalyst.lO 
The fourth Labour Government, upon being elected, sought to re-write 
much of the old politco-economic order. This was facilitated by the 
adoption of a new ideological framework that shifted away from the 
eclectic combination of corporatist, paternalistic and socialist tendencies, 
toward a form of market or economic liberalism.ll This new creed, loosely 
referred to as "market liberalism", was in many respects, the antithesis of 
the highly interventionalist Keynesianist doctrine. 
Central to market liberalist theory is the call for less State intervention in 
the running of the economy, due to the belief that little of what the 
government does, actually works. Following Adam Smith's concept of 
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"the invisible hand", the belief is that the pursuit of self interest will, in 
turn, produce a result that is beneficial to all in society. Thus, the 
underlying assumption of this theory is that left to itself, the market-place 
will work to a position of general equilibrium, producing the maximum 
possible benefit for all in society.12 Accordingly, advocates of this school of 
thought generally advocate a form of "more-market" or economic 
liberalism as opposed to substantial Government intervention. 
On the basis of such assumptions, the Labour Government implemented 
policies reflecting this "more-market" ideology, rather than the ad hoc 
interventionalist approach that was typical of the post-war Keynesian 
consensus in New Zealand. Consequently, the management of the 
economy has been significantly transformed. The change that was 
particularly dramatic, and the area of focus in this study, is in the 
structure, organisation and management of the State sector. The reforms 
here have been, without doubt, the most significant since the creation of a 
permanent, unified and politically neutral public service in 1912.13 They 
must also rank, notes Boston, as one of the most comprehensive 
reorganisation of the public sector initiated anywhere in the West during 
the post-war period.14 
That the State sector was targeted for reform could not have come as a 
surprise. This sector consumed resources that, by 1984, amounted to about 
25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).lS Similarly, the SOEs , 
which were to become the focus for much of the change, were also a 
significant element within the public sector, accounting for example in 
1984, for more than 12 percent of GDP, and some 20 percent of gross 
domestic investment.16 Prior to restructuring, there were three main types 
of public enterprise; government departments with advisory, 
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regulatory and trading functions (e.g. The Post Office, the Forest Service), 
government owned limited liability companies (e.g. Air New Zealand, 
Bank of New Zealand) and finally, public corporations established under 
separate Acts of Parliament (e.g. the Housing Corporation, Railways 
Corporation).17 With the State possessing such a large number of diverse 
activities, the way in which they are managed has significant social and 
economic ramifications. It is precisely the way that they had been 
organised and managed prior to 1984 that was of concern to the incoming 
Labour Government. 
Policy makers in New Zealand had, for many years been concerned about 
the inefficient use of public sector resources. As the Treasury noted in its 
post-1984 election briefing papers to the new Government, inefficiencies 
existed in the government departments, primarily because: 
(a) Most departments had no clearly defined goals. 
(b) Most departments had no clearly specified management plan. 
(c) There were few effective control mechanisms to review the performance of 
departments in meeting their output requirements. 
(d) Departmental managers had little freedom to change the way their 
departments operated to meet their goals. 
(e) Too much emphasis was placed on the control of inputs. 
(f) There was no effective review mechanism for dealing with senior 
managements' poor performance within departments. 
Source: The Treasury, Economic Management. 1984, p.290. 
Moreover, many of the same criticisms were leveled against the SOEs as 
their performance in the post war period had been consistently dismal.18 
The Government was therefore determined to improve the overall 
efficiency of the public sector. Three major theoretical underpinnings were 
seen to facilitate such an objective. The first was the Public Choice theory 
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which asserts that all human behaviour is dominated by self-interest and 
is therefore "self maximising. "19 Thus, just as businesses seek to maximise 
profits, so politicians seek to maximise their votes, and bureaucrats their 
agency or departmental budget. In the light of this theory, public choice 
theorists reject concepts such as "public interest" or "social justice" -
arguing instead that individuals will pursue their own self interests, 
inflicting substantial damage on the political marketplace in the process.20 
Given such an analysis, the policy implications of the public choice school 
are limited. The role of the State, for example, should be minimalised, 
politicians should be prevented from running budget deficits or imposing 
taxes beyond a certain level, and where feasible, services provided by 
government agencies should be contracted or privatised to the private 
sector. In addition, as the model assumes that departments have vested 
interests in their own survival, ideally they should not advise 
government nor implement policy. Public choice theorists therefore argue 
that advisory, regulatory and delivery functions should be separated and 
managed by different agencies.21 
The second model to influence the decision-makers in government, the 
Agency theory, also assumes that individuals are motivated primarily by 
self interest.22 With equal importance however, it assumes that social and 
political life is best understood as a series of contracts in which one party, 
the principal, enters into exchanges with another, the agent. In the 
political realm, the voter is seen as the principal entering a contract with 
politicians (their agents) who undertake a range of tasks and activities on 
their behalf. Agency theory is primarily concerned with "finding the most 
effective way of negotiating, writing and monitoring contracts so as to 
minimise the likelihood of violations."23 
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The final important theoretical influence has been the Managerialist 
model. It argues that public sector inefficiencies are due, to a large part, to 
a lack of management training, coupled with insufficient emphasis on 
management skills. The solution is for the public sector to adopt the best 
management practices and techniques of the private sector with the aim of 
changing it into a business orientated culture.24 
Guided by these theoretical underpinnings, the Labour Government's 
sweeping changes in the State sector were aimed at improving the 
accountability of the public service to the political executive and 
Parliament, and/ or at increasing the efficiency with which resources are 
used (both in operational and allocative terms).25 The broad policy thrust 
that spearheaded the change in the State sector is known as 
commercialisation . Commercialisation, notes Easton, "involves using 
private enterprise as the model on which to organise economic 
relations. "26 Essentially, it is about maximising the use of private property 
rights in the economy and society. Indeed, in many ways it is argued to be a 
political programme, altering the balance between the State and private 
sectors.27 It is under the broad umbrella of the Government's 
commercialisation policy that two major policy initiatives 
corporatisation and privatisation - were implemented. 
The Corporatisation Programme 
Corporatisation was seen as a significant initial move towards 
transforming the State sector into a more accountable and efficient 
operation. Corporatisation involved, wherever possible, the separation of 
a government department's commercial from non-commercial activities 
and transferring the trading activities to public corporations.28 The 
enabling legislation - The State Owned Enterprises Act - became effective 
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on 1 April 1987. Under the Act, and as Figure 2.1 (below) illustrates, nine 
SOEs were established as limited liability companies: the Government 
Property Services, Airways Corporation, Telecom Corporation, the Coal 
Corporation, the Electricity Corporation, Land Corporation, New Zealand 
Forestry Corporation, Post Office Bank and New Zealand Post. Five 
existing Corporations- Railways Corporation, Air New Zealand, Shipping 
Corporation, the Petroleum Corporation and the Tourist Hotel 
Corporation - were also brought under coverage of the Act. Resulting from 
these moves, four government agencies were abolished: the Commission 
for the Environment, the Forest Service, the Department of Lands and 
Survey, and the New Zealand Post Office. Finally, four new government 
departments were created: the Ministry of Forestry, the Department of 
Conservation, the Department of Survey and Land Information, and the 
Ministry of the Environment.29 
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Figure 2.1 
The Corporatisation programme's structural reorganisation of the State 
sector (effective as of 1 April 1987) 
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Source: Robert Gregory, "The Reorganisation of the Public Sector" in Boston., & Holland., 1987, 
p.llS. 
A variety of measures were incorporated in the Act to ensure improved 
efficiency and accountability. With regard to improved efficiency, for 
instance, the principle objective of every SOE is to operate as a "successful 
business enterprise."30 They are now required to be as profitable and 
efficient as comparable private sector businesses. Incentives and sanctions 
appropriate to trading organisations have replaced public service controls, 
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and restrictions imposed by government fiscal constraints are lessened. 
The new corporations now also have to pay taxes, borrow in the 
marketplace, and price their goods and services competitively. If some 
services intended to meet social criteria are unprofitable, they are 
negotiated - on a. contractual basis - between the Government and the 
corporations. The aim of such reforms is, in theory, hoped to make 
taxpayer's subsidies "transparent", allowing the managers of the new 
corporations to remain free to concentrate on meeting their commercial 
objectives.31 The Act also contains a "good employer" clause, in which the 
new organisation must exhibit a sense of "social responsibility" by having 
regard to the interests of the community in which it operates.32 With 
regard to accountability, each of the new corporations now has two 
shareholders: the Minister of Finance and the Minister of State Owned 
Enterprises, who are responsible for monitoring performance and a 
Government appointed Board of Directors. More significantly, part three 
of the Act specifically outlines mechanisms for improving the 
accountability of SOEs to Parliament; each enterprise must prepare a 
comprehensive statement of corporate intent covering such matters as the 
objectives of the corporation, the nature and scope of its operations, the 
performance targets and other measures by which the performance of the 
enterprise may be judged. Half yearly reports are also required for the 
shareholding Ministers with an annual report submitted to Parliament. In 
addition, an auditor's report is to be submitted on each corporation's 
financial statements annually.33 
While the corporatisation programme radically changed the structure and 
nature of the State sector, setting up structures that would facilitate 
improved efficiency and accountability, the Government decided to go a 
stage further and privatise certain SOEs. 
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. The Privatisation Programme l The term "privatisation" is used to cover a multitude of policy initiatives. 
These include State disengagement from public activities and 
responsibilities; privatising funding through user charges while retaining 
ownership; market deregulation and the contracting out of services to 
private firms.34 The term's narrowest meaning, and the activity with 
which privatisation has become most closely associated, refers to 
government selling its SOE shares to the general public and private sector. 
Table 2.2 (below) shows that as at 15 June 1990, the Government had sold 
eighteen SOEs, receiving $9.5 billion in receipts.35 ) 
Table 2.2 
The Privatisation of the SOEs (to 15 June 1990) 
Business Sale price($m) 
N.Z Steel 327.2 
Petrocorp 801.6 
Health Computer 
Service 4.2 
DFC 111.3 
Post Bank 665.4 
-Completion 13.1 
Shipping Corp 18.5 
-Completion 15.6 
Air New Zealand 660.0 
Landcorp Financial 
Instruments 15.7 
Landcorp Financial 
Instruments 32.3 
Rural Bank 550.0 
Government Print 20.0 
Government Print 
(Deposit) 2.3 
National Film Unit 1.5 
Communicate NZ .200 
State Insurance 
Telecom NZ Ltd 4.25 billion 
Settlement date Purchaser 
22.3.88 Equiticorp brought 90% of 
the Crowns interest. (1) 
31.3.88 Fletcher Challenge 
7.11.88 Paxus Information 
18.11.88 National Provident 
(80%)Saloman Bros (20%) 
28.2.89 ANZ 
31.10.89 
3.4.89 ACT (NZ) 
19.3.90 
17.4.89 see note (2) 
7.3.89 Mortgagees 
5.10.89 
31.10.89 Fletcher Challenge 
1989/90 Rank Group (3) 
2.90 see note (4) 
23.3.90 TVNZ (5) 
8.12.89 DAC Group 
see note (6) 
15.6.90 see note (7) 
(see over for notes) 
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Notes: 
(1) After Equiticorp collapsed. NZ Steel was sold for $323 million to Helenus Corp, an 
Australian based consortium of companies. 
(2) The initial ownership after sale was: BIL (65%), Qantas (19.9%), Japan Air Lines Ltd 
(7.5%), American Air Lines (7.5%). 30% of BIL's holding is now held by the public and 
staff of Air New Zealand. 
(3) From sale of sundry assets, including its main building in Wellington. 
(4) From the sale of the business- balance of $21 million to be paid on possession. 
(5) Balance of $1 million due September 1990. 
(6) Sale announced, April 1990 for $735 million. The sale will not be completed until 
legislation is passed. 
(7) The new structure is; N.Z public I Overseas investors (40.1 %), Ameritech (24.95 %), 
Bell Atlantic (24.95 %), Freightways Holdings (5.0 %), Fay, Richwhite Holdings ( 
5.0%). 
Source: The Treasury, Wellington. 
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The Government gave two main justifications for privatising the SOEs. 
These justifications, known in this study as "the debt and efficiency 
arguments", will be comprehensively discussed in chapter three, however 
both are briefly outlined here. The first centred on the level of New 
Zealand's total indebtedness (both foreign and domestic) which by 1987 
had reached $42 billion.36 According to the Government, New Zealand 
could not sustain such a high level of debt. It therefore argued that State 
assets would need to be sold in order to significantly reduce the country's 
foreign debt levels. Such an option was also seen as preferable to 
alternative methods of reducing the country's indebtedness - such as 
increasing taxes or reducing expenditure on social services.37 The second 
major justification centred on the increased productive efficiency that 
would be gained, it argued, if the SOEs were fully owned by the private 
sector. It will be recalled that the corporatisation programme had been 
initiated with the aim of increasing State sector efficiency. However it was 
felt by the Government that the real gains in efficiency would only be 
achieved if some SOEs were wholly owned by the private sector. 
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Privatisation - The Process 
With the background of the privatisation programme briefly reviewed, it 
is now possible to focus on the nature of its formation. Specifically, the rest 
of this chapter discusses three observations that support the elitist 
assumption upon which this study is based. The first observation 
highlights t~e relatively short "lead in" period that the privatisation 
programme had, by comparing it with that of the corporatisation 
programme; the second, examines the speed in which enabling legislation 
/ 
was passed;\,tJ:le final observation focuses on the Government's refusal to 
\_ '--o>'"--, • _, 
listen to public opinion which was highly critical of its plans to privatise 
the SOEs at the time. ) 
' 
The Privatisation Programme's "Lead In" Time 
,r-7 
The elite model, it will be recalled, asserts that the masses have(only an 
...__ 
indirect influence over the decision-making behaviour of elitesJ' One 
significant explanation for this, it argues, is because communication between 
the two groups flows downward, resulting in the masses being largely ill-informed. 
Thus, the masses have no real power to influence the decision-making 
process because they possess inadequate information to do so. The 
privatisation programme's "lead in time" concurs with such an assertion. 
By "lead in time", this study refers to publicly known policy-related events 
that occurred prior to the Government's implementation of the 
privatisation programme. To offer some comparative context to this 
analysis, privatisation's "lead in" time is compared to the programme that 
immediately preceded it- corporatisation. In doing so, this study does not 
/ 
imply that the corporatisation programme's "lead in time" exemplifies a 
pluralistic decision-making process in operation. Indeed, it too has been 
criticised for being both rushed and elitist. However, in a comparison of 
the two, it will be shown that it was substantially longer; more people 
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knew - for a greater length of time - about the Government's plans to 
corporatise. Thus, the masses are argued here to have had comparatively 
more opportunity to contribute and debate the legislation relating to the 
corporatisation of the SOEs before it was enacted, than was the case with 
privatisation. 
Turning first to the corporatisation programme's "lead-in time." Hints by 
the Labour Government that major changes would occur in the State 
sector can be traced back to the early 1980s. For instance, in June 1980, the 
then leader of the Opposition, David Lange, stated that a Labour 
Government would provide "the most radical shake out of the whole 
system since the demise of provincial government. "38 Random cut-backs 
he argued, would not lead to a stronger and more effective public service; 
instead these goals would be achieved by "substantially strengthening the 
financial accountability of government departments and of the ' 
government through Parliament." 39 
By late 1985 it was obvious that the Government was committed to a 
radical restructuring of the SOEs. In the December Economic Statement, 
the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, outlined the set of principals 
aimed at enhancing accountability and efficiency that would be applied 
throughout the public sector. In doing so he noted: 
The essence of the problem is that the public sector needs to be adapted to meet 
the management needs of a modern economy. The present environment can be 
frustrating not only for those who have to deal with public sector organisations 
but also for those who work in them.40 
This was followed in May 1986 by a major statement on expenditure 
reform. In it, Douglas stressed that the poor performance of the SOEs 
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resulted from their unclear roles, conflicting objectives, burdensome 
controls, lack of commercial freedom and inadequate incentive 
structures. 41 It was time, he announced, to therefore apply the set of 
principles outlined in the December 1985 Economic Statement. The aim in 
doing so, would be to turn certain trading activities out of departmental 
organisations and into corporate structures by 1 April 1987.42 
It can be seen that the Government communicated its intent to corporatise 
the SOEs prior to any legislation being introduced into the House of 
Representatives. Indeed, when the enabling legislation - The State Owned 
Enterprises Act- was introduced on 30 September 1986, there continued to 
be an open discussion with regard to the intended changes in the State 
sector. For example, after its first reading on 30 September, the Bill was 
referred to a Select Committee where a wide variety of interested parties 
were able to make submissions. Palmer noted that the Select Committee 
received "a large number of submissions" resulting in substantial 
amendments to the initial draft of the SOE Act. These changes included 
the removal from the first schedule plans to float shares of the Bank of 
New Zealand and the Development Finance Corporation. In addition, five 
clauses and one sub-clause were changed, based on recommendations 
received in the Sub-Committee proceedings.43 On the 11 December, the 
Bill was r~ported back from the Select Committee, at which time the 
Government immediately took urgency to pass it through its remaining 
stages. In doing so, however, it reassured the opposition that while 
urgency had been taken, the new legislation still "provide[d] a battery of 
instruments of accountability" to Parliament and the Select Committee.44 
Two further examples of initiatives implemented by the Government 
reinforce the assertion that the "lead in" time to the corporatisation 
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programme involved greater levels of open communication and was 
comparatively more "pluralistic" in nature than the privatisation 
programme. For example, an advisory group was created in October 1986 
with a budget of $4.5 million to investigate how public servants would be 
affected by the changes to the State sector. Part of this group's role was also 
to advise the Government on the broader community impact that the 
corporatisation policy would have and "co-ordinate assistance" to 
communities affected by the restructuring.45 Additionally, department 
officials were briefed nationwide by a State Services Commissioner, Mr 
Don Hunn, on the impending changes that would occur in the public 
sector.46 
By the time The State Owned Enterprises Act took effect on 1 April 1987, 
transforming nine government departments into corporations, the public 
had officially known about the Government's intentions to corporatise for 
sixteen months. In that time, a constant dialogue between the 
Government and interested parties had taken place, with official channels 
of communication made available and resources set aside by the 
Government to monitor the reaction to, and effects created by the 
restructuring on the State sector. As a result of this, a wide variety of 
interested groups could contribute, and ultimately help shape, the final 
form that the corporatisation policy would take. 
Conversely, the privatisation programme's "lead in" time is argued here 
to have been comparatively more elitist in nature; it was not as long, nor 
as open as for the corporatisation policy. Central to this assertion, and 
unlike corporatisation where the Government clearly communicated its 
intent, is that the lead in to the privatisation programme saw it repeatedly 
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denying that it intended privatising any SOEs. A chronological survey of 
these denials is illustrative. 
As early as 1980 when the National Government considered making part 
of the Forest Service a limited liability company, the then Labour 
Opposition lambasted such a proposal - stating that it was "totally 
opposed" to the idea as the company could then be "flogged off" to the 
private sector and consequently out of Parliament's control.47 Later in 
1983, Opposition Leader David Lange continued to assure New Zealand 
that a Labour Government would not privatise any of the SOEs. In the case 
of Telecom, for instance, he stated: "It is Labour's traditional and emphatic 
· view that control of telecommunication facilities should be retained by the 
State. "48 Or to the possible privatisation of Postbank: "The Government 
has no intention of deregulating the Post Office in such a way that Private 
Enterprise can come and cream off the profitable operations." 49 
By the 1984 election the New Zealand Labour Party continued such a line 
of argument by stating on two occasions in its Policy Document that 
"Labour has no plans to sell any of the publicly- owned concerns."50 
Indeed, upon the election of the Labour Government, the Prime Minister 
Lange heralded that "the election of a Labour Government has ended the 
move towards privatisation of state ventures to private enterprise by the 
National Government. "51 
Throughout its first term in office (1984-1987) the Government steadfastly 
maintained its anti-privatisation stance. For instance, in the Economic 
Statement of 12 December 1985 the Minister of Finance, in outlining his 
plans to restructure the public sector, stated that the key to efficient 
management of operations within the public sector "is not the red herring 
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of privatisation."52 Moreover, the Minister for State Owned Enterprises, 
Mr Richard Prebble, is quoted in September 1986 arguing that "only an 
idiot, and in that context I would put the Opposition, would advocate 
selling Air New Zealand; At the moment to do so would be to sell a very 
valuable taxpayer asset at a fraction of what it's really worth. "53 Indeed, in 
case there was any doubt on where he stood, he told Parliament on 30 
September 1986 during the introduction of the State Owned Enterprises 
Bill: 
The Government opposes the suggestion by Opposition members that [it] will 
sell off taxpayers' assets. The Government does not regard itself the owner ... of 
the State Corporations affected [by the Bill]. The Government is the guardian 
on behalf of the people.54 
In the same debate the Government assured the Opposition that it 
intended keeping a firm hand in controlling the corporations as the new 
Bill would ensure private shareholders were limited to a minority 
ownership and would have no voting rights. 
The Government also distanced itself from the suggestion that it would 
privatise by actively condemning the National Party's support for such a 
programme. For instance, when in March 1987, the National Opposition 
stated it would pursue a "moderate" programme of privatisation, selling 
the Bank of New Zealand, the Tourist Hotel Corporation and the 
Development Finance Corporation, Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey 
Palmer responded: "The Opposition [has] made many loose statements 
about "privatisation" and they will come back to haunt it in the months 
ahead."55 
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When the Labour Government did begin to soften its anti-privatisation 
position, it did so in such a way that the public was still unsure whether 
any privatisation programme would be initiated. For example, the first -
albeit vague- indication from the Government that it might contemplate 
some form of privatisation came in the 1986 Budget. The Minister of 
Finance stressed that New Zealand would need to look seriously at how to 
reduce the "millstone of debt" incurred from the "Think Big" projects. A 
variety of options to reduce the level of national debt had been examined 
during which the sale of State owned assets was briefly mentioned: "These 
[options] include mothballing the plants, selling them, or simply stopping 
altogether any further injection of public money:·56 However, at the time 
Douglas down-played the sales option by stating in the same address that 
"the Government is not bailing out of the industries involved."57 
More definite moves were taken by the Government towards the end of 
1986 when it began to dispose of some State assets. In October 1986, the 
Government announced that it would sell its 89 percent holding of New 
Zealand Steel. In March 1987, the Bank of New Zealand had 12.9 percent of 
expanded capital worth $180 million publicly floated. This was followed in 
the June Budget of 1987 with the announcement that due to the 
"crippling" level of national debt, the Government had "no option" but to 
sell more assets and use the proceeds to pay off debt.58 Consequently, 
Crown shares in the Development Finance Corporation (100%), Petrocorp 
(100%) and Air New Zealand (25%) would be sold. However, while being a 
significant development, this was not an announcement that a full scale 
privatisation programme would be initiated. Instead, it was seen - and 
indeed, portrayed by the Government - as a number of "one-off" sales.59 A 
variety of observations support this assertion. First, in the case of New 
Zealand Steel and Petrocorp - two investments inherited from the former 
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National Government's "Think Big" strategy - it came as no surprise, and 
indeed made economic sense for the Government to divest its 
shareholding. New Zealand Steel had cost the Labour Government $2.5 
billion since 1984, while Petrocorp, in the 1986-1987 financial year, had 
\ 
required $1.8 billion in associated tax write-offs. 60 Second, in the case of Air 
New Zealand and the BNZ, the share floats were only of a limited nature 
only. Finally, the Government had not yet stated that these sales were the 
start of a major policy initiative. It will be recalled also that at this time the 
corporatisation policy was the main focus of attention, with the 
Government maintaining that it intended continuing ownership of the 
SOEs and that corporatisation was no "trojan horse" for privatisation.61 
By mid 1987, due to the number of signals being given by some key 
Ministers, speculation increased as to the Government's position on 
privatisation. For instance, in August 1987, Douglas stated that 
corporatisation was the "half way house" for selling off more, or the rest of 
the State sector: "We have to get the regulatory environment right first, 
before [the SOEs] are moved, and some are certainly not in any fit shape to 
be floated off yet, so we will sell part of the State holding first and some 
more, or the rest later."62 The Minister of State Owned Enterprises, 
Richard Prebble, also indicated that privatisation could be a viable solution 
to significantly reducing the level of national debt. In November 1987 he 
stated that "the New Zealand Government must look at asset sales ... the 
logical thing is to retire some assets and retire some debt." 63 Further 
signals that assets could be privatised were given by Prebble in early 
December when he remarked that "the dividends from SOEs are not 
enough to finance the realistic debt repayment programme ... within a very 
short period of time some valuable assets [will be] worth selling."64 
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The Government, had still not, however, officially stated its intent 
regarding privatisation. Indeed, due to conflicting Government 
statements, confusion abounded as late as November 1987. For example, in 
response to a speech Prebble had given in Australia advancing the case for 
privatisation, Labour MPs immediately sought a commitment at the 19 
November caucus meeting that there would be no further privatisation of 
State assets. More explicitly however, and in response also to Prebble's 
comments, the Prime Minister, David Lange, stated that he knew of 
"absolutely no plan to fob off the Corporations mentioned in [his] 
speech ... Given the state of the market, the Government would have to be 
nuts to sell them."65 
However, just twenty nine days later - in the Economic Statement of 17 
December 1987 - the Government officially acknowledged that it would 
initiate a major privatisation programme as part of a fiscal strategy aimed 
at reducing $14 billion of national debt by 1992. 
Not surprisingly, the Government's December 17 announcement was 
immediately criticised by the State unions, who felt that the Government 
had been "totally dishonest" to them regarding privatisation.66 The 
General Secretary of the PSA, Colin Clark notes that "considerable 
dialogue" took place throughout the corporatisation programme, during 
which time the Government "repeatedly denied" that it was planning a 
"full-scale" privatisation programme. Thus, the 17 December 
announcement was perceived by the unions to be an "utter betrayal": 
The Government just bulldozed us aside, and we were the unions who 
represented the thousands of State employees who were going to be affected by 
the outcome ... We were. given no opportunity - formal or informal - to have a 
say ... The unions were only allowed to be part of the process once they had 
made the decision to privatise.67 
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What can be seen here, therefore, is that th{Government gave no clear 
indication to the public or unions that it would privatise the SOEs prior to 
17 December. Instead, it denied or at best, gave conflicting information 
that, consciously or unconsciously, served to hide its real intent.Jrhus, the 
"masses" could hardly have participated or had any influence in the 
formation of a policy that they were told would not take place) Clark 
confirms this when he remarked that the unions "knew nothing about the 
plans to privatise prior to December 17 ... we really couldn't do anything at 
all because there was no information available. If we had had more to go 
on, then more would have been done at the time, that's for certain." 68 
The Enabling Legislation 
An analysis of the manner in which the Government passed the required 
enabling legislation to sell the SOEs adds further weight to the assertion 
that the formulation of the privatisation programme was elitist in nature. 
It will be recalled from the discussion in chapter one that elitism views 
democratic institutions such as elections and parties to be only important for their 
"symbolic value." An analysis of the Crown Forest Assets Bill (1989) is 
illustrative of this. 69 
The Crown Forest Asset Bill, from the onset, came under attack from a 
wide variety of sources including, not unexpectedly, the Opposition, 
environmental protection agencies, civil libertarians and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment.7D Criticism was 
particularly centred on the manner in which the Government passed it. 
Legislation that had already been criticised for serving only a narrow set of 
goals and interests proceeded to be rushed through the house, allowing 
little time for effective consideration and debate. For instance, the Bill was 
introduced on the night of the 1989 Budget (July 28) under the urgency 
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provisions provided in the standing orders - the first time in many years 
that a major policy issue other than a fiscal matter had been introduced in 
such a way. As it was introduced under urgency, select committee 
proceedings were by-passed - effectively barring the general public from 
voicing concern over the intended legislation, which by this stage had 
already received considerable criticism from interested parties. This was 
the case even though the original debate was adjourned for nine weeks 
while the Government introduced a large supplementary order paper in 
an attempt to improve some oversights that had been noted during the 
early stages of debate. By the end of the second reading (October 5), the 
Opposition attempted to have the Bill referred to the Primary Production 
Committee with the instruction that "it be advertised widely so that the 
people of New Zealand may have full opportunity to make their views 
known to Parliament."71 The motion however was defeated 39 to 30. In 
that debate, a member of the Opposition stated that "the select committee 
proceedings - of which the Government made so much in relation to open 
government, participatory democracy and so on - are being treated to a 
travesty of that kind. "72 
By the third and final reading (October 17), the Opposition attempted to 
have the Bill discharged on the grounds that, given its significance, the 
House was not given enough time to make a considered judgement. It 
was suggested that in being discharged, the Bill could be sent to a Select 
Committee so that "the people who own the land and the forests can have 
their say."73 In the ensuing debate, Jim Anderton remarked: 
The Government does not even have the confidence to put the matter to public 
debate and to consideration by the public through the select committee 
procedure. That makes a travesty of its commitment to open government. The 
public has a right to have a say on an issue such as this. The Bill has the 
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potential for incalculable damage ... yet no chance has been given through the 
select committee procedure for submissions to be heard ... It is an indictment on 
the Government, and, ultimately, an indictment on Parliament and 
parliamentary procedures. 7 4 
Opinion Polls 
It will be recalled that a central premise of the elitist model views public 
policy outcomes to reflect the interests and values of the ruling elite, and not the 
masses. Such a view is well illustrated in the formation of the privatisation 
programme; the Government can be seen to have persistently excluded 
the public from the consultative phase of the decision-making process 
when at the same time it was obvious that there was widespread public 
concern and criticism of the plan to privatise. While it is recognised that 
there is a degree of public dissent towards most government policies, the 
significance here is that the Government, while being aware of the 
sustained level of public discontent towards its privatisation policy, did 
not provide adequate communication channels for the general public's 
dissent to be heard. Moreover, given that the policy in question involved 
the sale of State (and therefore the taxpayers) assets, it is argued that in a 
supposedly "pluralistic" political system, such public dissent should have 
been given a far greater opportunity to be heard. 
It is a matter of record that New Zealanders' prefer State ownership for 
some enterprises.75 A series of polls conducted prior to and after the 
privatisation program was implemented, reflect that the overwhelming 
majority of New Zealander's either oppose State asset sales or want tight 
controls on foreign ownership of State corporations. Table 2.3 (below) 
illustrates that of the nine public enterprises that have been, or were 
proposed to be sold, in seven cases (Air New Zealand, Electricorp, Telecom 
[1987], Post Bank, Bank of New Zealand, Government Print and the DFC) 
amajority of the public wanted to keep them in public ownership. Only in 
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two cases (Railways, Telecom [1988] ) was there a majority who favoured 
privatisation. 
Table 2.3 
Questionnaire: "The sale of State Owned Enterprises" 
June 1987* October 1988** 
Keep/Unsure Sell {%} Keep/Unsure Sell{%) 
Air New Zealand 61 29 75 25 
Electricorp 70 29 n/a n/a 
Telecom 57 43 47 53 
Post Bank 62 37 70 30 
N. Z Railways 45 54 28 71 
Bank New Zealand 70 29 n/a n/a 
Government Print 65 35 n/a n/a 
DFC 72 27 n/a n/a 
*An NBR/Insight NZ survey asked seven hundred and fifty New Zealander's whether 
they would rather keep or sell five State enterprises. 
**An MRL Research Group surveyed 1014 people on five State enterprises in October 1988 
to find whether they wished to see the sale or retention of the SOEs. 
Source: Public Service Association, Wellington, 1990. 
The need for a dialogue between the Government and the general public 
was reinforced when - and as Table 2.4 (below) shows - an overwhelming 
majority of people stated that if the sale of State assets were to proceed, then 
there should be restrictions placed on the sales. 
Table 2.4 
Questionnaire: Support for the sale of State Enterprises* 
No Keep 50% Sell only Do not Tot.no sale 
restric- N.Z Owner- to NZ'ers sell /restric-
tions{%} shiJ2{%} {%} {%} tions{%} 
Telecom 3 30 20 47 97 
Railways 11 39 21 28 89 
Electricorp 2 28 25 45 98 
THC 16 39 27 19 86 
*Figures come from an MRL Research Group opinion survey held on the 31 March 1990. 
1709 respondents were interviewed and were asked the qu~stion: "What restrictions, if 
any, do you believe should be placed on the sale of the following State owned 
enterprises?" 
Source: Public Service Association, Wellington, 1990. 
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Table 2.5 (below) more succinctly illustrates the degree to which the public 
wanted SOE ownership to be retained in New Zealand hands. 
Table 2.5 
Questionnaire: Support for New Zealand ownership of the SOEs (December 1988 and 
September 1989) 
How much do you agree or 
disagree that you would ... 
Support privatisation if the Govt 
organisations involved were bought 
by New Zealand interests. 
Agree 
Strongly 
(%) 
'89 '90 
21 11 
Source: Public Service Association, Wellington, 1990. 
Agree 
(%) 
'89 '90 
53 62 
Total 
Agree 
(%) 
'89 '90 
74 73 
The Government, however, did not meaningfully respond to such 
opinion. In the case of New Zealand's two biggest SOEs, Telecom and 
Electricorp (and as table 2.5 shows above), over 45 percent of those asked 
said that the corporations should not be sold at all, with a further 50 
percent stating that if they were sold at least half the shares in the 
corporations should be retained in New Zealand hands. However, in the 
sale of Telecom, which took place in June 1990, there were no restrictions 
(other than just under a 50 percent ownership) to foreign buyers. Indeed, 
given the structure of the shareholder ownership, greater foreign 
ownership cannot be ruled out in the future. Moreover, the necessary 
legislation required to allow the sales process to begin was passed in only 
forty eight hours, prohibiting any meaningful discussion - in Parliament 
and by the public - taking place. As Sue Piper stated: 
No wonder the Government passed through the legislation which enabled 
[them] to sell Telecom so quickly because they obviously know ... that the longer 
the debate is about these questions the more resistance people have to the sale 
of services like Telecom.76 
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Results such as these question whether the Government had a clear 
mandate to sell the SOEs. Continues Piper: 
[It has not got] ... and in fact never did have a mandate. [In] the 1987 election 
campaign Labour did not announce the policy of asset sales, to the country. That 
policy was introduced after the election. So they never have had the mandate 
in the sense of an electoral mandate at all, and I guess what these polls are 
showing is that despite their efforts to promote privatisation ... they are not 
convincing you and I and everybody else ... that this programme is a good 
programrne?7 
Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has provided two key pieces of background 
information. First, it has described the events leading up to, and the 
rationale behind the Government's decision to privatise the SOEs. Such a 
decision, while radical in nature, can be seen to have been consistent with 
the "more-market" ideology being espoused by the Labour Government. 
More significant to this study was the process by which the decision to 
privatise was reached. The three observations discussed in part two clearly 
show that the general public and State unions were excluded from the 
privatisation programme's decision-making process in a number of ways. 
Such a finding concurs with the elite model's central proposition; namely, 
that the masses do not possess the power necessary to influence the 
formation of public policy. Of course, and as the model asserts, the 
corollary of this is that only a select few groups do. Accordingly, it argues 
that societies are governed by an elite of groups who make all the key political, 
economic and social decisions. With this central proposition in mind, the rest 
of this study turns its attention towards analysing the ~ower of two groups 
that are ~rgued to have had a significant influence in c'~he formation of the 
privatisation programme; namely, the Treasury and the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable (NZBRT). ) 
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Chapter Three 
Treasury's Relationship with Douglas: 
Bureaucratic or Political "Capture"? 
Labour ... unleashed an economic revolution in late 1984, based not on its own politics but on a 
blueprint provided by Treasury.l 
"Douglas was always in control of the overall decision-making process ... he called the shots and we 
provided him with the information he needed.''2 
Introduction 
The ___ pgrpose of this chapter is to examine the nature and degree of 
.,."-' ~ ~ --- -_.,~-,-~,_, ---~~-'---·'" ,., _-.. -. 
influence the Treas~hadjn~th~Jormation of the privatisation policy. To 
___ ,.,.,.~,.:c,..-.,...-3_~,----·-.-.· ,.,. t~~--..-~--c- - "'·"-· -~--· _,_.,..,~-~--------=-----~ 
do this, the discussion is divided into two parts. The first applies the 
bureaucratic and bounded rationality models to Treasury's relationship 
with the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. The aim of using these 
models will be to establish the amount of "bureaucratic capture" that took 
place; in other words, the degree to which the Treasury successfully 
influenced and manipulated Douglas' thinking on privatisation. The 
second part of this chapter discusses factors that suggest a limitation to the 
notion of "bureaucratic capture." 
Before operationalising the bureaucratic and bounded rationality models, 
it is necessary to briefly examine two assumptions that are used in the 
following two chapters. The first assumption relates to why this study 
focuses only on the Treasury and the New Zealand Business Roundtable 
(NZBRT) as the two groups that may have influenced Douglas' thinking. 
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Turning first to the Treasury, it is argued to have had the potential to 
directly influence Douglas' thinking on privatisation. As this chapter will 
fully discuss, the Department could have done this via its role as the 
principle advisory body to the Minister of Finance; Treasury officials made 
no secret of the fact that they supported a privatisation policy and are 
widely seen to have exerted direct influence by consistently ~vocating 
privatisation in their policy advice to Douglas. Moreover, their advice met 
relatively little competition and therefore monopolised this area of policy 
advice. The relationship between the information submitted by the 
Treasury and Douglas' justifications for the need to privatise the SOEs is 
given by some as evidence that significant "bureaucratic capture" took 
place. Thus, the Treasury is argued to have usurped political power, 
formulating a policy of privatisation which was imposed, via the Minister 
of Finance, onto an "overwhelmed" Cabinet.3 
The NZBRT - further discussed in chapter four - is the second group that 
is argued to have played a significant role in the formation of the policy, 
though through more indirect means. This is so because Douglas was 
predisposed to consider the position of, and the advice from, the business 
community for a number of reasons. First, he supported the privatisation 
policy because of the inherent belief that private sector management of 
the SOEs would be more efficient; privatisation was therefore 
implemented primarily with the private sector in mind. Second, it is 
known that Douglas made causal links between private sector confidence 
and a stable economic environment. The Minister therefore actively 
pursued policies - such as privatisation - that he felt would facilitate 
private sector confidence. Furthermore, privatisation was a policy that 
many in the private sector were calling for; it represented the epitome of 
the "more-market" environment that would enable companies to enjoy 
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larger profits and sounder strategic positioning within the economy. Thus, 
in the light of these assertions, the NZBRT is argued to have become more 
influential in the decision-making process because both it and Douglas 
shared the same commercial values and fundamentally, the same set of 
economic goals. 4 
The second assumption made here - primarily to limit the scope of 
analysis - is that Douglas was the primary actor behind the Labour 
Government's programme of economic reform. Such an assumption is 
held to be true by most political commentators. For instance, Easton states: 
~------­ ~--~-
-------------- -- --~~---
While Lange had the title and the symbols of power, it was Douglas who made 
the running; it was even his name that was used in the popular term for the 
Government's economic policies, in contrast to Thatchernomics or Reaganomics 
where the premier's dominance was acknowledged.s 
--~~~~~--· -- -~- _ _._-~_.._.,_,_,_'---~ ~-~ • ...-o~-- -~-~-·-·._...._,.~~---~~ 
-~~--..-o------·~-
~~ 
Because Douglas is widely regarded as the archi~rm 
programme, it seems logical to focus on that individual identified as 
central to much of the change in the New Zealand economy. Accordingly, 
this study analyses the Treasury and NZBRT's relationship with the 
Minister of Finance only. 
Operationalising The Bureaucratic Model 
This model identifies six ways through which the bureaucrat can exert 
considerable influence on the decision-making process. Each will be 
discussed here in turn. In operationalising the model's criteria, two of the 
six were found not relevant to this study. The first of the two relates to 
bureaucratic power being derived from the ambiguous role it plays in society. 
Moreover, this ambiguity is argued by the model to be enhanced by the 
lack of accountability the bureaucracy has with its political masters. 
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The Treasury's relationship with Douglas was, in the context of this study, 
quite unambiguous. The Department had a clearly defined role to play, 
providing the Minister with economic policy advice. Moreover, the 
concept of "accountability" is also not necessarily relevant to this study. 
Accountability, as outlined in the model, refers more to the 
implementation phase of public policy; where the lack of bureaucratic 
accountability gives it more scope to interpret and implement policy as it 
sees fit. However in the formation of public policy, which is the focus of 
', 
this study, the bureaucracy has no real need to be held accountable for the 
information it provides. This is because it is)merely giving policy advice 
which the Minister can choose to accept or ignore. 
~~ 
Similarly, the second criterion outlined i~.model is not particularly 
relevant to this study. Here, the fragmenta~tl);he bureaucracy is argued 
to provide greater autonomy - and thus g~C'IkJ"~~r - in the decision-
making process. The Treasury /Dougla~i£ship however was not 
fragmented. Treasury officials had a direct link with Douglas that was 
never really encroached upon by any other department or organisation. 
Moreover, the Treasury is a highly specialised and "insular department"; 
the need then for officials to seek advice from groups outside the 
c-.o..c __ ,__...=...-_..-.....__~ =~ 
Department becomes minimal. 6 Stated a senior Tr<:asury offkial: _"}Vhile 
~ 
the preparation of advice will draw on analytical techniques and 
information which naturally originate from outside the 
Treasury ... Treasury advice does not derive from sources outside the 
Treasury; [Its] advice derives from the Treasury itself.''7 
The other four criteria outlined in the model are relevant to this study 
and offer considerable insight into the influence Treasury might have had 
upon Douglas' thinking. 
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First, the model asserts that officials tend to be experts in their field whilst 
--·--_;- --o._.. 
politicians can lack such a high degree of specialist knowledge. As a result, 
the model argues, the politicians will tend to rely on the experts in the 
bureaucracy. This criterion is clearly applicable in Treasury's case. Treasury 
officials were significantly more conversant than Douglas in matters 
pertaining to macro-economic policy. They included some of the top 
graduates in economic studies as well as strong academic performers from 
other disciplines.8 Moreover, most of his senior advisers were far more 
experienced than Douglas in economic affairs because they had been 
economic advisers for a considerable number of years. Douglas on the 
other hand, while full of ideas and enthusiasm, did not have the degree of 
specialisation necessary to address some of the more complex economic 
issues. The role that the Treasury officials' expertise played is identified by 
an adviser close to Douglas at the time, who stated that the Minister came 
into office in 1984 "with a lot of good ideas but he hadn't filled them out. It 
was really the Treasury that provided the technical know-how for him to 
develop his ideas into policy."9 
The concept of bureaucratic expertise is particularly significant with regard 
to Douglas' presentation of the privatisation programme to his Cabinet 
colleagues as well as the public. The privatisation policy was clearly a 
sensitive political issue for the Labour Government, however, because 
Treasury officials could argue complex economic issues more 
compellingly, they could depoliticise the political sensitivity about 
privatisation by presenting it as a technical solution to an economic 
problem. Douglas could therefore justify privatisation by presenting 
Treasury's complex economic arguments - which on the surface seemed 
devoid of any ideological components. Jesson concurs with such an 
assertion: 
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Most of the public discussion ... was conducted in the language of economics, 
which meant that it was argued as a technical matter rather than one of 
political belief ... This meant that Rogernomics was based on an 
incomprehensible body of economic theory that was almost impossible to 
debate.lO 
(Finally, while having only 120 professional advisory staff, the expertise 
and intellectual firepower held by these officials in the realm of economic 
policy also helped to secure the Treasury's dominant position of influence 
,'l 
over its bureaucratic rivals.ll / 
~The high degree of social conformity within a bureaucracy is the second 
source of power identified by the model that can be applied to this study. It 
is achieved through the recruitment of personnel with similar social and 
educational backgrounds and reinforced by a secondary socialisation 
\. 
process that takes place within the organisation) Thus, the bureaucracy 
possess power because it speaks with "one voice" and as such, is easily 
identified and associated with by likeminded groups and individuals in 
the decision-making process. 
The Treasury clearly displays a high degree of social conformity -
recruiting mostly university graduates with generally similar degrees and 
backgrounds.12 Moreover, internal procedures within the Treasury - as 
with most government departments - emphasise conformity and 
---·-~--==~~"""' ~-
uninamity. For example, by the time a discussion pape;- goe;-t~h.e 
----------------- ---------------~ 
Minister, it has been reviewed, and if necessary re-drafted by the section or 
d~d-;-resuHtt1g1n an opmwn- t11atwUrbe -cons-ist~~t-~~ith--
~·-------~~-~-~~·~~-~- ·----.-~~--------~- _____,_....,.------~--, -
pr~-;~lling departmental opinio~.13 The unif~~~ityorideas and pol.i.cy 
.----------·~~--'-=-_,_......-=o..._~----·~-·oo,-,.~-~,~-....___..,-~-... --
advice that emanated from the Treasury at the time was, in part, a result 
of the similar socialisation processes the officials had experienced. This 
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social conformity is also argued to have given the Treasury influence over 
Douglas and the Cabinet, as both groups shared a number of similar social 
characteristics: they were from a similar age bracket (30 to 50 years old), 
had similar family backgrounds (typically middle class and often urban), 
and had been through similar university education, the economic content 
of which would have been much the same (1960s neoclassical economics 
updated to the 1970s). Moreover, these two groups went through similar 
------------~~-~~~----- --- ---political experiences; both were in "opposition" to the previous Prime 
=--=-·-- -- • o-, - - ' '- '-
-....--=-.: 
Minister and Minister of Finance, Sir Robert Muldoon.14 
The third source of bureaucratic power relates to its pervasiveness in society . 
Bureaucratic power is a dominant influence in the decision-making 
process because it proliferates so many spheres of social life. The model is 
obviously referring to the bureaucracy as a whole, however, it can be 
interpreted in a narrower sense to help explain the pervasive role that the 
Treasury plays in the formation of public policy. 
While the Treasury is not the only advisory source for economic and 
financial matters to the Cabinet, it is undoubtedly the most important. As 
Polascheck remarked, "Treasury's influence is greater than any other 
--------------
department...its financial decisions and recommendations pervade every 
aspect of governmen!_~ctivit)':''15 A number of reasons can be seen for this 
pervasiveness. For example, the Treasury is the dominant influence on 
recurrent expenditure; it initiates, co-ordinates and presents to the 
Government the expenditure plan for each successive year.16 The 
Department consequently has a wide range of control functions not only 
in the sphere of macro-economic policy, but also controlling public 
revenue and expenditure, overseeing government department's financial 
operations, and providing financial information on central government 
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r:------. ~ 
I'll- ot ook into, although its reports rarely de.li. with purely polit:;_j 
lwnsiderations. "18 
activ Thus, notes Roberts, "there is little t~at Treasury cannot and 
The emphasis placed on the Finance Portfolio is another reason for the 
pervasive nature of Treasury influence. The Minister of Finance is now 
one of the most senior members in the New Zealand Cabinet. In more 
-----~- -------~-~~--~-~-------
recent times there has also been the practice of appointing several Deputy 
Finance Ministers who are of Cabinet rank. In the Labour Government's 
first term there were effectively three Finance Ministers - Roger Douglas, 
--------------~~-0~-----------
Richard Prebble and David Caygill - all of whom not only held Cabinet 
rank, but also sat on the Policy Committee, with at least one sitting on 
;;;c":"'h-o-f,.-:-"lth-e--;:fi:-v-e~S;::-e-c~t~;;;l-C~~;it~~~~~-. _T_h_u-s, there was at least one senior 
Minister arguing Treasury's case in all the major policy-making forums.19 
The Treasury's pervasive influence is also enhanced because of the 
practices that surround the reporting procedures to Cabinet. As the 
monitor of government expenditure, the Treasury has significant 
influence over other departmental submissions to Cabinet. In 1987 for 
instance, 75 percent of all Cabinet submissions were commented on by the 
Treasury.20 Moreover, since 1973, Treasury reports have been distributed 
to all Cabinet Ministers. A wider range of key decision-makers are 
therefore able to consider and evaluate the Treasury's views, which are 
not only cogently argued, but are often shorter than the departmental 
submissions upon which they are commenting. Given the work pressures 
that most Ministers face, they will tend then to read the Treasury report, 
giving only brief attention to the original departmental submission.21 
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In the light of this evidence, this study asserts that the Treasury is a most 
dominant and pervasive influence over the decision-making process. It 
has a significant reporting role and is highly active with regards to policy 
matters across a wide spectrum of governmental activity. 22 
The fourth and most significant criterion in the context of this study 
relates to the bureaucracy being able to directly select and control the 
information that is given to the politician. This is argued to have a significant 
impact on the decision-making process because in doing so, it is able to 
influence the questions that are asked, the way problems are defined, the 
policy options that are considered and ultimately therefore, the policies 
that are decided upon. 
With this in mind, the information Treasury gave Douglas in its capacity 
as principle economic adviser had the potential to have significantly 
influenced his thinking on privatisation. The Treasury consistently 
presented and advocated two main justifications in its policy advice. The 
first related to the increased efficiency gains that would result from 
privatising the SOEs; the second was linked to the level of New Zealand's 
public debt and how it could be significantly reduced through the sale of 
the SOEs. These two justifications - known as the "debt and efficiency 
arguments" -will be discussed in turn. 
Turning first to the efficiency argument. The Treasury advocated the 
privatisation of the SOEs primarily because of the belief that private sector 
ownership and disciplines would significantly improve their operating 
efficiency. The efficiency argument can first be seen in Economic 
Management. In it, the Treasury lamented the fact that the New Zealand 
economy faced "serious structural difficulties" displaying "one of the most 
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lack-lustre performances among countries in the developed world."23 
Treasury identified the State sector as being particularly inefficient and 
therefore in need of significant reform. This was so, because "the efficiency 
with which these resources are used has a major impact on the growth 
and general performance of the economy."24 It was argued that a primary 
reason for this inefficiency was due to the Government's ownership of the 
SOEs. Treasury therefore advised the Government that improved 
efficiency gains in the State sector could be achieved through privatising 
certain State owned trading enterprises. 
After Economic Management , and continuing to the December 17 
Economic Statement in 1987, the policy advic~ sU:brnitted to-bouglasoy 
·-~-=--· Treasury clearly shows a continued bias in favour of privatisation. The 
-----~~--~-~~---=~--- -~--- ---~-7-. ~- ''"'-~"·~-----~-----~~---~-.. -~~-~--~-~ 
context for this centred around the corporatisation debate. In it, the 
------~--- -,~-- _____ "_____ -------------~---~- ----~--~.~ 
Treasury consistently downplayed the ability of State owned enterprises to 
effectively monitor operating performance and thus provide the necessary 
incentives to improve efficiency. At the same time, it implied that private 
sector ownership and disciplines would give more effective monitoring, 
greater incentives, and ultimately superior efficiency. 
For instance, in May 1985, Treasury wrote a paper for Douglas entitled "The 
Economic Rationale for Continuing State Ownership of Trading Enterprises. "25 
The paper discussed some of the problems Treasury felt were created by the 
State ownership of the SOEs. Referring to the SOE model, it stated that the 
"commercialisation" stage achieved important efficiency gains, however 
there were "often significant limitations to such a policy, particularly in 
the absence of private sector disciplines on performance."26 The paper 
went on to discuss the relative weakness of monitoring and incentive 
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mechanisms that resulted from State ownership. The report concluded by 
stating: 
In many cases continued State ownership may not be the most effective way of 
meeting the Government's aims of improving efficiency ... Undertaking a review 
of the appropriateness of continued State ownership of individual State owned 
trading activities, could permit significant gains in efficiency and economic 
growth.27 
By August 1986, the Treasury was clearly advocating the privatisation of 
the SOEs to Douglas in its policy advice. For instance, in one report, the 
Department wrote: 
In Treasury's view there are inherent limitations to the achievement of private 
sector levels of efficiency ... The proposed monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms for SOEs, while an improvement over the current position, are 
unlikely to be adequate substitutes for [these] market mechanisms.28 
The paper went on to suggest that a privatisation programme would go a 
long way to meeting higher levels of efficiency. Moreover, it is argued that 
such a programme would be far more effective if a complete rather than 
partial asset sales programme was initiated because, "partial privatisation 
is unlikely to achieve all achievable efficiency gains"29 
In September 1986 a paper titled "State Owned Enterprises: Umbrella 
Legislation and Public Participation" emphasised that public participation 
would play an important role in encouraging directors and managers to act 
in the owner's interest. It recommended to the Minister of Finance that he 
should therefore urge the Deputy Prime Minister to instruct that "the SOE 
umbrella legislation reflect ... appropriate adjustment of accountability 
provisions to accommodate public participation." 30 
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By 1987, Treasury had intensified its criticism of' the SOE model, arguing 
that it did not provide the structures necessary to achieve optimum 
efficiency levels. For instance, in March 1987 it submitted a report 
highlighting the limitations to offshore borrowing while an SOE remained 
in State ownership.31 In essence, the report argued that as long as the SOEs 
were majority-owned by the Government, international debt markets 
would view SOEs as an extension of sovereign risk. As such, it would be 
very hard for an SOE to go bankrupt. The principle of competitive 
neutrality- something that corporatisation was trying to achieve - could 
therefore not exist.32 
It is clear that Treasury's comments were being accepted by Douglas. On 4 
May 1987, he wrote a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister highlighting his 
concerns that while new SOEs were now more efficient than before, they 
still did not have transferable shares, and as such, were not subject to 
normal private sector disciplines: 
No matter how good the directors we appoint are ... the fact remains that there 
will be no more external disciplines to ensure that their objectives are aligned 
with those of the owners of businesses. I therefore share the concerns of officials 
that a fully effective financial monitoring function is necessary.33 
After April 1 1987, the importance that effective monitoring procedures 
would have on the new SOEs was increasingly being stressed by the 
Treasury. In doing so, it continued to downplay the effective monitoring 
of performance that could take place while the SOEs were State owned. 
For instance, during May and June 1987, Treasury compiled a 
comprehensive report entitled "Commercial Performance of the State Owned 
Enterprises: Principles for Shareholder Monitoring." 34 The document was 
prepared to assist Ministers in deciding upon the details of a programme 
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for the commercial monitoring of all SOEs. Treasury proposed a 
framework for monitoring that reflected procedures adopted in the 
private sector. Throughout the paper, however, it repeatedly discussed the 
inherent limitations of monitoring that existed while an SOE was State 
owned. For instance, in one part it stated that inefficiency in the 
production of goods and services arose "from the absence of pressures on 
public enterprise to perform which normally would be present through 
the transfer of ownership." 35 In another section it argued that: "By 
definition, the transfer of ownership is a limited option for public 
enterprises. This reduces significantly the pressures on directors to act in 
the shareholder's interest." 36 
By the night of the July 1987 Budget, Treasury can therefore be seen to 
have consistently stressed the limitations that public sector monitoring 
had on improving the SOEs operating efficiency. The implication was 
always that only private ownership and disciplines would secure greater 
and more lasting efficiency gains. 
Prior to the 1987 Budget, the Treasury also consistently justified 
privatisation on the grounds that revenue generated from the sale of 
assets would help to significantly reduce New Zealand's high level of 
public debt. 
Treasury can also be seen to have first used the debt argument in Economic 
Management. and Opening the Books. It stressed that "the overseas debt is 
too high"37 and that the Government could not "go on borrowing to 
maintain the living standard of New Zealanders."38 Therefore, as a 
solution the Department suggested the Government sell existing shares in 
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organisations such as Air New Zealand or Petrocorp in order to finance 
the fiscal deficit in the short term.39 
The debt argument was not emphasised by the Treasury in its policy 
advice until December 1986 when it began submitting reports for the 1987 
Budget. In one of the first budget reports, Treasury advised Douglas that 
the Government needed to significantly reduce the level of New Zealand's 
public debt.40 A number of arguments were given in support of this. For 
instance, the accumulation of debt was resulting in levels of debt servicing 
that placed an "increasing burden on the taxpayer." These costs were 
growing well in excess of the rate of growth of nominal GDP, and as such 
were having "negative" effects on the growth of the economy.41 Treasury 
also noted that the level of debt would soon begin to have a detrimental 
effect upon the finance market. Thus, Government action: 
... to reduce the deficit and particularly the growth of expenditure would help 
to strengthen confidence about future economic prospects. Improved confidence 
would not only help to reduce inflationary expectations but would also 
contribute to a more stable economic environment.42 
It therefore advised the Government that "the need for fiscal restraint next 
year will be paramount and indeed that some further policy measures to 
achieve reductions in the fiscal deficit are likely to be needed."43 
By March 1987 the Treasury's briefing papers to Douglas had become more 
assertive: The level of public debt had now reached "chronic" 
proportions.44 Moreover, this reflected significant inconsistencies in 
Government policy that threatened a "major break in confidence" -which 
in turn would result in adverse pressure being put on the interest and 
exchange rates. Such an occurrence, it was argued, would undermine the 
liberalisation measures that had already been implemented.45 
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During March, the Treasury's arguments began to link an asset sales 
programme to a reduction in the level of debt.46 It argued that a 
privatisation programme on one hand would yield greater efficiency gains, 
while on the other the proceeds from the sales would be used to reduce the 
level of debt. It therefore recommended to the Minister that he note 
"Treasury's view that there are substantial efficiency gains possible from 
asset sales, and proceeds from any such sales should be applied to debt 
reduction. "47 
Again, Douglas accepted the advice given to him by Treasury, for in a 
memorandum for Cabinet he stated that New Zealand could no longer 
afford to "go on running deficits of the current size and accumulating debt 
IC' 
> ' -·-~· -_ '-
at the current rate."48 He concluded that the Government had to look at 
~~ , __ ....,_____,__~, -~~-
ways of reducing tile' f1scal deficit. To achieve this, he s~3h:~d that "some 
- . ->~""'"-'"""""--.!S3<_,--=----.......,~.J 
asset sales" should take place during the year "[They] do not remove the 
------'"""""'-:~~-__:---~-~~..,.,.,..,_.,._,, .. ~~-..-~-,_c-___ ~- --.,-~--.,~'!'"·~--,~----· -~~-.-_,;.,..,..,....,...,."!~-~-·.:_.~~-- :;''\- -~ :-:J 
pressure on interest rates and ~-x~~ang~ r~te.~,5t.~~!eci ~yJ~~g~,}l?ancial 
~-- - ..... -k;~--C-0_.,.,.,_-.'/~• ~' _,. -~-~~~•~-'-- ~-- - - ., '-"•.- ...,.-,,_ ... _~ 
deficits. However they do contain the growth of debt servicing costs." 49 
By April 9, Douglas' proposal for an extensive recasting of government 
activity had been developed by the Treasury. A scenario considered by the 
Treasury to be the best "overall budget package" resulted from this and was 
given to Douglas.SO The package included the sale of "many government 
assets" both in commercial and social areas in order to generate funds to 
eliminate public debt.Sl To illustrate this point, Treasury submitted a table 
that emphasised the significance an asset sales programme would have in 
reducing the level of New Zealand's public debt (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 
Elimination of debt burden with asset sales 
Commercial Assets 
Rural bank 
NZBC 
BNZ 
Petrocorp (net) 
Electricity 
Forestry 
Postal 
Coal 
Telecom 
POSB 
Property 
DFC 
Airways-Airports 
Lands 
Tourist Hotels 
State Insurance 
Air New Zealand 
Government Printer 
Geothermal 
Railways 
Ministry of Works 
Sub-Total 
Non Commercial Assets 
Housing-Rental 
-Loans 
Educational Establishments 
Health 
Sub-Total 
Grand total of Assets 
Debt Burden 
Gross Internal Public 
Gross External Public 
SOE Debt 
Grant total of debt 
SHORTFALL 
Source: The Treasury, Wellington. 
$ (m) 
1,500 
1,000 
1,500 
500 
6,000 
1,500 
200 
100 
2,500 
300 
1,000 
400 
500 
200 
300 
500 
500 
200 
500 
200 
100 
19,500 
3,000 
3,000 
10,000 
10,000 
26,000 
45,500 
22,000 
22,500 
5,500 
49,500 
4000 
Douglas appears to have accepted Treasury advice. By May 1987 he 
submitted a memorandum to Cabinet with a proposal that the 
Government embark on an "on-going programme of sales of equity in 
State-Owned Enterprises" in order to "slow the growth of public debt. "52 
As part of the asset sales programme Douglas proposed a combination of 
selling shares and equity bonds. Consequently, his recommendations to 
Cabinet were that they: 
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a) Note: ... a programme of public participation in State Owned Enterprises offers 
considerable potential for reducing the public debt burden ... as well as providing strong 
incentives to improve SOE performance. 
b) Agree [to the]: 
i. Sale of 100 percent of the Crowns equity in Petrocorp, DFC and Air New Zealand. 
ii. The issue of equity bonds equivalent to 25 percent of the equity of Government 
Property Services and the New Zealand Forestry Corporation. 
iii. Authorisation to issue equity bonds equivalent to up to 25 percent of the equity of the 
remaining seven new SOEs ... 
Source: The Treasury. Budget Report No. 60. 13 May 1987., p.S. 
On the night of the July 1987 Budget, Douglas publicly announced for the 
first time that some asset sales would take place. He clearly had, by this 
time, accepted both the Treasury's debt and efficiency arguments. 
However, his public support for them - and indeed a full privatisation 
programme - was muted. For instance, while acknowledging that the sale 
of some assets would reduce the level of debt, he announced that most 
would only have up to 25 percent of their equity sold on a non-voting 
basis. Moreover, only fleeting reference was given to the efficiency gains 
that privatisation would bring.53 
After the Budget, it is clear from their correspondence to Douglas, that 
Treasury officials were not happy with the Government's announcement 
that only a "limited" privatisation programme would be initiated. 
Consequently, advice given between July and December 1987 continuously 
stressed the merits of full privatisation by highlighting the limited gains to 
efficiency that would result from partial privatisation. For instance, in one 
paper they wrote: 
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The issuing of equity bonds for some SOEs will transfer some responsibility for 
monitoring to private sector investors ... However the Government's retention of 
ownership ... willlimit the contribution of monitoring.54 
While in another paper: 
Because it does not lead to contestable control we believe that the partial 
privatisation of businesses is likely to provide only comparatively small 
benefits. This suggests that the Government should look to transfer at least the 
majority of the equity of any SOE. 55 
Concurrent with Treasury's "full privatisation" thrust were a variety of 
papers that continued to highlight firstly the negative effects of New 
Zealand's public debt levels and secondly, the potential to reduce the debt 
even more if a more comprehensive privatisation policy was 
implemented. 
Again, it can be asserted that Douglas concurred with the advice given by 
Treasury because by November 1987, he had agreed to a full privatisation 
programme; using the debt argument as the primary justification. In a 
Cabinet memorandum he stated: 
The Government will transfer ownership and control of the State Commercial 
businesses and assets to full private ownership. The objectives are to use the 
proceeds of the sales to reduce levels of public debt so as to provide the 
Government with more financial flexibility, and to increase national income 
through more efficient use of assets.56 
Page 86 
Treasury's Relationship with Douglas: Bureaucratic or Political "Capture"? 
The Bounded Rationality Model - Treasury's Use of the Satisficing 
Process 
The concept of bounded rationality gives further insight to the suggestion 
that the Treasury influenced Douglas' thinking. The model states that 
individuals, when faced with a number of choices, will prioritise and 
choose an option that best serves their own interests. Moreover, once an 
option has been identified, a satisficing process takes place in which only 
information supporting that option choice will be given. What results 
from this is a policy that reflects the information given. 
---------------- -<c-~----- -~-~-=~------
Treasury was significantly influenced by, and- aTignect-to-t:-he-Ghicago:. 
School of Economics, whose policy outlook is fundamentally anti-statist. 
As Reder defines, the Chicago school: 
---~~l:~:ased toward:-;r~scrving o~ c:::l::h;~~ -;,'; :-;,~;~~ 
(negative) freedom of choice and action for consumers, producers and · 
entrepreneurs, (ii) a minimum tax-, welfare-, and interventionalist state, and 
:~:c_;;able rule bound institutional frame=o~k includi:~ 
~---
Treasury's policy advice justifying privatisation on the grounds that it 
would improve economic performance is derived from the Chicago 
perspective that it held. Accordingly, officials are argued here to have 
adopted a satisficing process, providing only information that was in line 
with the Chicago school of thought. The outcome of this satisficing process 
is illustrated by a number of empirical and factual anomalies pertaining to 
the Treasury's assertion that private ownership is inherently more 
efficient than public. For instance, in one paper, Treasury officials stated 
that "[w]ith the exception of heavily regulated private sector firms, the 
empirical studies are almost unanimous in finding evidence for superior 
efficiency by private sector firms." 58 
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However, a number of prominent individuals and significant studies 
clearly disagree with the assertion that private sector efficiency is 
inherently better. Millward, for instance "finds overall, no broad support 
for private enterprise superiority ... there seems to be no general grounds 
for believing managerial efficiency is less in public firms. "59 Further, the 
Borcherding et al. survey of studies covering five countries concludes 
along similar lines, stating that public sector inefficiency has not so much 
to do with the transferability of ownership, but rather lack of competition. 
Indeed, the sources of public sector "waste" it argues has more to do with 
the clash of differing objectives rather than fundamental inefficiency.60 In 
another example, Treasury constantly used the agency theory or "principle 
agent" analysis in its support of privatising the SOEs on the grounds of 
enhanced efficiency. However, it is well known in the profession that "the 
theory of agency is not well enough developed to be of much scientific 
interest. "61 In the light of such evidence, Easton concludes by stating that 
the theory relating to Treasury's efficiency argument dominated over all 
the evidence that argued to the contrary.62 
Similarly, Treasury consistently advocated privatisation on the grounds 
that it would reduce debt, yet never acknowledged in its argument that 
there was considerable skepticism of the debt argument. For instance, J.K 
Galbraith on a visit to New Zealand in 1988 stated that "the sale of 
government assets has very little impact on the real influence of debt. It is 
a cosmetic action which reduces deficits without having any real effect on 
the economy. "63 Dr Roderick Deane also recognised the shortcomings of 
the debt argument. The real economic gains, he argued, "do not relate to 
the balance sheet effects accruing from the sale of assets ... the public sector 
has not altered its net worth through the privatisation process. "64 
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The Treasury therefore only submitted information to Douglas that 
supported the Chicago perspective it held. Indeed, when a paradigm 
conflict arose, Treasury would simply choose to ignore the alternative 
view. Such a situation has serious implications on the formation of public 
policy. Easton argues that where there is paradigm conflict, "it is 
incumbent upon policy advisers to be aware of both paradigms and to seek 
policy recommendations which involved consistency with each." 65 Read 
concurs with this opinion: 
In such circumstances it is a requirement of professionalism that. .. economic 
advice related to practical decisions should not stray far from the middle 
ground of ... economic science and should, where appropriate, pay due regard to 
alternative theoretical interpretations of the facts. 66 
The result of this was that Douglas received a "bounded" view of the 
problem and issues. He consequently never formed an opinion based on 
other viewpoints. 
A Limitation to the notion of "Bureaucratic Capture" 
The evidence presented through applying the bureaucratic and bounded 
rationality models suggests that the Treasury had a number of means 
through which it could influence or "capture" Douglas' thinking on 
privatisation; it contained experts in economic policy who were of a 
socially similar background and education to those in the key decision-
making positions; it was a pervasive influence in the realm of economic 
policy - dominating the nature and content of economic advice that 
Douglas received; and it provided information to the Minister that was 
unwavering in its consistency and highly selective in its focus. However, 
while these means of influence existed, a number of other factors suggest 
that the notion of "bureaucratic capture" is limited. Douglas is argued to 
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have been influenced by variables that were independent from his 
relationship with the Treasury. A wide number of factors can be 
indentified, but for the purposes of this study, four will be briefly 
discussed. These are; Douglas' own thinking, experiences, principles and 
personality. 
The Consistency in Thinking Between Douglas and the Treasury 
Probably the most significant factor supporting a limitation to the notion 
of bureaucratic capture is that by the time Douglas became Minister of 
Finance in 1984, his thinking was already consistent _to that of the 
Treasury. Both held a similar "freemarket" orientation in their economic 
thinking, identifying the same problems that existed in the economy and 
coming up with similar conclusions as to how these problems should be 
rectified. 67 
Douglas' quest for greater efficiency and his skepticism regarding State 
intervention can be seen to have existed as early as 1980. For instance, in 
his book There's got to be a better way! published in July of that year, he 
openly questioned the role government departments played in the 
economy: 
But can we really say that everything Government departments do is necessary? 
Any reshaping of New Zealand's institutions should start by challenging every 
facet of central Government. .. Ask- are Government departments necessary? ... Be 
ruthless with the answers. 68 
In the same book, he also advocated government disengagement from 
commercial activities arguing that "[p]oliticians do not know how to run 
businesses. Leave that to the businessmen."69 Moreover, he called for 
fundamental change: advocating a user-pays policy, greater bureaucratic 
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accountability and more clearly defined objectives. In the case of Railways 
for instance, he recommended the Government "turn the show into a 
Corporation" dividing it into small cost centres "so everybody knows what 
he is contributing and how he can do better."70 
Another paper written in 1982 and entitled Does New Zealand have an 
economic future? gives further insight into Douglas' desire for radical 
structural reform. It proposes ways of improving economic performance 
and the role of government in the State sector. He wrote: "In New Zealand 
there are plenty of examples [of] petty Government regulations that 
are ... counterproductive ... We have to decide what is the proper role of 
Government and what is the proper role for the private sector."71 
While Douglas was clearly dissatisfied with the status quo, Oliver notes 
that prior to the end of 1983 his thinking was still developing; up until 
that time he still believed that government involvement in the economy 
was necessary because the market, if left to itself, would develop in ways 
that were detrimental to the national interest.72 Policies he supported at 
the time reflect this. For example, he supported small business protection; 
regional development schemes; the Government "picking winners" for 
investment; and import barrier protection. By the end of 1983 however, 
Douglas' views had shifted considerably to become consistent with a "free 
market" approach in economic thinking. He now showed skepticism in 
the State's capacity to "pick winners." State funding was no longer 
necessary in order to create development in the economy - rather it should 
now only be given in special cases where "market failure" had been 
demonstrated to exist.73 Douglas also no longer saw the need for import 
barriers either; he argued for a rapid reduction in trade protection, 
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accepting the fact that "aggregate output and employment will fall 
initially." 74 
Thus, by the end of 1983, Douglas had adopted a "free market~'- approach to 
his economic thinking.75 He now believed that the market, and not the 
Government should be the primary decision-maker in the economy. 
These views now held by Douglas had evolved to become consistent with 
the Treasury. Two examples illustrate this consistency. First, when 
Douglas became Minister of Finance, his comments supporting radical 
change were very similar to the Treasury's in Economic Management . For 
instance, while the Treasury was attacking the intervention of the 
previous Government and suggesting a fundamental reassessment of the 
way the Government managed the economy, Douglas at the same time 
was stating that: 
New Zealand is at a crossroads ... [We] can no longer afford soft options. 
Regulation and major interventions in the economy have not provided the 
answers ... Far reaching changes in economic policy are essential...the important 
thing is to take steps which result in permanent improvements over the medium 
to long term . .?6 
Second, a senior Treasury official stated that while there might have been 
some differences between the two in the emphasis of some policies, the 
disagreements were never fundamental. The reason for this, he suggested, 
was "because great minds think alike. The reason for the consistency in 
thinking was because we were people grappling with the same problems 
and coming up with similar conclusions."77 
Thus, by 1984 Douglas and the Treasury were already of similar minds 
when confronting the problems that existed in the New Zealand economy, 
and more importantly, both agreed that significant change would need to 
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be implemented in order to rectify these problems. It is argued here that 
this consistency in thinking between Douglas and Treasury downplays the 
notion of "bureaucratic capture" because while Douglas may not have 
advocated privatisation per se, the policy was consistent with his own 
thinking and economic objectives. In this context, the Treasury - through 
the policy advice it gave - had little need to "win" him over to the notion 
of privatising the SOEs. 
Influencing Factors Prior To 1984 
The second factor suggesting a limitation to the notion of bureaucratic 
capture relates to the political and economic events that occurred prior to 
1984. It is argued here that these events significantly helped formulate 
Douglas' freemarket thinking which in turn made him amenable to a 
policy such as privatisation. Two examples are illustrative. 
The first relates to Douglas' reflections on the National Government's 
"Think Big" programme. He argued that political rather than purely 
economic criteria were used to evaluate the viability of the programme. 
Thus, some projects went ahead that should not have, resulting in a 
number of "financial white elephants."78 Douglas felt that the solution to 
this was to eradicate political interference in the formation of economic 
policy. He was not against government intervention per se, but was 
against intervention that was motivated or conditioned by electoral 
pressures.79 He felt it constrained productive investment and had in fact, 
led to economic decline. Douglas thus favoured a more "technical" criteria 
in the formation of economic policy that excluded the possibility of 
favouring particular interests in society. Moreover, he felt that the best 
decisions would be those that were made by a small elite, who stood apart 
from, and immune to, social and electoral pressures.80 Accordingly, the 
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free market policies being advocated by Treasury were consistent with this 
type of thinking. As Oliver notes: "The ideology of the market, and of the 
inevitable incompetence of state economic planning gave him the 
rationale for finally and completely excluding pernicious social and 
political influences from the field of economic policy. "81 
The second example is associated .with the support Douglas received from 
the Labour Party and Caucus prior to 1984. If he had not gained this 
support prior to 1984, his thinking, and therefore the freemarket policies 
he advocated as minister - such as privatisation - could not have 
developed to the degree that they did. Three main events prior to 1984 are 
identified as having facilitated support for Douglas' policy proposals. 
Labour's loss of the 1981 election was the first event that turned opinion 
towards Douglas' call for the new electoral strategy of placing economic 
policy as the first priority. It was felt that a primary reason for the loss of 
the election was that too much policy had been produced, resulting in the 
impression that Labour would promise anything to anybody.82 As 
Henderson wrote in November 1982: "The 1981 process should be 
reversed: economic policy should be agreed upon first and policies in other 
areas forced to fit within that framework."83 
Another related argument was that Labour had repeatedly lost elections 
because its policies were similar to those of the National Party. A new 
strategy needed to be rendered as distinct from the strategy of its 
opponents. As Moore put it: 
We will only take centre stage with courageous policy action. We should 
apologise to no one that there is nothing for Welfare, if we were Government 
our first budget [would be] to redirect investment and to disinvest ourselves from 
unprofitable traditional industries. That's our challenge and our most dangerous 
move, but it will also return to us the most because of its audacity.84 
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Douglas' policies aiming to restructure the New Zealand economy, known 
later as "Rogernomics", provided the solution to a number of key 
problems. First, it offered a distinct "alternative" to the policies of the 
National Party. More importantly, it gave the order of priorities that 
needed to be addressed. Policies would no longer be given equal status. 
Doing so in 1981 had led to a number of different policy agendas 
competing for position in an overall policy, which in turn led to great 
problems in the dissemination of policy.85 
By the time Lange had ascended to the leadership early in 1983, an electoral 
strategy consistent with Douglas' thinking had been accepted. The strategy 
now provided a "centre" for the policy making process, with economic 
policy dominating all others. The adoption of such a policy would, it was 
felt, ensure that the problems of 1981 would not be repeated.86 
The second event centred on the growing support within the Labour 
Caucus for Douglas' proposals of economic restructuring. For instance, 
within the context of the CER debate, a number of Labour MPs such as 
Palmer and Hercus supported the restructuring that would inevitably be 
needed to accommodate such an agreement. In February 1981, Hercus 
again made it clear that she supported restructuring when she told the 
Woollen Mill Workers Union that "the National Government was not 
incorrect in making the textile industry the subject of study and a 
candidate for more rapid structural change."87 
Caygill also called for restructuring. In a paper to the Caucus Economic 
Committee Policy Seminar in February 1983, he argued for the closure of 
industries that were not viable in a less protected trade environment.88 
Moore also called for trade liberalisation policies. Trade protection he 
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argued, had become a stimulus to monopoly control of the closed 
domestic market which encouraged high domestic prices. Moreover, he 
claimed that protection defended only a few jobs, whilst slowing 
employment in other areas.89 
The decline of the "corporatist tendency" within the Labour Caucus is cited 
as the third event that benefited Douglas's policy stance prior to 1984. 
Corporatism depends upon a consensual agreement between employers, 
union organisations and the Government. Policy would be negotiated and 
agreed upon before its implementation took place. Economic policy 
therefore would be based upon a tripartite consensus and would represent, 
express and encourage "a sense of national unity, a common purpose, and 
would therefore facilitate harmony between employers, workers, and all 
sections of society."90 
A number of influential members in the Labour Caucus advocated the 
corporatist approach in the implementation of economic policy. However 
there were those who felt that such an approach to economic management 
was simply not feasible. The essence of their argument was that the 
construction of an "accord" in support of restructuring would have been 
impossible. This was because the Trade Union movement remained 
suspicious of the idea that opening up the economy to competition had 
long-term benefits. Any tripartite agreements would be exceptionally 
fragile, particularly if they were based on voluntary and revocable 
adherence.91 Arguments such as these raised serious questions concerning 
the political practicality of corporatism, resulting in the policy's decline. 
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The major beneficiary of this decline was Douglas. His type of policy 
proposal of restructuring the economy offered an alternative to the 
daunting political problems that corporatism posed. First, it required no 
corporatist "accord" as the centre-piece of its programme and consequently 
was seen as being far more efficient. Moreover, the programme could be 
implemented by an elite of civil servants and Ministers- people distanced 
from the pressures and influences of organisations representative of social 
interests such as the Trade Unions.92 Thus, it was felt that if a programme 
of restructuring incurred high social costs, as it no doubt would, then it 
would be far more appropriate the programme was more elitist in nature. 
Douglas' Principles 
Douglas also possessed a number of principles that were consistent with 
the implementation of a privatisation programme. First, privatisation 
represents the type of policy that Douglas had always felt was essential in 
order to achieve successful structural reform; it was decisive and was based 
on fundamental considerations that avoided a "short term shortcut."93 
Douglas looked instead to the medium term: "Going for quality means 
choosing the actions that deliver most benefit to the nation in the 
medium term, instead of choosing more now, for supposed political gain, 
at the cost of less later." 94 
Second, Douglas believed that the Government should be consistent in the 
policies it implemented. Once a policy starts to move, he argued, its 
momentum should not be stopped until the "total programme" is 
completed: "Keep the reform process going - drive it to a successful 
conclusion."95 Furthermore, Douglas argued the need for consistency 
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because structural reform had its own "internal logic" that inevitably saw 
one step leading to another. 96 
Douglas' "continuation principle" suggests then that he would have been 
in favour of a privatisation programme for two reasons. First, and due to 
his belief in the benefits of private sector monitoring, it would ensure 
greater efficiency gains. Second, a privatisation programme was felt to be 
necessary as it would "lock in" the efficiency gains that had been made 
during the corporatisation process. As Douglas stated: "If the process stops 
prematurely at corporatisation, many of the gains may ultimately be 
frittered away as time passes."97 
Another key principle held by Douglas, and linked closely to consistency, 
was the need for credibility. The key to credibility was consistency of policy. 
Therefore in order for the Government to remain credible in its structural 
reform policies, it needed to be consistent - to develop the corporatisation 
programme into privatisation in order to increase and secure the levels of 
efficiency. Indeed, Douglas argues that the Government lost much of its 
credibility when it failed to fully carry through its privatisation 
programme. In this context he stated: "Wherever our policies have gone 
only part of the way towards reforms of uncompromising medium-term 
quality, the Government is .. .in trouble."98 It was only through consistency 
and therefore credibility of policy, argued Douglas, that the Government 
could create economic confidence which in turn would generate growth in 
the economy. Consequently, decisions had to be fundamental in nature, 
unwavering in their resolve and carried through as far as they could go: 
"You have to break the pattern of the past dramatically enough to 
convince [people] that, this time, somebody really does mean business." 99 
Page 98 
Treasury's Relationship with Douglas: Bureaucratic or Political "Capture"? 
Douglas' Personality 
Douglas' personality is the final factor discussed here that suggests a 
limitation to the assertion that Treasury "captured" Douglas and 
manipulated the process leading up to the decision to privatise the SOEs. 
Those who worked with Douglas comment on the strength of his 
leadership, his ability to quickly absorb complex ideas and his decisive 
method of decision-making. Such qualities are argued to contribute to the 
suggestion that Douglas was in control, using Treasury to facilitate his 
own vision. Two examples are used to illustrate this. 
The first example relates to Douglas' the "activist" management style. All 
of the Treasury officials interviewed for this study commented on 
Douglas' pro-active nature. For instance, he made a point of personally 
communicating with a large number of Treasury officials. He would not, 
as the previous Minister of Finance did, simply liaise with the most senior 
officials. Thus, Douglas maintained a "hands on" approach to his 
management of the Treasury and its officials. It is argued that this gave 
him a continuous insight into the occurrences within the Treasury. More 
importantly, it enabled him to have and maintain control of the process of 
change. 
Douglas' pro-active management style was linked to his own conviction 
that what he was doing was necessary. As already established, by 1984 he 
had already done a considerable amount of thinking about ways of 
improving the economy's performance. Treasury officials note that the 
Minister "developed his own ideas ... he had a clear vision of what he 
wanted to do." He is argued to have therefore "driven Treasury and set 
their overall agenda for them ... That is probably why he has been so 
successful."100 
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The second example of Douglas' control over the Treasury can be seen on 
the occasions that he disagreed with the advice he received from its 
officials. A good illustration of this was on the occasion Douglas 
announced for the first time that a partial privatisation programme would 
take place. While he signalled complete State disinvestment in New 
Zealand Steel and the selling of shares in Air New Zealand, Petrocorp and 
the DFC, the bulk of the privatisation initiative at this time consisted of an 
equity bond sale for all other SOEs. However, Treasury did not support 
issuing equity bonds; the reason being that equity bonds, while basically 
equivalent to ordinary shares, are different in that they do not offer the 
shareholder the right to vote on decisions affecting that company. 
Effectively therefore while they may "own" shares in the company, the 
shareholders have no control over them.lOl 
Memorandums from Treasury clearly indicate that they advised Douglas 
against the "equity bond option." The grounds for this objection lay in the 
limited efficiency gains that they felt equity bonds offered. This was: 
... because equity bonds are issued with no voting rights ... Shareholders have 
little opportunity to influence the direction of the business. The Government 
continues to be left with the primary responsibility for monitoring the business 
and seeking to improve its performance. 102 
Such an argument was consistent with Treasury's fundamental belief that 
only a full transfer of ownership would provide the most enhanced 
efficiency gains possible. The above illustration also reinforces the 
assertion that Douglas was in control of the policy making process leading 
up to the December 17 Statement. One could posit that Douglas, in not 
following Treasury recommendations, knew the political sensitivity that 
surrounded a privatisation programme. If he had, as Treasury 
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recommended, pushed for complete State disinvestment from the SOEs in 
the July Budget, the policy could easily have faced opposition to the extent 
that it would have had to be shelved. However, by proposing ah initial 
"limited" privatisation programme via the equity bond option; a move 
that only advocated a maximum of 25 percent non-State ownership and 
ensured that control remained firmly in the hands of the State, his more 
cautious colleagues would not have reason to over-react. In other words, 
the July 1987 Budget announcement by Douglas was made for the purpose 
of acting as a "political icebreaker" to the opposition that clearly existed 
towards privatisation at the time. 
When he did finally advocate a full "on-going" privatisation programme 
in December 1987, the more limited July Budget announcement had 
broken the ice by exposing the Cabinet and public to the idea of a 
privatisation programme as well as positing general justifications for it. 
Conclusion 
To what degree did the Treasury influence Douglas' thinking on 
privatisation? If viewed through the bureaucratic and bounded rationality 
models the influence was significant, suggesting that "bureaucratic 
capture" occurred. The Treasury officials were experts in their field; had 
similar social backgrounds and education resulting in a high degree of 
empathy; they monopolised most of the economic advice Douglas 
received and had the ability to directly control and select the information it 
gave him. Moreover, the consistency by which Treasury advice advocated 
the debt and efficiency arguments must also surely have contributed to the 
influence it had over Douglas' thinking. The evidence to support the 
notion of "bureaucratic capture" is argued to be seen in the final outcome; 
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the Government used the very same arguments Treasury advocated in 
Economic Management and in the lead up until the December 17 1987 
statement. 
However, while these factors are evident, it is argued here that Douglas 
was not influenced to the extent that Treasury "captured" his thinking. 
Advisers can always be ignore~./Jt they are taken notice of, then there has 
to be some disposition towards their views. As previously discussed, by 
1984 a number of factors had already propelled Douglas to adopt a similar 
freemarket way of thinking to that of the Treasury. While this does not 
mean he advocated a privatisation policy at the time, it is argued here that 
such a policy would have been consistent with his overall thinking and 
objectives. Moreover, it is argued that Douglas held a number of 
principles that demonstrated an affinity with the notion of privatising the 
SOEs. Finally, the notion of bureaucratic capture must be downplayed in 
light of his strong personality; his vision of change was too developed and 
his activist management style too dominant for the Treasury to 
meaningfully "capture" his thinking or the overall process at which the 
change was occurring. 
Thus, while the Treasury's policy advice must have influenced Douglas to 
some degree, it was more in the sense that it provided him with the 
technical detail to translate his broad vision into substantive policy. In this 
light then, the Treasury facilitated the Minister's wishes rather than 
"captured" his thinking. 
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Chapter Four 
The New Zealand Business Roundtable's 
Relationship with Douglas 
Business dominates the community much more completely than at any time in our history.l 
"I find it impossible to assess how influential we have been." (Roger Kerr, Executive Director of 
the NZBRT). 2 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to assess the nature and degree to which the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT) influenced Douglas' thinking in 
the formation of the privatisation programme. To do so, the economic 
elite model is applied to the relationship between Douglas and the NZBRT 
prior to December 17 1987. This model proposes that political power is 
concentrated in the hands of a top economic elite. In other words, the 
political system is run by and for the people and institutions that dominate 
the economy. Moreover, it asserts that in order to maintain and control 
their political power, the elite uses direct means to influence the decision-
making process.3 The central question that this chapter seeks to answer is; 
can such an assertion be found to exist in the NZBRT's relationship with 
Douglas, and if not, is some alternative explanation required? 
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Operationalising the Economic Elite Model 
Defining the Economic Elite 
Before the model can be operationalised, it is necessary to identify which 
group in New Zealand is the most representative of the "economic elite." 
A number of class wide policy-making organisations exist in New Zealand 
and have become more prominent during the 1980s.4 These include: the 
Top tier Group, the New Zealand Chambers of Commerce, the Institute of 
Directors and the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT). This type 
of organisation is neither concerned with "sectorial interests", nor 
involved in the everyday operation of the industrial relations system. 
Rather, and as Roper explains, it "is composed of policy-making business 
associations whose explicit raison d'etre is the political representation of 
the common interests of the "business community" as a whole." 5 
While all of these groups represent the New Zealand business 
community, in order to limit the scope of analysis, this study assumes that 
the NZBRT is the most representative of the community's "economic elite." 
The application of three definitional characteristics found in the economic 
elite model substantiates this assumption. 
The model's first definitive characteristic of the economic elite is described 
as a small group of individuals who command the operations of the major 
businesses in the economy. The NZBRT clearly represents such a group. 
While currently only having 38 members, all are of Chief Executive status 
who control some of the largest companies in New Zealand.6 Therefore, 
and as the following three observations illustrate, this small group holds 
considerable economic power. 
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First, the NZBRT consists of representatives from almost every sector in 
the New Zealand economy. Most member firms are listed companies. 
However, and as table 4.1 (below) illustrates, membership also includes 
private companies, multinationals, co-operatives, financial mutuals and 
State owned enterprises. 
Table 4.1 
NZBRT members: 31 November 1986 - 31 December 1990 
Financial/Investment Forestry/Conglomerates Oil 
Brierley Investments Fletcher Challenge Shell 
AMP Society Carter Holt Harvey BP 
Bank of New Zealand Elders NZFP Mobil 
Gibbs Securities ICI (NZ) 
Corporate Investments Crown Corp. 
Mair Astley Holdings SOEs 
National Bank Food Processing Electricorp 
United Building Society Goodman Fielder Wattie Telecom 
NZI Corporation NZ Co-operative Dairy Co. 
Fay, Richwhite & Co. McDonald Systems MediaLPrinting 
Wilson Neill Waitaki (NZ) Ind. Newspapers . 
Equiticorp Alliance Group Wilson & Horton 
Post Bank UEB Industries 
Transport 
Inter Pacific. Equity Ltd Freightways Constry!:LProp 
Westpac Union Shipping Group Chase Corp 
Trustee Bank Holdings Newmans Group McConnell Dowell 
Progressive Enterprises Mainzeal 
Alliance Group Manufac./Basic Metals 
New Zealand Steel LiqyorLRetailing 
Compyters Steel and Tube Lion Nathan 
IBM Ceramco Magnum Corp 
Coma leo 
Feltex Automobiles 
Agriculture Macraes Mining Todd Motors 
FernzCorp Toyota (NZ) 
Source: New Zealand Business Roundtable. Wellington. 
The NZBRT also represents a group of individuals whose companies 
collectively account for a significant portion of the economy's market 
capitalisation and GDP.7 For example, in March 1989 the organisation's 
thirty five companies accounted for 77 percent of the sharemarket's total 
value.8 In the same year, NZBRT companies also accounted for 17.7 
percent of the nation's GDP. Thus, as a group, the NZBRT contributes 
almost as much to the economy as the public sector.9 Within the NZBRT 
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there is a significant concentration of economic weight; the four largest 
companies - Fletcher Challenge (2.8%), Telecom (2.56%), Brierley (2.33%) 
and Electricorp (1.76%)- account for nine and a half percent of GDP.10 
Furthermore, the concentration of individual wealth within the NZBRT 
is extraordinary, as table 4.2 (below) illustrates. In 1989 eight individuals 
held over 350 million shares valued in excess of $507 million. It is 
significant to note that the table does not reflect the total wealth of these 
individuals, but merely indicates the shares they held in the NZBRT 
company of which they were Chief Executive. 
Table 4.2 
Selection of individual NZBRT members holdings in Roundtable companies (1988 & 
1989) 
% Number of Tot. value of 
~arne Com~an~ held shares holding ($m} 
A. Gibbs Ceramco 7.05 6,974,797 8.927 
R.Brierley BIL 4.08 67,026,183 100.539 
C.Herbert Wilson Neill 33.0 89,184,604 64.212 
D.Myers Lion Nathan 12.0 49,144,690 153.822 
P.Masfen Corp. Invest. 61.0 52,744,737 92.303 
P.Francis Chase 3.08 12,509,804 6.630 
Fay: & Richwhite Ca12. Markets 56.0 72,842,560 81.583 
Share Price as at 23.3.89. 
Source: David Steel, "The Business Roundtable II", 1989, p.44. 
The NZBRT also displays the second definitional characteristic identified 
by the model; namely, that the economic elite is united through a variety of 
bonds, with individual members forming a network of close associations; 
such as through interlocking directorates and shared stock. For example, 
the number of directorships held by Roundtable members is significant; in 
1989, 31 members sat on 153 Boards, of which 146 were private and 7 
State.ll A result of this is an extensive, web-like network of 
interconnecting directorships extending to nearly every sector of the New 
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Zealand economy. This network, coupled with the NZBRT companies 
market dominance ensures that the organisation will have a profound 
effect on both the private and public sectors in New Zealand.12 
To fully explore this network is beyond the scope of this chapter, however 
three brief illustrations provide an insight to its pervasive nature. Turning 
first to the NZBRT's immediate membership; table 4.3 (below) shows that 
in 1989 two or more NZBRT members sat on thirteen company and SOE 
Boards. Moreover, a number of these individuals sat on more than one of 
these Boards. 
Table 4.3 
NZBRT members sitting on the same Board of Directors (1989) 
Private Sector Company 
Air New Zealand 
Baycorp Holdings 
Consolidated Electronics 
Ceramco Corporation 
European Pacific Investments S.A 
Freightways Ltd 
Lion Nathan Ltd 
Magnum Corporation Ltd 
Printpac Ltd 
Tappenden Holdings 
SOE Board. 
Electricorp 
Telecom 
Reserve Bank 
NZBRT member 
R.Matthew, T.Farmer, R.Trotter 
T.Farmer, C.Bidwell 
A.Gibbs, C.Bidwell 
A.Gibbs, C.Bidwell 
L.Pyne, D.Richwhite 
T. Farmer, A.Gibbs 
D.Myers, A.Gibbs 
A.Fergusson, B.Hancox, }.Keegan, R.Matthew 
R.Carter, B.Hancox 
T. Farmer, A.Gibbs 
R.Deane, T.Farmer, R.Trotter 
P.Troughton, T.Farmer, R.Trotter 
L.Fergusson, R.Trotter (resigned 1989) 
Source: New Zealand Company Register Vol 28: 1989-1990. 
Second, the NZBRT's influence extends beyond its immediate 
membership. Most member companies have representatives on a large 
number of private sector and State Corporation Boards. Consequently, a 
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substantial part of the economy is linked to the NZBRT in some way. 
Table 4.4 (below) partially illustrates this, showing the network of private 
and State sector Boards linked together by representatives from just one 
NZBRT company. 
Table 4.4 
Representatives from Fletcher Challenge sitting on private and State Corporation 
Boards (1989) 
FCL Representative 
Sir Ron Trotter (NZBRT member) 
Carl Ryan 
Hugh Fletcher 
William Wilson 
David Sadler 
Barry Downey 
George Pearce 
Company/State Corporation Board 
Telecom, Reserve Bank 
Airways Corporation 
Air New Zealand 
Equiticorp 
Electricorp, Trustbank 
Maori Development Board 
Lion Corporation 
Source: New Zealand Company Register Vol28: 1989-1990. 
Finally, NZBRT members are also united through the ownership of the 
same company stock. For example, in 1990, sixty one publicly listed 
companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange were owned by two or 
more NZBRT companies.13 Indeed, a number of NZBRT companies have 
major stock interests in each other. Table 4.5 (below) illustrates this, 
showing the amount of shared stock held between just four NZBRT 
companies and its members. 
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Table 4.5 
Company Stock shared by NZBRT members (1990) 
Other NZBRT No. Of %of 
NZBRT company with ordinary ownership 
Compan)': major interests shares in compan)': 
Ceramco 
AMP 12,041,760 12.5 
ANZ 6,712,390 6.98 
Bidwell C (indiv. holding) 2,179,989 2.27 
BNZ 7,097,019 7.38 
Gibbs A (indiv. holding) 978,369 1.02 
National Bank 330,000 0.34 
Nat. Mutual Life 1,246,998 1.30 
N.Z Insurance 1,255,000 1.08 
Shell N.Z 200,000 0.21 
Westpac 5,241,302 5.44 
Goodman 
Fielder AMP 86,638,312 9.38 
Wattie ANZ 19,180,771 1.85 
Nat. Mutual Life 49,271,132 4.77 
Fletcher 
Challenge AMP 63,084,872 6.76 
ANZ 32,824,649 5.72 
BNZ 25,981,859 2.78 
Nat. Mutual Life 60,474,034 6.46 
NZI 6,079,759 0.65 
Westpac 12,116,525 1.29 
Lion Nathan 
ANZ 9,551,176 2.42 
BNZ 6,454,100 1.64 
N.Z Insurance 771,500 0.20 
Shell N.Z 500,300 0.13 
West12ac 1,772,042 0.45 
Source: Directory: of Shareholders: New Zealand Public Com12anies ,1990. 
The model's third and final definitional characteristic states that the 
elite's members see eye to eye on pecuniary matters; there is little internal 
dissension as the fundamental goal of the elite is to maximise profits. The 
model also suggests that if conflict does occur between members, it will be 
kept out of the public eye. These characteristics are evident within the 
NZBRT. First, all members share the same pecuniary objective which, as 
the organisation's statement of purpose indicates, is to ensure "a healthy 
and dynamic business sector, generating an adequate flow of profits and 
investment. "14 Second, while disagreements within the NZBRT are 
known to have taken place, most members are not usually prepared to 
discuss them outside of the organisation.15 For instance, Don Rowlands, 
the Fisher and Paykel Group Chief Executive stated that his resignation in 
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August 1987 was due to "other commitments"; however it was widely 
known that he did not agree with the NZBRT's position on import 
controls.16 Moreover, when Bruce Cole, the Chief Executive of L.D 
Nathan Ltd and John Eade of Winstone Ltd. left the Roundtable, both 
refused to comment on the reasons for their departure.17 Those who do 
comment on their resignation are often vague in their explanations; when 
Michael Robson, the Managing Director of the Independent Newspapers 
Ltd. (INL) was asked if he agreed with statements made by the NZBRT, he 
stated that "some things I agreed with. Some things I disagreed with"; 
while Peter Stanes of Feltex merely stated that the NZBRT's perspectives 
were "not terribly relevant to Feltex."18 
The NZBRT can therefore be seen to closely mirror the definitional 
characteristics of the economic elite as outlined by the model; and thus, it 
is accurate to assume that the organisation represents the New Zealand 
business community's "economic elite." Moreover, through its market 
dominance, interlocking directorates and commonalty of interests, the 
Roundtable extends its influence well beyond its immediate membership 
and thereby acts as a representative of a much wider section of the business 
community. 
The Use Of Direct Access-Points By The NZBRT 
The above examples also make it clear that, due to the economic weight it 
holds, the NZBRT has considerable potential to influence the decision-
making process. As Venables observes, to some the NZBRT is the real 
power behind the political throne: "It is clear that the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable represents a major force in New Zealand's economic 
and political life ... the Government has to take the Roundtable seriously, 
whether or not it agrees with its ideas."19 
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Speculation, however, is not sufficient to conclude that the NZBRT used 
its considerable economic weight to influence Douglas' thinking regarding 
the privatisation programme. The economic elite model also identifies a 
number of direct channels, or access- points, through which the economic 
elite can exert its economic muscle and thereby influence the decision-
making process. In the following section these access-points will, in the 
context of the privatisation programme, be applied to the NZBRT's 
relationship with Douglas. 
First, the model posits that the economic elite can directly influence the 
decision-making process through the initial selection of party candidates : 
only those who comply with the priorities of the economic leadership will 
be elected into the party. However, with regard to the NZBRT, no evidence 
supports such an assertion. Most significantly, it is argued here that the 
model's observation is more suited to the "open" candidate selection 
system that is used, for instance, in the United States. Here, party 
candidates are selected to represent political parties by the general 
population who vote for the most preferred candidate. The potential for 
groups, particularly those representing corporate interests, to be able to 
manipulate the voting patterns here is argued to be high.20 In New 
Zealand, however, a "closed" selection system exists. Here candidates are 
chosen by a small committee consisting of members from the Party 
hierarchy and local electorate. This study argues that such a system makes 
it considerably harder for interest groups such as the NZBRT to influence 
candidate selection. For instance, and with reference to the New Zealand 
Labour Party, access onto the Selection Committee by members of the 
public is limited. These committees are composed of three separate 
interests; those appointed by and on behalf of the New Zealand Labour 
Party Council; representatives from the electorate concerned; and, while 
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not formally represented, a Trade Union affiliate who is usually 
represented by a member from the Labour Party Council. As clause 246 of 
the Labour Party Constitution states: 
Only financial members resident in the electorate who have branch or 
affiliated membership in the New Zealand Labour Party in the electorate of 
not less than one year's standing ... shall be eligible for election to the Selection 
Committee to represent the electorate.21 
Furthermore, in order for a candidate to be successfully elected, all three 
representative interests on the committee would need to be individually 
influenced by the particular interest group. In the context of this study, the 
likelihood of the economic elite successfully achieving this would be 
slight; both the Party and its union affiliates have actively criticised much 
of the reform programme implemented by the Labour Government. Thus, 
it would be relatively difficult for a candidate who actively supported "big 
business" to be ~elected. 
The second direct access-point identified by the model is through the elite 
influencing appointments to governmental posts. Again, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the NZBRT exerted any influence in order to secure the 
appointments of these posts; indeed, two observations suggest that there 
was no need. First, Douglas firmly believed that individual ability and 
competence should be the primary criterion for selection to these posts. As 
he stated to the Mount Pelerin Society: "Policy starts with people. It 
emerges from the quality of their observation, knowledge, analysis, 
imagination, and ability to think laterally to develop a wider range of 
options."22 Consequently, there was a certain inevitability that a number of 
NZBRT members would be appointed to key government posts; they are 
some of the most experienced businesspeople in control of New 
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Zealand's largest companies. Kerr concurs with such a view when he 
stated that the "talent pool" in the New Zealand business community is 
limited. Thus, "pretty obvious tracks are laid to certain NZBRT members ... 
they have been appointed because they did have considerable commercial 
experience." 23 
Second, Douglas made a point of appointing only those individuals to 
government posts who supported the reforms being implemented by the 
Labour Government. Again, to the Mount Pelerin society he stated that 
the success of the Government's reforms in the public sector, "depended 
on people as much as policy. Replacing people who cannot or will not 
adapt to the new environment is pivotally important."24 Although from a 
different perspective, Piper concurs with such a view: "We have never 
seen a formula regarding appointments ... but the Government was looking 
for the kind of people who could introduce accrual accounting, 
performance measures and do things like sacking 5000 people."25 As the 
following discussion will identify, many NZBRT members had been 
openly supportive of Douglas' policies. Thus, it was also inevitable that 
some would be appointed to key government posts. 
The model identifies a third channel through which the economic elite 
can influence the decision-making process: from the government posts its 
members have been appointed to. A number of NZBRT members were 
appointed to three different types of government posts from which they 
might have influenced Douglas' thinking on privatisation. 
For instance, some NZBRT members were appointed to chair a number of 
Special Task Forces. The potential here to influence key decision-makers is 
obvious; a form of "bounded rationality" can take place in which the 
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information and recommendations contained in the Task Force's report 
will only reflect the elite's interests. However, it is argued here that those 
Task Forces containing NZBRT members could not have influenced 
Douglas' thinking on privatisation. For example, while the Committee 
chaired by Alan Gibbs reviewing the public health system advocated a 
"two tier" privatisation policy, it was not released until April 1988 - four 
months after the decision to privatise was publicly announced.26 Similarly, 
the SOE Steering Committee chaired by Sir Ron Trotter which was created 
to "complement officials' advice as well as act as a forum for the sounding 
of ideas -and policy" first met in February 1988 - two months after the 
December 17 Statement.27 
NZBRT members were also appointed to run individual SOEs as Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or given directorships on their Boards. With 
regard to the position of CEO, two NZBRT members are CEOs; Dr. Rod 
Deane (Electricorp) and Dr. Peter Troughton (Telecom). As previously 
mentioned, the appointment of NZBRT members to the SOE Boards has 
been far more numerous. Table 4.6 (below) illustrates that between 1987-
1989 13 NZBRT members have collectively held 15 directorships on 8 
different SOE Boards. 
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Table 4.6 
NZBRT members on the SOE Boards (1987-1989) 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
NZBRT member 
A. McConnell 
P.Skinner 
D.Chalmers 
Sir R.Trotter 
J.Todd 
D.Rowlands 
A. Hutton 
R.Kerr 
Sir R.Trotter 
T. Farmer 
P. Troughton 
A.Gibbs 
R.Kerr 
R.Deane (CEO) 
A.Gibbs 
P.Troughton 
A.Fergusson 
T.Farmer 
R.Kerr 
Sir R.Trotter 
R.Deane 
The NZBRT's Relationship with Douglas 
SOE Board 
Railways Corp 
Development Finance Corp. 
Post Office Bank. 
Lands Corp (Chairman) 
Reserve Bank 
Reserve Bank 
Eco.Dev. Commission 
Electricorp 
Electricorp 
Reserve Bank (Chairman) 
Telecom (chairman) 
Telecom 
Telecom (CEO) 
Forestry Corp 
Electricorp 
Electricorp 
Forestry Corp (Chairman) 
Telecom (CEO) 
Reserve Bank 
Telecom 
Electricorp 
Telecom (Chairman) 
Electricorp (CEO) 
Source: New Zealand Government Directory, Wellington: Government Printer, 1987,1988, 1989. 
Jesson states that these positions have ensured the organisation has had 
"direct access to political power", and as such possess the potential to 
influence Douglas' thinking from these positions.28 In a limited sense, this 
assertion is correct; securing these positions has increased the NZBRT's 
already extensive network and provided it with another platform from 
which to lobby. However, there is no conclusive evidence to prove that 
the NZBRT used these positions to lobby Douglas over privatisation. More 
significantly, two observations suggest that even if they had, the 
organisation would have had little influence. 
First, and as the previous chapter discussed, Douglas was determined to 
make the SOE's as efficient and accountable as possible. Accordingly, it is 
argued here that he was instinctively propelled towards privatisation 
because it facilitated those very objectives. Thus, any advice from the SOE 
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Boards regarding the merits of privatisation would have acted merely as a 
"confirming" rather than "influencing" factor. 
The State - Owned Enterprises Act was also propelling the SOEs toward 
privatisation. The Act, observes Jesson, "marked a commitment to 
commercialisation which .. .involves using private enterprise as the model 
around which to organise economic relations. "29 Douglas, it will be 
recalled, is known to have accepted Treasury's view that private 
ownership is inherently more efficient than public. The Act's 
"commitment to commercialism" therefore would have been limited 
while the SOEs were still owned by the State. Thus, and as Beattie argues: 
"It was a short step from making the SOEs operate along private sector 
lines and actually selling them off ... The directors would only have been 
stating the obvious [and therefore] their influence over Douglas would 
have minimal."30 
The fourth direct channel identified by the model, by which the economic 
elite can influence the decision-making process is that of extensive 
lobbying. A number of lobbying platforms exist through which this can 
take place; these include the organisation's use of the media, speeches, 
submissions and personal contacts However, and as the following section 
will reveal, the NZBRT cannot be found to have significantly used any of 
these channels to influence Douglas' thinking on privatisation. 
First, the news media can be used as a platform from which to lobby. 
However, and as table 4.7 (below) illustrates it is not a medium extensively 
used by the NZBRT. For instance, scanning five of the country's leading 
newspapers for any NZBRT related article between 1986-1990 indicates 
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that while the total number of articles has grown annually, the overall 
total is still relatively low.31 
Table 4.7 
Number of NZBRT related articles in the major newspapers (1984 - 1987) 
N.Z Nat. Business The The Aid 
Ye~r Herald Review Press Dominion Star 
1985 1 1 2 3 1 
1986 10 2 6 6 3 
128Z 16 14 9 12 6 
Source: News12a12er file libraries. 32 
Of the total number of newspaper articles identified, less than 5 percent 
had any relevance to the NZBRT's views on privatisation. From this, it 
can be concluded that this medium is unlikely to have significantly 
influenced Douglas' thinking. 
The use of speeches is another means by which the elite can lobby for 
change; however, they also were not used as a platform by the NZBRT to 
influence Douglas' thinking on privatisation. The NZBRT publication 
Labour Markets and Employment "contains most NZBRT speeches"33 during 
the January 1986- December 1987 period, however none specifically discuss 
the restructuring of the SOEs or privatisation.34 
The use of speeches by the NZBRT, while not discussing privatisation per 
~ did however serve a purpose; they provided a platform from which the 
organisation could express its support for the free market orthodoxy 
which, of course, was consistent with such a policy. In particular, the 
theme for improved economic performance is evident in most NZBRT 
speeches. For instance, Sir Ron Trotter stated to the Young Nationals' 
Conference that: 
Page 122 
The NZBRT's Relationship with Douglas 
The present period calls for far-sighted leadership ... Many policy weaknesses 
and threats to an improved performance still remain [such as] the labour 
market, the public sector and the existence of a number of economic activities 
that are still sheltered from competitive pressures.35 
Accordingly, it could be argued that NZBRT speeches, while not 
specifically referring to privatisation per se, did act as a "feedback" or 
echoing mechanism for Douglas; they clearly signalled to him that the 
NZBRT supported the reforms the Labour Government was making in 
the public sector and that more could be done - such as privatising the 
SOEs. 
The use of submissions and general studies is the most extensively used 
medium the NZBRT employed to generally influence the decision-
making process; between April 1986 and December 1987, eleven major 
submissions and studies were published covering diverse topics such as 
indirect taxation, Town and Country Planning and the New Zealand Ports 
Industry. Prior to December 1987 however, the NZBRT did not produce a 
study or submission that specifically focused on privatisation. While this 
is evident, a number did, in passing, mirror Douglas' own views for the 
need to privatise by discussing the merits that such a programme would 
have - both in reducing the level of public debt as well as increasing 
economic efficiency. 
For instance, the "efficiency argument" is clearly seen in the NZBRT 
submission entitled The New Zealand Ports Industry. Here, the organisation 
argued that "public and employee shareholding" should be introduced 
into port corporations to supplement or replace the "weak monitoring 
mechanisms inherent in public ownership."36 Moreover, it went on to 
add: 
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There are inherent limitations to the achievement of private sector levels of 
efficiency in 100 percent publicly owned enterprises. For this reason the 
attention of many governments ... has switched to programmes of introducing 
minority or majority private shareholding into their trading enterprises.37 
In a second submission,Corporatisation of the Harbour Boards , the NZBRT 
was more forthright. It stressed the limitations of the Government's plan 
to corporatise the port companies, concluding that it should give further 
consideration to allowing direct private participation in the ownership in 
these companies: 
Continued public ownership of the port companies ... as proposed by the 
Government, will raise problems in the monitoring of port companies 
performance ... These problems are inherent in any form of public ownership. 
Without free transferability of port company shares, significant monitoring 
incentives provided by the opportunity for takeover are also absent. 38 
The submission concluded that in view of these monitoring problems and 
possible conflict of interest, "[t]he clear logic of corporatisation is ... the 
introduction of majority and, ideally, full private shareholding."39 
The "efficiency argument" however is most clearly seen in Better Value for 
Public Money; a response to the Government's 1987 Budget.40 In general 
terms, the report argues for a reduction in expenditure, revenue and 
borrowing in order to reduce the proportion of total economic resources 
being managed in the public sector. The submission goes on to outline a 
number of ways in which government expenditure programmes can be 
detrimental to efficiency, equity and economic growth. For instance, it 
argues that: 
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- government operations are often conducted inefficiently and displace more 
efficient private production; 
- regulatory activities impose burdens and costs on the economic system and 
transfer income in hidden ways; 
- the resulting poor economic performance minimises the opportunities from 
improving the position of less fortunate groups. 41 
Conversely, the submission posits that a "growing body of empirical 
evidence more clearly established the superiority of private sector 
involvement in [the public sector]."42 In concluding, it suggests that the 
Government: 
.. .look more deeply at the range of functions which the Government is 
undertaking and to review the need for retaining many of them in the public 
sector. In advancing a programme of economic reform, it is important that the 
public sector carries its due share of the adjustment that still has to be 
undertaken. 43 
Better Value for public money also mirrored Douglas' view that 
privatisation would significantly help to reduce the level of public debt. 
Among other things, it argued that New Zealand was "one of the world's 
largest debtor nations per head of population" warning that the 
continuation of such trends would "lead ultimately to the national 
equivalent of bankruptcy."44 Moreover, debt reduction through increasing 
the level of taxation, it argued, would have detrimental effects on 
efficiency, equity and economic growth. Thus, the submission concluded 
by stating that a good argument existed for reducing the national debt 
through "asset sales accompanied by a reduction in accumulated 
liabilities." 45 
The influence that the NZBRT submissions and publications had over 
Douglas must, however, be put in context. While the NZBRT clearly 
Page 125 
The NZBRT's Relationship with Douglas 
advocated a privatisation programme through this medium, it was not 
focused on by the NZBRT as an issue that warranted an individual study. 
Indeed, the submission that contains the most in-depth analysis of 
privatisation, State Owned Enterprise Policy: Issues of Ownership and 
Regulation, and concludes by stating that "privatisation is the next logical 
step after corporatisation", was released in April 1988 - four months after 
the December 17 1987 announcement.46 Moreover, as the NZBRT's 
justifications for privatisation clearly mirror the views Douglas already 
held, it is argued here that they would have contributed little to the 
development of his thinking on privatisation. 
The NZBRT's submissions also played a similar role to that of the 
organisation's speeches; they "echoed" Douglas, indicating that the 
business sector supported the overall thrust of Rogernomics and that 
further reforms such as privatisation would be welcomed. A good 
illustration to this assertion can be seen in the response Douglas gave to 
Better Value for Public Money. He noted that the submission: 
... broadly supports the kind of tough decisions this Government has made ... The 
Government acknowledges that the process is not complete ... We remain 
committed to further reductions in the fiscal deficit, through the application of 
consistent, mutually reinforcing and predictable policies. 47 
Another channel through which the NZBRT had the potential to 
influence Douglas' thinking was via the personal associations that some of 
the members had with him. For example, Alan Gibbs is a close friend of 
Douglas whom he met at the Princess Street branch of the Labour Party.48 
As the discussion has already identified, Gibbs has been a key figure in the 
events between 1984- 1987, becoming the Government appointed head of 
the Forestry Corporation and heading the Hospital Task Force. Moreover, 
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it will be recalled that he is a firm advocate of privatisation. Roger Kerr, 
the NZBRT's Executive Director, is also a friend of Douglas and is said to 
have had "easy access" into the Beehive during the period Douglas was 
Minister of Finance.49 Kerr was a member of the "Kitchen Cabinet"; an 
unofficial circle of advisers who, according to Jesson, "wielded more 
influence than many in the regular Cabinet. "50 
It can be assumed that the personal contacts NZBRT members had with 
Douglas prior to December 1987 could have contributed to his thinking on 
privatisation. This is particularly so given that the development of 
Douglas' thinking is attributed to "his ability to pick up ideas from articles, 
casual conversations and his own observations and then to test them on 
his confidants. "51 However, it is methodologically difficult to quantify 
exactly how much influence these informal contacts had over Douglas. 
Further methodological problems arise when attempting to quantify the 
influence that NZBRT members had in the variety of different roles they 
played; were these individuals representing the NZBRT per se in the 
variety of official and informal roles they played? Moreover, if these 
individuals did influence Douglas in any way, was it because they were 
members of the NZBRT or simply due to their own powers of persuasion? 
Such amorphic questions are difficult to resolve. Three examples are 
illustrative. First, while the Special Task Force that produced the report 
Unshackling the Hospitals was chaired by an influential NZBRT member 
and did reflect many of the organisation's views, he was not representing 
it in any formal way. Thus, can it be said that the NZBRT was being 
represented in this instance? Indeed, Kerr notes that the NZBRT "did not 
have any involvement with the formation of the report or have any input 
whatsoever on the general debate on health reform. "52 A similar 
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argument can be advanced for the NZBRT members who sat on the SOE 
Boards. Kerr asserts again that a Roundtable member sitting on an SOE 
Board "is just not relevant" to the policies discussed in the organisation.53 
Finally, while the NZBRT per se has received relatively little media 
coverage, a number of its members have been more widely reported. 
However, they are not individually identified as members of the NZBRT, 
but rather as leaders in the "business community." Thus, when Alan 
Gibbs' personal views advocating privatisation were quoted in an article 
titled: "Business Leaders Favour Bigger State Cuts", was he representing 
the NZBRT or himself? 
The final direct channel identified by the model through which the elite 
can influence the decision-making process is through the decentralised 
structure of government. As chapter three discussed (with reference to the 
Treasury) government decision-making is primarily a decentralised 
process; the majority of substantive work on policy proposals occurs in 
specialised administrative agencies. Thus, the model argues, the economic 
elite can impact on the decision-making process by influencing these 
agencies. 
This aspect of the model has no real application to the relationship 
between the NZBRT and the Treasury. An analysis of the Treasury's 
expenditure on consultancy contracts relating to the asset sales programme 
shows that while eleven separate SOE studies were commissioned by the 
end of 1987, none involved individual NZBRT members or companies. 
More importantly, the NZBRT had no real need to "influence" Treasury's 
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thinking on privatisation. As the discussion here and in chapter three has 
shown, between 1984 and 1987, both organisations were espousing the 
same debt and efficiency arguments that justified the need for such a 
programme. Such was the consistency in outlook between both 
organisations, that the NZBRT has been called the "public relations branch 
of the Treasury."54 The similarity in outlook is also well illustrated by the 
comments that some NZBRT members have made. For instance, one 
complained that "half of what we've been producing lately, I can't 
understand myself. It's speaking Treasury language. "55 Another stated that 
he disliked the "Treasury-type presentation of policy ideas" as it took him 
"a long time to understand the gobbledegook."56 
This consistency in thinking between the NZBRT and Treasury reflects the 
close personal links that exists between the two organisations. The primary 
link is through Roger Kerr who, in 1986, left his position as Assistant 
Secretary at the Treasury to become Executive Director of the NZBRT. 
Kerr's departure from the Treasury was seen as the Department's most 
significant defection to the private sector. He had been responsible for key 
economic policy and headed the Economics II team that wrote Economic 
Management in 1984. It will be recalled that Economic Management gathered 
together the various conceptual strands of the supply-side consensus that 
was emerging from the business community; it stressed a "hands off" style 
of economic management suggesting that Trading enterprises in the public 
sector be organised as SOEs, and that further efficiency gains could be made 
if these enterprises were privatised.57 
It is clear from the above discussion that the NZBRT exerted little, if any, 
direct influence over Douglas regarding the privatisation programme. This 
is so, even though the Department_ had numerous access-points to 
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advocate for its implementation. Such an observation clearly contradicts 
the model's assertion that the economic elite uses direct means to influence 
the decision-making process. As such, the relevance this part of the model 
has to this study is questionable. 
The model concludes by asserting that the "close relationship" between 
business and government yields a number of results; the most significant 
being that the Government's decisions will benefit and further the priorities of the 
economic elite. While the means have been shown to differ between the 
model and the facts surrounding this study, the ends, however, are the 
same; the privatisation programme brought considerable economic benefit 
to the elite in a number of ways. Such an assertion can be illustrated in 
three ways. 
First, and most significantly, the privatisation programme has enabled five 
NZBRT companies to increase their market dominance in the economy. 
As Table 4.8 (below) shows, Brierley's now has a major shareholding in an 
airline that, in 1989, was the country's largest offshore revenue earner 
($200 million);58 Fletcher Challenge extended its already dominant 
portfolio base by acquiring the Rural Bank and New Zealand's foremost oil 
and gas explorer, producer, distributor and processor;59 both Fay, 
Richwhite & Co. and Freightways own 5 percent of the largest player in the 
country's telecommunications market; and the ANZ now owns a Retail 
Bank that, in 1990, commanded a 7 percent share of the retail bank 
market.60 
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Table 4.8 
Strategic strength of NZBRT acquisitions (1989) 
Business NZBRT Net Assets No. of 
owner 12rofits($m} ($} em12. 
Air New Zealand B.I.L (45%) 81.9 1.27 billion 8,621 
Rural Bank F.C.L (100%) 173.0 21.8 million 420 
Post Bank ANZ(lOO%) 31.1 5.27 million 3,150 
Petrocorp FCL(lOO%) 188.4 N/A 724 
Telecom Fay/R'white (5%) 
Freightways (5%) 198.0 4.2 billion 19,000 
Source: Annual Com12any Re12orts. 1989-1990. 
Second, the NZBRT companies - and in particular, Fletcher Challenge -
purchased some of these assets for a price well below their bookvalue. For 
example, the Rural Bank had its sale price depressed for two reasons. First, 
the desired competitive bidding process that the Government hoped 
would push the Bank's price up did not occur as only one credible bid was 
received. Thus the process was turned into a negotiated sale. Second, the 
Bank was not accurately valued prior to the sale.61 Fletcher Challenge paid 
$550 million for the Bank based on a projected forecast that posted a 
trading profit of $32 million for the 1989/1990 financial year. However, the 
Rural Bank's real after tax profit in that year turned out to be $115 million 
- three and a half times the forecast of $32 million. Accordingly, the Rural 
Bank was sold for approximately· $200 million less than if it had been 
properly valued.62 Fletcher Challenge also made significant financial 
savings when it purchased Petrocorp. The ammonia-urea plant had 
sustained considerable losses resulting in substantial on-going debts; 
accordingly, prior to the sale, the Government passed special legislation 
allowing the would-be owners to deduct $1 billion from their tax bi1J.63 
Finally, a number of private sector advisers have received substantial 
consultancy fees and commissions from their assistance to the 
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Government in the asset sales programme. The Treasury's expenditure on 
fees paid to these advisers illustrates this; from December 1987 through 
until June 1990 the Department spent $77 million on seventeen SOE 
related projects.64 As table 4.9 (below) illustrates, two NZBRT members 
received a substantial part of this total sum. 
Table 4.9 
NZBRT consultancy fees (December 1987 - June 1989) 
(figures in $000) 
NZBRT member Project 1988/9 1989/90 Total 
Fay, Richwhite THC 220,000 581,000 808,317 
Govt Print 156,750 434,881 591,637 
TVNZ 0 156,000 156,000 
Forestry Corp Forestry 0 24,362,071 24,362,071 
Source: The Treasury ,Wellington. 
The Nature of Douglas' Relationship with the NZBRT 
Having applied the economic elite model to this study, it is clear that an 
inconsistency between the two exists. The model posits that the benefits 
enjoyed by the economic elite are a result of it using direct means to 
influence the decision-making process. However, the discussion in this 
chapter has clearly shown that the NZBRT enjoyed the same benefits from 
little or no direct influence. How can such an inconsistency be explained? 
An answer lies in defining what exactly is meant by the "close 
relationship" shared between the economic elite and the Government. If, 
as the model posits, this relationship consists of continuous and direct 
contact between both groups, then its relevance to this study is clearly 
limited. However, the interaction between the two can be viewed another 
way. Lindblom, it will be recalled, posited that the economic elite does not 
need extensive contact with key decision-makers. The relationship that exists 
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between the two groups can be symbiotic; government officials cannot be 
indifferent to business performance because a failure in the market system 
can easily spell its downfall. Furthermore, he argues, because the business 
elite must be induced rather than commanded to perform by the 
Government, the relationship is one of "mutual adjustment" that 
operates largely through an unspoken deference between both groups. 
Thus, the business community needs little direct contact with the 
Government because its interests and wishes will be automatically 
considered. Lamare concurs with Lindblom's observation by stating that 
corporate control over the economy "can become an important 
consideration in policy-making without the direct intervention by 
business, singularly or in unison, into political affairs."65 It is argued here 
that such a relationship existed between Douglas and the NZBRT, and 
accordingly, there was little need for any significant contact between the 
two. Three observations illustrate this. 
Douglas' Predisposition toward Private Sector Interests 
First, Douglas was predisposed to considering private sector interests. As 
previously mentioned, since 1984, the Government had been 
implementing policies that shifted much of the decision-making from the 
State to the market. Douglas recognised that the most lasting economic 
growth in this new "more market" environment would only take place if 
those making the investment decisions in the market had confidence in 
the type of strategies the Government was implementing.66 Thus, the 
Minister was predisposed to considering private sector interests and how 
they reacted to Government policy. The implementation of the 
privatisation programme can largely be viewed in this context. The 
Treasury advised Douglas that the continued high level of public debt 
would result in a loss of confidence from the finance market. This 
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uncertainty would, it was argued, undermine the gains that had already 
been made; high interest and exchange rates would result in discouraging 
capital investment and, through the impact of the exchange rate, place 
undue pressures on local industries facing international pressure.67 In 
short, the health of the overall economy was seen to predominantly rest 
on the confidence held by the private sector. Accordingly, Douglas believed 
that in order to maintain this confidence, he would need to significantly 
reduce the level of public debt. Privatisation, of course, provided the 
means to do this. 
Favourable Disposition Toward the NZBRT 
Second, the need for direct contact was further reduced because of 
Douglas' favourable disposition toward the NZBRT as an interest group. He 
admired the organisation because it was "prepared to go back to first 
principles and argue from there instead of presenting usual parochial 
points of view."68 Conversely, other interest groups had been "pathetic" in 
their short-sightedness. As he once wrote: 
New Zealand would take a big leap forward if Manfred, the Employers' 
Federation, the Federation of Labour and the Combined State Unions were half 
as good at taking a broad approach which truly served the medium-term 
interests of their members.69 
Douglas' favourable disposition toward the NZBRT largely stems from his 
own association with the private sector; first as Company Secretary for 
Bremworth Carpets in the late 1960s, and later with Red Seal, the family 
health food business which he managed for a number of years.70 It is 
argued here that Douglas' prior experience in the private sector lessened 
the need for extensive NZBRT contact in two ways. First, it contributed to 
his "pro-business" outlook; he admired the businessperson's practicality, 
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individuality and more importantly, could empathise with their concerns. 
The NZBRT did not therefore need the same amount of contact as other 
groups in order to "sell" its point of view. Second, and as already 
mentioned, Douglas' own business background resulted in a number of 
close friendships with influential members of the business community. 
These friendships, no doubt, also ensured that he was constantly informed 
about developments and issues in the business community as a whole, 
further reducing the need for official contact with the NZBRT. 
Consistency in Thinking and Development of Events 
Finally, there was little need for direct contact between Douglas and the 
NZBRT because of the consistency in overall economic thinking they both 
shared. Since 1984, and as the discussion has indentified, the NZBRT has 
consistently and vigorously espoused the supply-side economics of the 
new right; stressing the value of the market and the need to limit the role 
of government in society. Indeed, this is reflected in the organisation's 
statement of intent: 
[The NZBRT] believes the living standards and general prosperity of the New 
Zealand community are best served by a free enterprise system and market-
orientated economy. It supports the concepts of competition, entrepreneurship 
and risk-taking ... [and] a medium term policy framework which is neutral and 
consistent .... 71 
This belief in the freemarket orthodoxy is, of course, consistent with both 
Douglas' own thinking and the economic reforms that the Labour 
Government was implementing throughout the 1984 - 1987 period. With 
regard to privatisation, and as this study has already shown, both Douglas 
and the NZBRT were clearly in favour of such a programme. The NZBRT 
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would therefore have had little difficulty in concluding that Douglas was 
of a like mind. 
Furthermore, Douglas' rhetoric was closely followed by a series of reforms 
in the public sector which suggested that a privatisation policy would 
eventually be implemented. The previous chapters have discussed these 
reforms in some detail, however a brief chronologie survey of these events 
is illustrative here. 
Figure 4.10 
State sector reform - chronology of events leading to the December 17 Statement 
December 12 1985 - Economic Statement 
Douglas announces a set of principles for SOEs that produce goods and services on a commercial 
basis: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
Separation of commercial from non-commercial SOEs. 
Principle objective of the SOEs is to run them as a successful business enterprise. 
Managers giVen responsibility for decisions on the use of inputs, and on pricing and 
marketing their outputs. Managers will also be held accountable to Ministers. 
Unnecessary barriers to competition will be removed so that a commercial criteria 
will provide a fair assessment of managerial performance. 
Boara's of Directors will be established comprising of, generally, members from the 
private sector. 
May 1986 - Statement of Government Expenditure Reform 
Douglas stresses the need for a reduction in the level of government expenditure. Therefore, in 
order to ensure greater public sector efficiency, the five principles outlined in the December 12 
Statement will be applied. 
October 1986 - Partial sale of New Zealand Steel 
87 percent of the Crown's holding in NZ Steel is sold 
January 1987 - Partial sale of the BNZ 
The Government announces it will float 13 percent of its holdings in the BNZ; the largest such 
issue in New Zealand's history thus far. 
April 1987 - State Owned Enterprises Act 
SOE Act comes into effect, establishing nine new State Corporations that will operate along 
private sector lines. 
June 1987 -Budget 
Citing the high level of New Zealand's public debt, Douglas announces that a number of asset 
sales will tal<e place: Development Finance Corporation( 100%); Petrocorp( 100%) and Air New 
Zealand (25%). In doing so, he states the Government recognises "that these are now commercially 
viable businesses for which government ownership serves no special purpose." 
December 17 1987 - Economic Statement. 
The Government announces that it will implement an "on-going" privatisation programme to help 
reduce the level of public debt?2 
Thus, the NZBRT knew that not only did Douglas share its views on 
privatisation but the development of events surrounding the SOE reforms 
suggested- and irrespective of denials the Government was making at the 
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time- that a privatisation programme would eventually be implemented. 
For these two reasons, it is asserted here that the NZBRT had no need to 
lobby Douglas. As Kerr reflects: 
It was pretty obvious that Douglas' well known desire to reduce debt and 
improve efficiency coupled with the implementation of the corporatisation 
policy both pointed to privatisation somewhere down the track. .. If Labour 
didn't do it, then National would.73 
Linking the lack of direct influence to the consistency in thinking can be 
effectively illustrated by showing how vocal the NZBRT was when it 
clearly disagreed with Government policy. For example, the NZBRT stood 
completely opposed to the Government's Labour Relations Act (1987), 
condemning it for what it saw as the Act's perpetration of a form of 
compulsory unionism, and its emphasis on large, centralised structures. In 
particular, it rejected the idea of a 1000 - member starting limit for unions. 
Consequently, the NZBRT considered the act inadequate and stressed that 
further reform was deemed necessary. Stated Douglas Myers, Deputy 
Chairman of the NZBRT: 
The Government's failure to come sufficiently to grips with the challenges of 
labour market reform is one of the biggest disappointments of the last three 
years. It is imperative that real progress is made . ..74 
Accordingly, the NZBRT has extensively lobbied for changes to the Labour 
Relations Act and issues relating to labour market reform. For instance, it 
has presented a number of submissions to the Government arguing for a 
more decentralised labour market. More significantly, the NZBRT has 
sought to target a wider audience by publishing a booklet Freedom in 
Employment: Why New Zealand needs a flexible decentralised labour market. 
which outlines the "benefits" of a decentralised labour market. It also has 
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commissioned a market research firm to produce Industrial Relations in New 
Zealand: A survey of Public attitude which concludes that "New Zealanders 
would like to see a roll-back of union power and influence. They believe 
there should be more free market choice in the labour market and an 
emphasis on enterprise-based initiatives. "75 
A significant number of speeches have also been presented by key NZBRT 
members, criticising the Labour Relation's Act; moreover, those speeches 
have been drawn together in a publication Labour Markets and Employment 
in order to "provide a convenient point of reference for readers interested 
in further background in this important topic."76 Finally, a number of 
media releases have been issued by the NZBRT focusing on labour market 
reform. Indeed, of the five newspapers surveyed for this study between 
1984 -1987, 62 percent of all NZBRT related articles focused on its criticism 
of the Government's handling of labour market reform. 
Conclusion 
How much influence did the NZBRT have over Douglas with regards to 
privatisation, prior to December 1987? The economic elite model provides 
only limited insight. The model does offer a useful framework for 
defining the economic elite as well as identifying an outcome that concurs 
with the findings in this study. However, the most important aspect in 
relation to this study - identifying how the elite influences the decision-
making process- has been difficult to test. 
Two concluding observations can be drawn from this outcome. First, the 
difficulty in operationalising the model could be attributed to a weakness 
in the model's own framework. The discussion here has shown that 
where both the decision-makers and economic elite have been in 
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agreement over a particular issue, the model's criteria has been largely 
redundant in explaining the nature of the relationship. However, the 
model is seen to be far more operational when an antagonistic 
relationship exists between the two groups; the "access-points" are more 
openly used, and thus, any "influence" is easier to identify. It is therefore 
asserted here that the model is most effective in analysing relationships 
where some degree of conflict exists. 
A second concluding observation could be that the characteristics of this 
study rather than the model itself created limitations in an analysis of the 
NZBRT's relationship with Douglas. Some informal contact clearly existed 
between NZBRT members and Douglas prior to, and throughout the 1984-
1987 period. Accordingly, such contacts could have influenced Douglas' 
thinking. However because of their informal nature, it is difficult to 
accurately assess how influential these contacts were. Moreover, due to 
the amorphous nature of the NZBRT, it is methodologically difficult to 
separate the influence between the individual and the organisation. 
Both these conclusions, however, assume that the NZBRT was exerting 
some form of direct contact with Douglas; in other words, through overt 
or covert means it attempted to actively influence the decision-making process . 
Perhaps, and as the discussion in this chapter has suggested, the NZBRT 
simply had no need to influence the decision-making process? Lindblom's 
thesis provides a framework through which such an assumption can be 
assessed. Both the N.ZBRT and Douglas clearly shared similar if not 
identical views, not only with regard to privatisation but also in the way 
the economy should be managed. Moreover, the implementation of the 
corporatisation programme and the partial privatisation of some State-
owned assets were a clear signal to many that privatisation would, 
eventually, be implemented. Accordingly, and as Swier remarks, "the 
Roundtable just had to sit back and wait. "77 
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Conclusions 
To New Zealanders, the Government is a friend. It does things for them which they want 
done.l 
This is a debate about democracy .. .it is a public disgrace that the Government ... has blatantly 
refused to discuss with the community the biggest asset transfer since the Land Wars of last 
century.2 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to make some concluding remarks based upon the 
findings in this study. The elitist assumption will be briefly discussed first, 
examining the fate of New Zealand's supposedly "pluralistic" political 
system after 1984. The discussion then turns to examine the utility of the 
models used to analyse the power held by the Treasury and NZBRT. 
Finally, the study concludes with a number of observations pertaining to 
the analysis of political power. 
The Elitist Assumption - A Pluralistic Political System? 
(The fundamental assumption underlying this study has been that the 
formation of the privatisation programme was elitist in nature) While the 
elite model was not extensively "tested", the broad assertions contained 
within it have clearly been shown to exist in this study. ~s, already 
outlined, the masses were totally r/f_xcluded from the decision-making proce~ 
'I 
prior to the December 17 StatemenO, Indeed, even after the announcement 
-to privatise had been made, the G;vernment continued to~xclude public 
participation by pushing the enabling legislation though the House under 
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urgencyi The privatisation programme also failed to reflect the demands of 
the masses.; public opinion at the time indicated to the Government that a 
substantial percentage of the population opposed any moves to privatise 
the SOEs- yet it chose to ignore these signals. The masses were also largely 
ill-informed about the Government's intentions regarding privatisation; on 
a number of occasions it had categorically denied that such a programme 
would be implemented. Finally, there was a general consensus of opinion 
between those groups that did have some degree of influence in the 
decision-making process. Douglas, the Treasury and NZBRT all espoused 
the same justifications for the need to privatise. Thus, the policy outcome 
can be said to have reflected the interests and values of the ruling elite and not 
the masses. 
The elitist assumption is further supported by the fact that none of the 
criteria contained in the pluralist model are evident in this case study. The 
above findings clearly show that with regard to the privatisation 
programme at least, the political system did not consist of an "intricate 
balance of power amongst overlapping economic, professional, religious, 
ethnic and other such groups.(The masses also did not play a "crucial 
.( 
role" in the decision-making process. Finally, the policy outcome did not 
reflect the "diverse and large range of interests that exist within the 
community." 3 i / 
/ 
In the light of such an outcome, a pertinent question can be asked: how 
pluralistic is the New Zealand political system? While a comprehensive 
answer to such a question is beyond the scope of this study, a number of 
brief observations can be made. 
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Obviously, in the wider sense of the word, the New Zealand political 
system is "pluralistic." There are a considerable array of checks and 
balances to ensure that some degree of political accountability and 
interaction between the elite and masses exist.4 Indeed, legislation passed 
in recent years has sought to increase the degree of public participation in 
the decision-making process. The Official Information Act (1982) for 
example, is aimed at enhancing "the ability of the public to exert some 
influence on policy formation."S The purposes of the Act as set out in 
section 4 are: 
(i) To enable their more effective participation in the making and 
administering of laws and policies: and 
(ii) To promote the accountability of Ministers of the Crown and officials, - and 
thereby to enhance respect for the law and to promote the good government of 
New Zealand. 6 
No doubt, based on such developments, Palmer has felt able to 
optimistically state that: 
Greater opportunity for public participation in all important decisions on a 
continuing basis will improve the decisions and be more democratic. That has 
been the direction in which New Zealand has been travelling in recent years -
more information about decisions is made available and more public 
participation in those decisions encouraged? 
However, notwithstanding a number of individual initiatives such as the 
Official Information Act, it is argued that the public policy process has 
become increasingly more "elitist" since the fourth Labour Government 
came to power in 1984. There is no question that it brought about 
considerable change. However, this change has not only been in terms of 
substantive government policy; it has also been the process of political 
decision-making itself. As Mulgan observes: 
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... the political system has been moving away from a relatively populist style, 
marked by a high degree of popular participation, corporatist consultation of 
interest groups, and responsiveness of politicians to the demands of the 
electorate. It is becoming a more elitist, technocratic system with greater 
influence being exercised by expert[s] ... and less by other groups and members of 
the public ... B 
The privatisation programme was not the only policy initiative to reflect 
such a trend. The Government can be seen to have arbitrarily broken 
promises made to the public and/ or excluded the public from the decision-
making process on a number of occasions. Three examples are illustrative. 
In the Budget of November 1984, the Government introduced a surtax on 
national superannuation, changing it from a universal entitlement to a 
targeted, means-tested allowance. This was done, however, despite an 
election policy in which the Government promised that "the basic 
National Superannuation structure is to remain."9 Moreover, not long 
after the 1987 election the Government, without consulting the Combined 
State Unions, introduced the far-reaching State Sector Bill in Parliament. It 
then proceeded to rush it through the proceedings in the House despite 
continuing objections from the unions. Such an action clearly 
contravened an election promise stating that the Government would 
initiate "consultation and fair negotiation with its employees and Unions" 
as well as the statement that it was committed to providing a pay-fixing 
mechanism "which is agreed upon after full and proper negotiations with 
State sector unions and which is fair to both parties. "10 Finally, the 
Government can be seen to have broken its promise regarding the 
implementation of a "user-pays" scheme in tertiary institutions. Prior to 
the 1987 election, MPs had publicly assured interested parties that there 
would be no moves toward user-pays in tertiary education. Indeed, these 
verbal promises were confirmed in the election policy which stated that a 
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Labour Government would "ensure that tertiary students are not required 
to pay a higher contribution to their own education than they do at 
present. "11 
In adopting this more elitist style, it seems that the Government's general 
rationale was, as Mulgan puts it, "to govern in the public interest as it saw 
fit. It could not be bound by election promises any more than it could 
become prey to pressure from sectorial interests." 12 Douglas made the 
point more starkly. The most effective policies were those that were 
apolitical. As he once remarked: 
[The three Ministers of Finance] said "let's put together a programme that is 
economically sound regardless of politics." What we found was that the politics 
of such a programme was excellent. We have followed that technique ever 
since ... The only times we have faltered in our support in the polls have been on 
the few occasions we have tempted to be "political."13 
While such an attitude may be admirable in terms of achieving desired 
objectives, it arguably is less so for those who cling to democratic values. 
Certainly, the degree of knowledge about the details of party policy have 
always been incomplete. Indeed, it can also be argued that sectorial 
interests have unduly influenced the decision-making process in the past. 
A Government who listens to its expert advisers rather than interest 
groups will, arguably, make better decisions.14 However, the extent to 
which the Government arbitrarily broke election promises, excluded the 
public from the decision-making process, and showed little compunction 
about having done so, was arguably too extreme. The Government, it 
seems, paid the price for such an attitude, losing the 1990 election in the 
largest landslide this country has seen. There is a certain sense of irony, 
therefore, in Palmer's observation that "[d]espite the confidential nature 
Page 148 
Conclusions 
of the decision-making process, most arguments in favour of a policy need 
to withstand the scrutiny of the public gaze in the end."15 
Palmer's remark coupled with the outcome of the 1990 General Election 
suggests, therefore, that while the decision-making process became 
decidedly elitist in nature after 1984, the fundamental plurality of the New 
Zealand political system has remained intact. In other words, while 
Governments in New Zealand may choose an elitist style of political 
management, they cannot distance themselves too far from the masses 
who ultimately decide their fate in the general election. 
The Utility of the Models and The Difficulties in Analysing the 
Concept of "Power" 
With the elitist assumption established, the study focused on the Treasury 
and NZBRT; two groups that have been identified by political 
commentators as having significantly influenced the decision-making 
process during the Labour Government's two terms in office. It will be 
recalled that the purpose in applying the models was to analyse the 
influence that each group had within the decision-making process of the 
privatisation programme. In other words, the question each sought to 
answer was, "how much political power did these groups have?" 
The Bureaucratic and Bounded Rationality Models 
The bureaucratic and bounded rationality models were both useful in 
identifying the variety of ways in which the Treasury could have 
influenced Douglas' thinking on privatisation. For instance, the 
bureaucratic model identified that the Treasury contained experts in 
economic policy who had a far greater understanding of complex 
economic issues than Douglas. Its officials were also of a similar social and 
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educational background, which meant that they spoke with "one voice" 
and, as such, could be easily identified and associated with by likeminded 
individuals and groups. The Department was also seen to be a pervasive 
influence in the realm of economic policy, dominating the nature and 
content of economic advice that Douglas received. Finally, and in 
conjunction with the bounded rationality model, it was shown that the 
Department also had the ability to control and manipulate the 
information it gave to the Minister. However, while these criteria 
provided a considerable amount of descriptive insight, it is argued here 
that they failed to accurately reflect the Treasury's power in this case study. 
Two observations support this assertion. 
First, the models are argued to have overstated Treasury's power in 
influencing Douglas' thinking on privatisation. This was largely due to 
the successful operationalisation of the models' criteria - resulting in an 
outcome suggesting that the Treasury did "capture" Douglas' thinking. 
Indeed, this conclusion seems to be confirmed, as the arguments used by 
Douglas to justify privatisation mirrored those given to him by the 
Department. However, further analysis suggested that the models 
provided a fundamentally unbalanced picture in that they failed to 
identify that Douglas was influenced by a wider set of important variables 
quite unrelated to his relationship with the Department. These included: 
his own thinking, (which was consistent with the Treasury's, and which 
was largely influenced by events prior to 1984); his principles, (which were 
consistent with the implementation of a privatisation programme); and 
finally, his dominant personality and "hands on" management style 
(which would have lessened the likelihood of any "bureaucratic capture" 
taking place). With this more "balanced" analysis established, it was 
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concluded that Douglas, not the Treasury, controlled the overall decision-
making process with regard to the privatisation programme. 
Second, while Douglas may not have been "captured" by the Treasury, 
there can be little doubt that he was influenced to some degree by the advice 
he received. It will be recalled that this could have been done in a number 
of ways. For instance, a clear development of argument can be seen to 
have developed over time. At first, the Department did not advocate 
privatisation per se. Instead, it stressed the limitations to improved 
economic efficiency that would be gained by merely corporatising the 
SOEs. The transparency of such an argument is apparent because it begged 
the question "what would improve economic performance?" The answer 
of course was provided in the form of a privatisation programme, which 
the Department began to directly advocate toward the end of 1986. The 
Treasury's treatment of the "debt argument" can also be seen to have 
followed a similar developmental process. At first, its advice m~rely 
stressed the "increasing burden on the taxpayer" and the "negative" 
impact it was having on the growth of the economy. However in time it 
began to directly link an assets sales programme with a reduction in the 
level of debt. In both cases then, the Minister was presented with the issues 
and then offered a solution- which was of course privatisation. Treasury's 
advice to Douglas was also devoid of any political considerations; the 
arguments were simply presented as a technical solution to an economic 
problem. The presentation of the issue was served in such a way to isolate 
and simplify what were, in reality, a number of politically volatile issues. 
It also made justifying of the programme's implementation easier; the 
language of economics gave an aura of authority, and it was able to be 
argued as a technical matter rather than one of political belief. Finally, and 
with the aid of the bounded rationality model, the Treasury can be seen to 
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have used a satisficing process; providing information that was consistent 
with the Chicago school of thought only. This meant that the advice 
Douglas received was consistent and as such, continually reinforced itself. 
Furthermore, it also resulted in Douglas receiving a "bounded" view of 
the problem and issues. He consequently had little opportunity to form a 
reasoned opinion based upon any alternative viewpoints. 
However, because Douglas was already predisposed to the idea of 
privatising the SOEs by 1984, it is difficult to establish exactly the degree to 
which he was influenced by this advice. In other words, how much was 
the advice "converting" or simply "re-inforcing" his existing thinking? If 
an antagonistic relationship had initially existed in 1984, with Douglas 
being "converted" to the Department's point of view over time, then 
perhaps a more conclusive picture of its influence might have been 
drawn. 
The Economic Elite Model 
The economic elite model identified a different set of problems associated 
with an analysis of the political power held by groups in society. While the 
model's outcome concurred with the findings in this study - namely, that 
the economic elite benefited from the policy outcome- it provided only a 
partial and inconclusive insight as to how this outcome was reached. As 
explored, the economic elite model's criteria effectively identified the 
NZBRT as the business community's "economic elite", and the access-
points through which it may have influenced Douglas' thinking. 
However, little evidence could be found demonstrating the NZBRT's use 
of these access-points. Even when contact between Douglas and the 
NZBRT was established, significant methodological problems made it 
difficult to ascertain how influential the organisation may have been. For 
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example, it was difficult to separate the NZBRT's influence from that of 
its individual members. Consequently, is it therefore valid to assume that 
the NZBRT had "direct access" into the decision-making process simply 
because some of its members held important government posts? More to 
the point, if these individuals did influence Douglas, was it because they 
were members of the NZBRT, or simply because they had the ability to 
provide a plausible argument? Such amorphic questions were unable to be 
resolved in this study. 
Lindblom's thesis provided more of an insight into the seemingly distant 
and impersonal relationship between Douglas and the NZBRT. It posits 
that the economic elite can possess a significant degree of power without 
directly influencing the decision-making process. This is so, the argument 
asserts, because the Government's own standing is largely based on 
business performance; a failure in the market can easily bring a 
Government down. Thus, the interests and wishes of the business 
community will automatically be considered. Such an indirect 
relationship can be seen to have existed between Douglas and the NZBRT. 
For instance, Douglas' "more-market" environment needed private sector 
confidence in order to stimulate economic growth- privatisation was seen 
as a means to facilitate this; it would send a clear signal to the business 
community that the Government was serious about improving economic 
efficiency and significantly reducing the level of public debt. Moreover, 
the NZBRT had no need for direct contact because Douglas was favourably 
disposed towards the business community, there was a consistency of 
thinking between both groups and policy developments between 1985 and 
December 1987 suggested that privatisation would eventually be 
implemented. 
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While Lindblom's explanation provided more of an insight into the 
Douglas/NZBRT relationship, the amorphic nature of the relationship 
still remains. Consequently, while we may know that the NZBRT is a 
powerful interest group which did have some bearing on Douglas' 
thinking, we still cannot comprehensively explain the process by which 
this power was secured. This suggests therefore that to simply view policy 
effects as a suitable gauge of political power without understanding the 
process by which it is gained, provides only an partial understanding of 
the power that groups have in the political system. As the pluralists 
maintain, power "is best understood as a process, not an effect. Nothing 
much is learned about the dynamics of this process ... by tallying the net 
gains and losses that result from decision-making. "16 
What Has This Study Captured? 
The bureaucratic, bounded rationality and economic elite models have 
largely failed to accurately quantify how much influence the Treasury and 
NZBRT had in the formation of the privatisation programme. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that their utility is limited when attempting to fully 
explain the political power wielded by these organisations in this case 
study. However, while analytical limitations have been shown to exist, the 
process of operationalising the moctels has raised a number of interesting 
observations about the concept of political power. 
First, the findings in this study illustrate the elusive and frustrating task 
that is involved when attempting to systematically study political power. 
As the discussion surrounding the bureaucratic and bounded rationality 
models showed, these difficulties exist even in cases where there is a close 
interpersonal relationship as well as a substantial amount of documented 
evidence. Accordingly, Lamare's remarks seem particularly appropriate: 
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The term political power conveys straightforward images of influence, 
dominance, and control...This apparent simplicity is deceptive, however. It is 
not an easy task to view the intricacies of social relations through the lens of 
political power.l7 
The difficulties associated with effectively operationalising the models also 
served to illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of political power. This 
study has identified two such dimensions; it is not only confined to 
interpersonal relationships, but also operates in an environmental context 
surrounding- if not permeating - any specific set of goals. Such a finding 
suggests that a number of dimensions may need to be identified in order 
to more comprehensively understand the power of an individual or 
group. In the case of this study then, more of a comprehensive analysis 
was given when the question went beyond asking "who governs?" to also 
incorporate "what governs?"18 
Finally, the limitations of these models suggest that the analysis of power 
is made more difficult through the absence of antagonistic relationships. It 
will be recalled from the discussion in chapter one that the notion of 
power implies the dominance of one over another. As Parenti states: 
[P] ower is the ability to get what one wants ... [It] frequently implies the 
ability to outdo those whose interests conflict with one's own. [Thus] we might 
expect some degree of competition, and one person's (or group's) gain frequently 
involves anothers' loss .. .19 
However, this study has clearly established that Douglas, the Treasury and 
NZBRT all independently supported the implementation of a 
privatisation programme. Accordingly, given the absence of any 
fundamental conflict, it is not surprising that the political power of the 
Treasury and NZBRT has been difficult to analyse; there was little need for 
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these groups to muster or utilise what political resources they possessed in 
order to "convert" Douglas' thinking. He was, as one senior official 
commented, "already on board." 20 
To conclude. It is argued here that while the decision-making process for 
the formation of the privatisation programme was decidedly elitist, 
Douglas was not "captured" by any one group within the elite. This does 
not mean that the Treasury or NZBRT were not influential. Each 
organisation has been shown in this study to have impacted upon his 
thinking to some degree. This suggests therefore that power does not 
always operate in conflictual relationships; groups do not always need to 
expend their political resources in order to get what they want. When 
there is a unity of outlook and purpose, as was the case here, power can be 
used to reinforce and facilitate, rather than to dominate. 
Given this observation, it may be more accurate to view the concept of 
power here in a collective, rather than individualistic sense. 
Fundamentally, the real political power lay not with the Treasury or 
NZBRT per se. Rather, it resulted from three of society's most powerful 
institutions - the Government, Bureaucracy and business elite - holding a 
similar ideological outlook, thereby creating a "supply-side economic 
consensus."21 Consequently, the economy was changed with extraordinary 
rapidity as no other group could effectively counter the prevailing 
orthodoxy. If they tried- as the unions did- the Government, Treasury and 
NZBRT simply portrayed them as self-serving, and short-sighted. As 
Jesson observes: 
In the mid-1980s, a unity of purpose developed between politics, business and 
the state bureaucracy, creating a network of interconnections and meeting little 
effective opposition. Conditions of radical change occurred simultaneously in 
the business, bureaucratic and political spheres, resulting in a momentum that 
was temporarily irreversible. 22 
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Accordingly, the conflict, as such, did not occur between the members of 
this elite. Rather, it was between this elite and those less powerful groups 
in society who opposed the free-market ideals that have now become so 
entrenched within New Zealand society. 
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